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The mining of silver, although not as significant as the mining of gold, has a history of 
money being made and lost, as well as instances of fraud and theft.  
 
In the late 1880s, when silver and lead deposits were discovered 100 km south-east of 
Pretoria, the Barnato family was quick to invest and float a company to exploit the 
deposit. To the north of Pretoria, Alois Nellmapius, later famous as the founder of the 
Hatherly distillery, established a company to mine a silver and copper rich deposit. The 
Strubens, pioneers of the Witwatersrand gold fields, discovered a silver rich copper 
deposit on their farm ‘The Willows’ east of Pretoria.  
 
The successful silver mining companies listed on the Stock Exchange in Johannesburg 
soon attracted the attention of the Randlords of Johannesburg and specifically that of H 
Eckstein & Co. The development of the company’s activities in silver mining in the 
1880s and 1890s forms a significant part of this study.  
 
The relationship between the mine owners and their managers during the nineteenth 
century is explored, along with local and international events in politics and economics 
that had an impact on the mining of silver in South Africa over the period from 1885 to 
1999.  
 
Silver mining in South Africa has had a ‘rise and fall’ life from the 1880s with three 
significant periods of investment, mining activity and decline. As with most 
commodities, prices vary over time. The international metals market has been a 
dominant factor in the life of the silver mines of greater Pretoria. The relationship 
between rising and falling international metal prices, and the operating lives of the 
mines, form a theme throughout this dissertation as it will be shown that the operating 
periods all coincided with periods of strong metal prices. In the one hundred and 
fourteen years, coupled with large tonnages of base metals – lead, copper and zinc - the 
mines produced over ninety-three tons of silver.  
 
Over thirty silver mines and ventures were revealed during the research, but discussing 
all of them in this dissertation was not feasible. It is therefore limited to the history of 
the seven mines that produced the greatest amounts of silver and other metals such as 
lead, copper and zinc and how their individual and interrelated histories together form 
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“The silver industry promises to be a very good thing and it will be advisable to 
take influential friends in with us”.1  
  
 
Lionel Phillips Chairman of Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd in a letter to A. Beit in London dated 23 May 
1891 in which he was discussing the development of the Argent mines and clearly expected silver mining 






Perhaps the most personal and poignant quotation for this dissertation 
 
In the Gold Fields ‘Argent Project FSJ de Jager’s reports’ file, de Jager comments on the attachment of 
the 1920s technical advisors and mine manager’s reports of the Transvaal Silver & Base Metal mine to 




“To have summarised these very interesting reports, would have meant detraction 
from their intrinsic worth. They are therefore presented as is, for the serious 
student of the Argent base metal deposits.”     
 
Having met Dr de Jager a few years before he passed away, I take to heart his comment and thank him for 






Because of the interdisciplinary approach of this dissertation - using historical documents, photographs, 
archaeological excavations and analysis of artefacts - to arrive at a history of the silver mining industry of 
the greater Pretoria region, a quotation by a very famous American historical archaeologist discussing the 
value of the written record is most appropriate. 
 
 
“This is not to say that we can learn all there is to know just from studying the 
written record. If this were so, there would be no need to dig into the ground, or to 
sort, measure and classify artefacts.”3 
 
                                                 
1
    Archives of H Eckstein & Co Ltd. Volume HE 149, p. 663, May 23 1891. 
 
2
    File ARG820/1/2 LEA-ZIN de JAGER – Argent Project FSJ de Jager’s Reports 1989, entry 5, ‘A report 
on the structure and possible remaining economic potential of the main vein - enclosure 3, Extracts from 
the monthly reports by the Technical Advisor, Jan1923-Oct 1925’, 20 April 1989. 
 
3




Number      Caption Page 
 
1. Alois Hugo Nellmapius c1889.  32 
2. Plan of underground workings of the Albert Silver mine. 34 
3. Cover of the 1st half-yearly Willows Copper (Argentiferous) Syndicate Ltd report – 1889. 41 
4. JWS Langermann. 42 
5. Harry Struben. 42 
6. Octavius J Skill – mine manager at the Willows mine. 42 
7. Financial part of the 1st half-yearly Willows Copper (Argentiferous) Syndicate Ltd 44  
       Annual General Meeting report.  
8. Mine Manager’s report - Willows Copper (Argentiferous) Syndicate Ltd, 1889. 48 
9. JB Taylor. 54 
10. Hermann Eckstein. 54 
11. Early photograph of Edendale mine labelled ‘Silver mine Nooitgedacht 1892.’ 58 
12. Plan of underground workings of the Edendale Estates Ltd No 1 mine: 1903-1909. 60 
13. General views of the headgear and buildings at Edendale No 1 mine, c1906. 61 
14. Main shaft on Edendale No 1 mine, c1921. 63 
15. Stamp battery and engine at Edendale No 1 mine, c1921. 63 
16. Main shaft headgear and buildings at Edendale No 1 mine, c1921. 63 
17. Plan of underground workings of the No 2 mine of Union Silver & Lead  
        Mines Ltd (Edendale) – c 1921. 65 
18. Cross-section through the main & prospect shafts of Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd c1889. 72 
19. Blake jaw crusher foundation in 2008 75 
20. Blake jaw crusher foundation with concentration plant building in 1902 75 
21. Sketch of vein crossing a lease boundary & so forming a deep level lease. 78 
22. Plan of underground & surface structures of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd – 1890. 79 
23. Historical photograph of the visit of Lord Randolph Churchill to the Transvaal  81 
 Silver mine in 1891.  
24. Andrew Angwin 82 
25. Plan of underground & surface structures of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd – 1892. 86 
26. Barney Barnato. 92 
27. Lionel Phillips. 92 
28. Hennen Jennings. 92 
29. Hermann Eckstein. 92 
30. Alfred Beit. 92 
31. George Farrar.                                                                                                       92 
32. Front cover of file for war claims damages to Transvaal Silver Mine Ltd – 1903. 103 
33. Supporting document in war damages claim, 1903. 105 
34. Damage to Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd – mine manager’s house. 106 
35. Damage to Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd – European miner single quarters. 106 
36. Damage to Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd – mine assay office. 106 
37. Damage to Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd – concentration plant building. 106 
38. Boschpoort Silver Mining Syndicate Ltd share certificate, 1907. 110 
39. Sir George Albu, Chairman of General Mining & Finance Corporation. 115 
40. Share option certificate for the Pretoria Silver & Lead Co Ltd., 1921. 117 
41. Sketch plan showing relationship of the lodes around the TSBM.                                  120 
42. Number 1 shaft at the Transvaal Silver & Base Metals mine, 1921.                              121 
43. General view of the Reduction and crushing plants at TSBM, 1921. 122 
44. Crusher and sorting station at TSBM, 1921. 122 
45. Secondary crushing plant at TSBM, 1921. 122 
46. Concentrating and smelting plants at TSBM, 1921. 122 
47. Sketch of the Shimwell lode from the Goldfields Co files. 127 
48. Plan of underground workings of the Boschpoort Lead Mine Ltd – 1952.                 134 





1. Map showing the principal silver mines of the greater Pretoria region, 1856 - 1999. xvi 
2. Map showing the location of the Argent mines and farms 70 
TABLES 
 
1. Silver mines and operating companies of the greater Pretoria region xvii 
2. Estimation of the amount of lead, silver & associated base metals recovered       24 
 from the 25 main silver mines of the greater Pretoria region.  
3. Mining companies operating at the Edendale mine 56 
GRAPH 
 
1.    Graph showing the values of lead and silver from 1882 to 1999 and the 
periods of mining in South Africa. 22 
 
  
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
Acronyms, which appear in the text and footnotes 
AGM   Annual General Meeting 
ALZ   Argent Lead and Zinc Ltd 
ERPM  East Rand Proprietary Mines Ltd 
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MEASUREMENTS AND CURRENCIES 
Where direct quotations are included in the text and they mention measurements in 
ounces, and or feet, they have not been converted to grams, kilograms or metres or 
appended in brackets in the quote, as it is felt that this detracts from the flow of the 
original quotation. In all other cases within the text the use of the metric units has been 
made. Generally distances are given in metres or kilometres and are indicated by (m or 
km). Mass units are indicated as (g) for grams or (kg) for kilograms. A table is inserted as 
Appendix 8 with a scale of direct conversions for the convenience of the reader.  
 
The currency in general use during most of the mining activities was the Pound Sterling 
(£). The currency has been retained and not converted into Rands, or converted to the 
modern purchasing equivalent. During the period from 1885 to 2011 the value of the 
Pound has changed dramatically. A Pound in 1890 was worth about 60 times more than it 
was in 2011. The variations in the historical value of the Pound compared to the value of 





As the subject matter of the dissertation is the history of a mining industry – silver, it is 
necessary to make use of certain mining terms along with discussing or mentioning 
machinery terms. Rather than continually referencing these terms, either in the body of 
the text or making use of footnote explanations, the terms are consolidated and 
explained in Appendix 1. Some terms are explained in footnotes where a simple 
explanation can be made. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTES 
Extensive use has been made of extracts from the letters of Hermann Eckstein, JB 
Taylor, Lionel Phillips and Alfred Beit in the volumes of letter books of H Eckstein & 
Co Archives. The citation in the footnote puts the page number before the date as the 
reference would be found in the order of volume number – page number – date of letter.  
                                                 
4
   http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency/results1.asp#mid this site enables one to calculate the past 
value of a pound sterling in relation to its value in year 2005. Unfortunately the conversion factors only 
go as far as 2005. 
viii 
 
During the creation of the database it was also found that it was easier to catalogue the 
copies of documents by date order and so by placing the date last it is easier to find a 
particular letter. 
 
In the nineteenth century, businesses adopted a method of retaining carbon copies of 
outgoing letters. A book of 100 pages, where the upper original was perforated along 
the binding side, was produced. By the use of carbon paper, as the writer wrote a letter, 
a copy was made on a bound page. In essence each book or volume then contained the 
letters of a given period of time. The name ‘letter books’ is a shortened version of the 
full name which is ‘letter press copy books.’ Within H Eckstein & Co files are the letter 
books of each partner and they were often marked personal letters or company 
correspondence or specific sub-groups and with the time period. During the weeks spent 






The use of abbreviations has been kept to a minimum. Use of Co for Company and Ltd 
for Limited has been made, but all other abbreviations are either listed on page vii or the 
name is used in full once and then followed with the abbreviation in brackets as 
(hereafter …..). For clarity of the text, no full stops are used between the initials of a 
name of individuals or after the abbreviations Co and Ltd for Company or Limited. The 
one exception is for volume in the footnotes and bibliography which is shown 
abbreviated to (Vol.) with a full stop before the respective number. Reference to one of 
the sources The South African Mining and Engineering Journal in the footnotes and 
bibliography has been shortened by abbreviating South Africa to SA. All other sources 
are presented in full name. 
 
In the text, references are made to various mining company names or mine names that 
do not conform to the list of acronyms above or the names listed in Table 1. When 
referring to a mine, and to make the text flow more easily it was decided to use an 
abbreviated version of the company name or mine name, but in leading capitals. Thus 
                                                 
5
  M Fraser, Inventory of the Archives of H Eckstein & Co 1887-1910.  
ix 
 
the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd becomes Transvaal mine or The Willows Copper 
(Argentiferous) Syndicate Ltd becomes the Willows mine. The assumption is that all 
mines mentioned were producers of silver as well as other metals. The only exception to 
this is if a gold mine is mentioned. This avoids repetition of acronyms and/or the full 
company name many of which do not have the word ‘silver’ or ‘mine’ in them. Only 
when discussing the company is the full name used. 
 
EARLY NEWSPAPERS IN JOHANNESBURG 
Many of the sources are from the newspapers of the 1880s and 1890s. A problem arises 
from the name changes that took place. In the 1880s there were two dominant 
newspapers. They were The Standard and Transvaal Mining Chronicle and the Diggers’ 
News and Witwatersrand Advertiser. The latter newspaper was sold to the public as the 
Diggers’ News. In 1890 the two newspapers merged to form the Standard and Diggers’ 
News and Witwatersrand Advertiser. Although some copies were sold with the full name, 
within a short period of time the newspaper changed its selling name again, to the 
Standard and Diggers’ News. In 1891 it became the official mouthpiece of the 
government of the ZAR and official notices in Dutch were gazetted through the 














The subject of this dissertation is the history of silver mining in the greater Pretoria 
region between 1885 and 1999 – refer to the Map 1 on page xvi for a visual guide to the 
geographical area that is termed the ‘greater Pretoria region’. No comprehensive history 
on the subject has ever been written and before in-depth research was begun only a very 
basic background history of one or two of the mines was in the public domain. Some 
sketchy historical material had been included in publications of the Geological Survey 
of South Africa, (now Council of Geoscience).
6
 In 1975 known information about one 
of the mines –Transvaal mine (Argent main mine) – was included in a mineralogical 




The principle aim of the research for the dissertation was to develop as full a history as 
possible of the development of the silver mines, along with the people involved with the 
mines. Questions explored and answered are who developed silver mining in the region 
and why? What was the role played by the Randlords in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries? What was the impact of politics and economics on the mining of 
silver and to what extent was the mining of silver in the region governed by the 
international price of silver and associated metals? The research revealed a significantly 
greater number of silver mines, ventures, prospects and more information than was 
thought to exist. Inclusion of the full results in this dissertation was not possible due to 
space constraints and this is discussed in more detail below. 
 
Historically there has always been a demand for silver, both as a currency and for 
jewellery. There was a market for silver in the manufacture of household items such as 
cutlery, dinner service vessels, coupled with jewellery and the new photographic 
industry of the 1890s, but this was small by comparison to the currency demands. 
Silver, along with gold, had been used as a currency for much of the nineteenth century, 
in Europe and the United States of America. By 1873 England, Germany, Holland and 
                                                 
6
   J Willemse, et al., Lead Deposits in the Union of South Africa and South West Africa with some notes on 
associated ores. See also PH Vermeulen, (ed), The Mineral Resources of the Union of South Africa, 4
th
 
edition.  pp. 171-172. 
 
7
   G Reeks, ‘Field Outing – 23 February 1975’, Micro News and Views, Vol. 1, no 3 (1975), p. 1.  The 
South Africa Micromount Society (SAMS) is a body of mineral specimen collectors who visit 
mineralogical sites and collect very small and often microscopic mineral samples. Micro News and 
Views is the journal of the society.  
xi 
 
America had demonetised silver, with America briefly remonetising silver again in 
1893. The politics that influenced the international silver market, especially in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century and its impact on the world market price of silver is 
discussed. The most detailed and documented history of the Pretoria silver mines 
occurred between 1885 and 1927. Local and international political and economic events 
relevant to the silver mines during that period are examined, paying particular attention 
to the vagaries of the international metal market for silver and lead. It was decided to 
restrict the discussion to those mines where records of production existed and 
significant quantities of silver were produced. These mines had the most interesting and 
complex histories; they operated and closed, due principally to the fluctuating prices of 
silver and associated base metals. The mines discussed are the Albert mine, The 
Willows mine, the ‘Edendale mines’, and the four mines at Argent, the ‘Argent mines’.8  
 
It was hoped to develop a history of the underclass’s involved on the mines. 
Unfortunately - as so often happens - the people who were employed to do the digging 
and mining have no history in terms of who they were and what became of them. In a 
few places - Willows and Argent mines - it has been possible to determine the number 
of whites and blacks employed and what their tasks were. It is clear that the mining 
industry in Johannesburg in the 1890s was one of a Marxian struggle with capitalism 
and the politics of a rising capitalist mining oligarchy against the dominant political 
forces of Afrikaner nationalism. Such a struggle is particularly noticeable in the pre-
1900 period, but it can also be transposed to the later mining periods, especially the 
years 1919-1922 and the rise of white miner trade unionism. Thus, as McGuire & 
Paynter stated: “An awareness of the role that power relations and ideology played 
shaping the past societies is a post-processual contribution… in that it emphasises the 
struggles among different interest groups in society”.9  
 
In Africa, all silver occurs either in argentiferous lead or argentiferous copper deposits. 
Silver is naturally associated with sulphides of certain other metals such as lead, zinc or 
copper. When the ore contains 1% or more of silver, it is said to be argentiferous.
10
 The 
                                                 
8
  The terms ‘Edendale mines’ and ‘Argent mines’ are generic names for mines that had many name 
changes over the time period. Details are discussed in the respective chapters. 
 
9
  R McGuire & R Paynter, The Archaeology of Inequality, p. 1. 
 
10
  PW Thrush, A dictionary of mining, mineral and related terms, p. 1014. 
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history of silver mining in South Africa is thus very closely aligned to the mining of the 
two base metals, lead and copper. At the height of the silver mining industry in the late 
nineteenth century, companies such as the Victoria Regina Silver & Copper Mining Co 
Ltd, Brakfontein Silver and Lead Ltd or Willows Copper (Argentiferous) Syndicate Ltd 
demonstrate this point. Having stated this, it is also true that not all lead and copper 
deposits contain silver in values high enough to make it economical to extract the silver. 
The text of this dissertation will often mention the term base metals, which by simple 
definition means the opposite of the noble or precious metals of gold, silver and the 
platinum group. In this dissertation the base metals commonly referred to are lead, 
copper, zinc and antimony.
11
 In the Americas, silver is often, though not always, found 
in its native or semi-pure state and not mixed as a component part of base metal ores. In 
the case of the silver mines of the greater Pretoria region, silver was the primary product 
sought, even when base metals provided substantial additional sources of revenue from 
the mining operation.  
 
Silver mining in the greater Pretoria region began in the 1880s, when prospectors 
discovered several deposits of copper and lead that on assay were found to contain high 
percentages of silver. Further prospecting in the region led to it being called the 
‘Pretoria Silver Belt’, a phrase coined by an anonymous journalist for The Standard and 
Diggers’ News in 1889.12 This term elegantly describes the general distribution of the 
mines, because they follow geological strata that trend from west to southeast – the beds 
of the Transvaal Supergroup. However, it is not the intention of this dissertation to bring 
geology into the text. It is a little known fact that a silver and base metal mining 




Gold mining and industrial growth in the 1890s on the Witwatersrand was primarily 
controlled by a few very wealthy and powerful men, who became known as the 
Randlords (a journalistic collective term for the mining magnates who had made their 
                                                 
11
  PW Thrush, A dictionary of mining, mineral and related terms, p. 84. 
 
12
  ‘Old workings (pre-European) in Pretoria silver belt’, Standard and Diggers’ News, 14 May 1889. 
 
13
  An industry is described as an “…organised economic activity concerned with… processing of raw  




fortunes in the diamond mines of Kimberley and the gold fields of Barberton).
14
 It is, 
however, a misnomer to assume that their power finished with the advent of the Anglo-
Boer War. It is true that the dominant forces of Rhodes, Beit, Eckstein and Barnato had 
died by the end of the Anglo-Boer War,
15
 but many of the Randlords would continue 
after the war and be friends or adversaries of the Milner administration and the 
Botha/Smuts governments. Some would turn to politics once again, and become 
Members of Parliament after 1907. Many - such as the Albu brothers, Lionel Phillips, 
Abe Bailey, Solly Joel and Sammy Marx - would continue controlling and guiding 
various industries after 1902, until they retired in the 1920s or 1930s. One of their chief 
personal objectives was to amass as great a wealth as possible, and in order to achieve 
this goal they were prepared to pursue any entrepreneurial activity that fulfilled this 
requirement. When silver deposits were discovered near Pretoria they were exploited 
both because of their potential monetary returns and silver’s worthiness as a precious 
metal. Eckstein, Taylor, Phillips and Beit, along with the other Randlords, were the 
economic might of the 1880s and 1890s in Johannesburg and Pretoria. 
 
It will emerge in the text how H Eckstein & Co. – also known as the Corner House 
Group – emerged to become the strongest company in the silver mining industry of the 
1890s. In 1889 the firm of H Eckstein & Co built a new head office in Johannesburg, of 
bricks and concrete rather than wood, as were most of the other structures. It was built 
on the corner of Commissioner and Simmonds streets and as the power of the company 
grew, so did the value of statements being issued from the building on the ‘corner’ of a 
city block. Very soon use of the term ‘Corner House’ became the generic name for a 
group that would grow to control the richest gold mines, land investment companies, 
industrial enterprises and other mining ventures such as silver mining. Ironically the 
‘Corner House’ was never the official name of the building or the group.  
 
                                                 
14
   The original source for the term ‘Randlords’ has not been found, but it is believed to have been used as a 
derogatory term by the English press in London in describing the millionaire financiers of the South 
African gold mining industry in the 1890s. Still one of the best sources for biographies on many of the 
‘Randlords’ is the 1985 book by Geoffrey Wheatcroft. The Randlords: The Men who made South Africa. 
 
15
  The term ‘Anglo-Boer War’ is used throughout this dissertation rather than the alternative term – ‘2nd 
South African War.’ 
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Throughout the text of the dissertation the name H Eckstein & Co has been used and 
only in a few places, such as quotes, is the generic name of the ‘Corner House’ or 
‘Corner House Group’ used synonymously.16   
 
Initially not all relations between President Paul Kruger of the ZAR
17
 and the Randlords 
were antagonistic. Strong economic ties existed between H Eckstein & Co and Kruger. 
On at least two occasions H Eckstein & Co were approached by the government of the 
ZAR for financial assistance with national projects, and this relationship had its benefits 
for both parties. As the silver mines became one of the points of contention between 
Kruger and some of the economically powerful Randlords, the mining of silver became 
increasingly vulnerable to political and economic manipulation by the government of 
the ZAR. The bickering between certain Randlords and the Kruger Government was to 
contribute to the Jameson Raid and ultimately the Anglo-Boer War. These events and 
the development of white-miner trade unions in the early twentieth century and their 
direct impact on the silver mining industry (1922 strike) are discussed along with the 
inter-relationships of the three distinct time periods of mining – the 1890s, 1920s and 
1950s - with only minor prospecting or tribute mining occurring between these periods.  
 
A few who made money in diamonds, but certainly not to the level of the Randlords, were 
to settle in Pretoria or the young Johannesburg and found businesses that would be vital as 
support industries to gold and silver mining. They would mine coal, make steel, make or 
import machinery or act as agents for overseas bankers or stockbrokers and would also 
invest in silver mining. There were also the lesser investors, those who had small-scale 
money to invest – ‘the followers’- who rushed to take up offers of new ventures like silver 
mining with the intention of making money. These investors either made money, or lost 
everything and faded into oblivion. The 1890s was an era of rush in and buy, then sell and 
take the profit - unfortunately many lost money in bad deals or potentially fraudulent 
schemes.  
 
Another dimension that is explored in the dissertation is the relationship, in the late 
nineteenth century, between the Randlords and some of their managers. It was often the  
                                                 
16
  AP Cartwright, The Corner House – The Early History of Johannesburg, pp. xv-xvi. 
 
17
  The terms ‘South African Republic’; ‘Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek’ or the acronym ZAR are 
synonymous. In order that the reference is not confused with the modern ‘Republic of South Africa’ it 
has been decided to use the acronym ZAR throughout the text when referring to the former Republic. 
xv 
 
Randlords who appointed the managers. In the correspondence of the Randlords, the 
managers were often referred to as ‘he is the best in smelting silver lead deposits with 20 
years experience’ or ‘he comes highly recommended as a mining engineer’ [or manager]. 
This was true of Otto Hahn, the general manager at the Transvaal mine. The relationship 
between OJ Skill at the Willows mine and the partners of H Eckstein is one of particular 
interest, because it is shown that Skill had a secret agenda - aimed most likely at ultimate 
control or ownership of the mine. Entrepreneurs, like the Randlords, do not always make 
the best ‘bosses’, because what drives them is not the same spirit that drives their 
subordinates. This was certainly true of many of the Randlords and the people in the 
1890s.  
 
It was stated earlier that the research revealed over thirty individual mines or prospects 
existed during the time period covered by the dissertation. Records of more than fifty 
mining companies, who operated these mines, were found. Table 1 presents a list of all 
mines/prospects that were found during the archival research, as well as the farms on 
which the mines were located and the periods of operation. Although a history was 
compiled for all of the mines listed in the table not all of the smaller mines and their 
histories form part of the text of this dissertation. The majority of these small mines and 
prospects are located west and southeast of Pretoria. They featured in the rush to locate 
silver rich deposits in the 1890s and again in the early twentieth century. None were 
successful mines due mainly to the size of the deposits, lack of finance to operate the 
mines or financial returns to the owners/shareholders. The complete list of the mines or 
prospects - whether they ultimately operated as a mine or not, or if no records of 
production for them could be found - is included. This consolidated information is not 
available in any other publication. The research has demonstrated that the industry in its 
114-year history produced conservatively 93 tons of silver, 31 000 tons of lead, 740 tons 
of copper and 3000 tons of zinc. 
 
In most cases the mines were formed with one name that remained unchanged for the life 
of the mine. There were a few exceptions and the most complicated to follow, because of 
the multiple name changes, are the Edendale and Argent mines. In order to help ensure 
that the physical mine under discussion or research is the same, the name of the mine has 
been linked with the farm name and number. In the 1890s and 1920s there were instances 
where two or more mining companies were operating separate mines, but on the same 
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farm. For example, in the 1920s the Pretoria Silver Lead mine and the Transvaal Silver & 
Base Metals mine operated on the farm Dwarsfontein. The two chapters covering the 
development and history of the Argent mines discuss mines such as the Brakfontein or 
Boschpoort mine. Even though they are on different farms to the Transvaal mine, which is 
on the farm Dwarsfontein, in the 1880s and early 1890s they operated as separate mines. 
It was only as H Eckstein & Co gained control of the Transvaal mine that they merged 
their control with that of the other companies on the adjoining farms – these became the 


















Map 1. Showing the principal silver mines of the greater Pretoria region.  
The mines discussed in the text as major producers are indicated in red, all others are black. 
 
The mines of the greater Pretoria region have been subdivided into five smaller 
geographical areas to facilitate an easier understanding of the spacial relationship of the 
mines to each other and to Pretoria. The list below - Table 1 - reflects the nominal five 
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Table 1 –  SILVER MINES AND OPERATING COMPANIES OF THE 
GREATER PRETORIA REGION, 1856-1999 
 
The mines discussed in this dissertation are indicated in bold type. Those mentioned in 
the text but not discussed are italicised below in bold. The farm names are the current 
registered names. The years in the right-hand column represent the operating periods. 
 
PRETORIA NORTHEAST AREA 
 
Albert (Silver) Mine Ltd Roodepoortje 250 JR 1885 - 1892 
Victoria Regina Silver & Copper Mining Co Ltd Roodepoortje 250 JR 1887 - 1892 
(South African Silver Mines Estate Co Ltd) Zustershoek 246 JR     1892 
 Leeuwfontein 248 JR 1892 
 Wolvengaten 250 JR 1892 
 Welverdiend 249 JR 1892 
Silver Hill Mining and Developing Syndicate Silver Hill 253 JR             1889 - 1914 
 
PRETORIA WEST AREA 
 
Uitkomst Developing Syndicate Uitkomst 499 JQ   1889 
The Dwarsvlei Syndicate Dwarsvlei 503 JQ 1888 - unknown 
Rhenosterspruit mine Rhenosterspruit 495 JQ     1890s & 1940 
Nevada Silver and Smelting Company Ltd  Mooiplaats 524 JQ 1888 - 1892  
Broederstroom mine  Broederstroom 481 JQ 1856 - 1860 
Broederstroom Lead & Silver Mining Syndicate              Broederstroom 481 JQ       1907 - 1908 
Broederstroom Galena Prospecting Broederstroom 481 JQ 1916  
Transvaal Silver & Lead Mines Ltd      Roodekrans 492 JQ  1906 - 1907 
 Hennops River 489 JQ 1906 - 1907 
Premier Silver-Lead Mine   Roodekrans 492 JQ  1907 
  Hennops River 489 JQ 1907 
Unnamed company                                                           Doornrandje 386 JR 1907 - 1908 
Silver Hill Mining Co  Doornrandje 386 JR 1967 
Leeuwenkloof mine       Leeuwenkloof 480JQ          1907 - 1908 
   1913 - 1925 
PRETORIA SOUTHEAST AREA 
 
White Swan Argentiferous Co Ltd              Oudezwanskraal 542 JR  1886 - 1891 
Transvaal Silver and Base Metals Ltd ditto 1919 - 1920 
Gold Fields of South Africa Co Ltd ditto 1955 & 1977 
Boschkop Silver Mines Ltd                   Boschkop 543 JR                1891 & 1905 -                    
 1908 
Unnamed company        Eensaamheid 534 JR 1891 & 1924 
H Eckstein & Co           Schoongezicht 225 JR       1891 
H Eckstein & Co          Groenfontein 206 IR 1890 - 1891 
Unnamed company ditto 1923 
Gold Fields of South Africa Co Ltd ditto 1974 - 1976 
H Eckstein & Co (Rondevlei Silver Prospect)           Rondevlei 208 JR 1891  
Witpoortje Syndicate Witpoort 563 JR   1889 – 1891 
Rand Eastern Developing Syndicate Ltd                       ditto 1903 - 1904  
Bronkhorst Lead and Silver Mines Ltd                         ditto  1920 
Transvaal Silver and Base Metals Co Ltd                     ditto 1920 
H Eckstein & Co Haartebeestfontein 537 JR   1891   
Spitzkop 533 JR 1891 
Great Western Chrome Co Ltd Haartebeestfontein 537 JR 1924 - 1925 
   Spitzkop 533 JR 1924 - 1925 
Spitzkop Prospecting and Developing Syndicate Haartebeestfontein 537 JR 1928  
Spitzkop 533 JR 1928 
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PRETORIA EAST AREA 
 
The Willows Copper (Argentiferous)      The Willows 340 JR         1884 - 1893                           
Syndicate Ltd                                                                                               & 1907       
Willows Extension Silver Mine Syndicate Ltd                 Hatherly   1889 - 1893 
Mundt Silver Mining Prospecting   (old Haartebeestpoort 304) 1889 
& Developing Syndicate      
Franzpoort mine Franspoort 332JR 1890 - 1898 
Edendale Lead Mines Syndicate  Nooitgedacht 333 JR      1894 - 1905  
Edendale Estates Ltd Nooitgedacht 333 JR      1903 - 1909 
Donerhoyul Tributing Syndicate Ltd        Nooitgedacht 333 JR      1911 - 1914 
Edendale Inspection Syndicate Nooitgedacht 333 JR      1918 - 1919 
Edendale Developing Syndicate Ltd       Nooitgedacht 333 JR      1920 - 1923 
The Edendale Lead and Zinc Co Ltd     Nooitgedacht 333 JR      1935 - 1937 
Union Lead Mine  Nooitgedacht 333 JR     1937 - 1938 
Union Silver and Lead Mines Ltd             Nooitgedacht 333 JR     1938 - 1941  
Edendale Lead Mines (Pty) Ltd Nooitgedacht 333 JR   1949 - 1974 
 
PRETORIA FAR SOUTHEAST AREA - ARGENT MINES 
 
Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd Dwarsfontein 209 IR 1889 - 1910 
Witpoortje Syndicate Ltd   Boschpoort 211 IR 1891 - 1909 
      Brakfontein 559 JR 1891 - 1909 
 Witpoort 563 JR 1891 - unknown 
Brakfontein Silver and Lead Syndicate Ltd Brakfontein 559 JR 1906 - 1907 
Boschpoort Silver Mining Syndicate Boschpoort 211 IR 1907 - 1909 
African Farms Ltd                                                           Boschpoort 211 IR 1909 - unknown 
Transvaal Silver Mines Tribute Syndicate Ltd Boschpoort 211 IR 1908 
Rhenoster Mines Ltd Dwarsfontein 209 IR                  1908 - 1909 
Dwarsfontein Galena Dwarsfontein 209 IR 1919  
Transvaal Silver and Base Metals Ltd Dwarsfontein 209 IR 1919 - 1927 
Pretoria Silver Lead Mines Ltd Dwarsfontein 209 IR 1920 - 1926 
New Pretoria Silver Lead Mines Co Ltd Dwarsfontein 209 IR 1926 - 1929 
Transvaal Galena (Pty) Ltd Dwarsfontein 209 IR 1940 - 1947 
Boschpoort Lead Mine Ltd                                             Boschpoort 211 IR 1951 - 1954 
Argent Lead and Zinc Mines Ltd Dwarsfontein 209 IR 1952 - 1999 
 Brakfontein 559 JR                    1952 - 1999
   
OTR Mining Ltd Dwarsfontein 209 IR 1999 
 Brakfontein 559 JR 1999 
 
References to the Transvaal mine in the text are synonymous with the ‘main mine’ on 
the farm Dwarsfontein 209 IR. It has been decided to use the generic term Transvaal 
mine throughout. However, in the 1920s it was also referred to as the ‘Argent main 
mine’ or ‘main mine’ in order to differentiate it from the other Argent mines operated 
by TSBM. Use of such references is retained in the text for that period. In the one 
hundred and fourteen year period it has operated as the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd, 
Transvaal Silver and Base Metals Ltd, Dwarsfontein Galena and Argent Lead and Zinc 
Mines Ltd. References to the Edendale mine in chapter 2 generally refers to both the 




Due to the myriad of sources available and the extensive research engaged in for this 
dissertation, the origins of the sources are discussed in some depth. The initial research 
began about fifteen years ago whilst researching literature sources for potential new 
mineral collecting sites as a backup to the author’s hobby of mineralogy. It was realised 
that many of the Pretoria mines had interesting histories and when it became available, 
such information was collected.  
 
Two of the most exciting archival finds made during the research were the finding of the 
originals of the 1890s mine engineer’s reports in the Harold Strange Library and originals 
of the reports and proceedings of the 2
nd
 to the 6
th
 Annual General Meetings of 
shareholders to The Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd. in the Barlow Rand Archives. The 
Barlow Rand Archives houses the volumes of documents of H Eckstein & Co Archives. 
They also hold plans of the Transvaal mine (Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd), both - surface 
and underground - for the years 1890 and 1892. It was these two plans that formed part of 
the archaeological research and which were used in creating the predictive model for 
locating the 1890s buildings. The unpublished letter books of Lionel Phillips presented 
the most interesting daily information on the Argent mines, its people, as well as many of 
the details of the political struggles between Kruger and the Randlords. The letter books 
of another of Eckstein’s partners, JB Taylor, gave much of the background and daily 
information on the Willows mine. Some of the handwriting, especially that of Alfred Beit, 
was extremely difficult to read and the transcription of his letters took many weeks. Also 
held in H Eckstein & Co Archives are originals of the annual reports of the 1890s 
Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd, (Transvaal mine), and these gave valuable information on the 
development of the mine, the equipment used on the mine and details of the staff. 
 
Of the secondary sources, the biographies or memoirs of the Barnato family, the 
Struben Brothers, Alfred Beit, Lionel Phillips, JB Taylor, Alois Nellmapius and 
Hermann Eckstein, were the most useful. AP Cartwright deals with the development of 
the Corner House Mining Group in his book The Corner House. JDF Jones, in his book 
Through Fortress and Rock, presents one of the few detailed sources for the Albu 




Mining companies such as Gold Fields of South Africa (hereafter Gold Fields), General 
Mining and Anglo American Corporation were approached very early in the research 
period. Original documents of the New Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa Ltd 
were lent for review and with subsequent permission, copied in full. These documents 
proved invaluable in the research as they included files of the 1920s Transvaal Silver 
and Base Metals Company which were transferred from General Mining to Gold Fields 
along with the mining leases. On reading through the files, it was exciting to find they 
contained extracts of the “Technical Advisors” reports for the period January 1923 to 
October 1925, and included the correspondence and decisions taken by Gold Fields on 
its mining operation in the 1950s and 1970s. An insight into the history of the mines 
during these periods was gained as the reports contain valuable historical, mining, 
geological, and exploration details. Had the files not been obtained, it would have been 
impossible to complete the history of silver mining in the greater Pretoria region, 
especially on some aspects of the 1920s and most importantly for the period of the 
1950s.  
 
When Gold Fields was re-approached in 2009 for information on another of their old 
mines (not connected with silver) the reply was that following the restructuring of the 
Gold Fields Company in the 1990s a corporate decision was made for all files dealing 
with old and abandoned mines and claims to be destroyed and this included the Argent 
files. One has to ask what valuable historical information for researchers was destroyed 
and why was it not offered to an archive?   
 
Newspapers and mining journals were also a major source, especially for details of the 
lesser mining ventures or proposed ventures in the 1890s. The Audio Visual Library of 
UNISA has a collection of the Standard and Diggers’ News from 1889 – 1899 on 
microfilm. The National Library in Pretoria has a set of The Transvaal Mining Argus 
from 1887 – 1907. Copies from 1887 – 1897 were reviewed. One of the most important 
sources for photographic evidence, as well as text, was the Mining and Engineering 
Journal. The journal has changed its name several times since its inception in the early 
1890s, although it is still published as The South African Mining and Engineering 
Journal (SAMEJ). No single archive has a complete set and it was necessary to visit 
both the Johannesburg Public Library and the Library of the Council of Geoscience to 
review all the copies. As no index to the journal exists, one has to page through each 
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issue of the journal dating from 1891-1958 in order to find references (approximately 
250 000 pages).  
 
The National Archives of South Africa in Pretoria was the major source for official 
reports and correspondence from the State Secretary of the ZAR, court case files of the 
ZAR, papers of the Government Mining Engineer and the Secretary of Mines. The War 
Claims Commission files of 1902-03 provided the intriguing data on the damage to the 
Transvaal mine caused during the Anglo-Boer War and most importantly the four 
photographs of some of the 1890s buildings.  
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C h a p t e r  1  
THE SILVER INDUSTRY OF PRETORIA - ECONOMICS AND POLITICS  
The mining of any commodity does not occur in a vacuum – both political and 
economic events bring pressures to bear on such industries. Events can be local or 
international, and they can promote, depress or destroy the industries. The mining of 
silver in the greater Pretoria region experienced all of these factors during its history 
from 1885 to 1999. One of these dimensions in the late nineteenth century history of the 
silver mines was the political situation in the ZAR, or more simply, the relationship 
between President Paul Kruger and the principle owners of the silver mines, the 
Randlords. At the heart of the dispute was what Kruger and the Republic could gain 
from silver, counterpoised with what political and economic profits the Randlords could 
make from the mining of silver. The other significant dimension is the economics of 
silver as a metal on the international markets and its place in the world economy and 
how it was impacted by world economic and political events.  
 
In order to contextualise the development of silver mining in the greater Pretoria region 
in the 1880s, an understanding of the state of flux in the world silver market at the time 
is necessary. During the late nineteenth century the international rush to mine gold on 
the Witwatersrand was matched by an equal and - in some places - greater emphasis to 
mine silver. Both metals held a demand, because both metals were recognised as the 
support base for many currencies such as the British pound and the US dollar. During 
the American Civil War, Lincoln had a serious problem of dwindling gold and silver 
reserves, and was faced with refusals by the European bankers for additional loans, 
unless at very high rates of interest. President Abraham Lincoln’s solution was to print 
his own money, backed not by gold or silver, but faith in the Union government.
1
 At the 
end of the American Civil War (1861–1865), the USA was virtually bankrupt and 
Britain, which controlled the international gold and banking market and to a very large 
extent the international industrial market, saw an opportunity to inflict severe economic 
pressure on America. By 1872 the American population was feeling the results of post-
war recession. The threat to the small group of European bankers, who controlled world 
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finance, was the continued printing of paper currency by the USA without the support 
of gold and to a lesser extent silver.
2
 Such a situation meant that they lost their control 
over the USA’s demand for international borrowing and as such their potential for 
control and profit from the ‘borrowing interest’. The European bankers - led by those in 
Britain - applied pressure through Congress to demonetise silver, so reducing the natural 
flow of money and forcing a return to a gold standard.   
 
Silver was still mined in the USA, but the official ratio set by the US mint had become 
16 to 1 or sixteen ounces of silver for one ounce of gold. This resulted in a situation 
where the mine owners could get more for their silver by selling it on the open market 
than to the US mint. The mint retaliated by suspending the purchase and coining of 
silver. By the late 1870s the price of silver had dropped so low that the official ratio of 
16:1 was preferable to the open market price. Two pressure groups were to force a 
change in the legislation. Farming had developed in the 1870s and early 1880s to a point 
where overproduction had become a serious problem. The inability to sell the products 
economically because of oversupply gave rise to financial deflation, leaving many 
farmers facing large debts with a cheaper dollar. The silver mining companies, faced 
with falling value in the silver price, had continued mining and stockpiling their silver 
bullion in a hope that the price would rise again. When the price began to recover they 
flooded the market and drove the price down again to the point where, in many cases, it 




By 1878, pressure on silver was so great that a new law was passed. Called the Bland-
Allison Act, it allowed for the resuming of coinage of silver. In reality this never 
happened because the US Mint purchased silver bullion from the mines and stockpiled 
it, in effect quarantining the silver bullion. It helped a few of the major silver mines, but 
not the population of the USA.
4
 Both agriculture and the small to medium mines 
appealed to the US Congress for help and an inflation of the dollar, which would lead to 
a demand for money and an increase in the prices of farm and mined produce.  
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However, a major silver mine, the Nevada Comstock, did not raise too much of an issue 
with respect to the new Act – the reason being they were already a major seller to the 
US Mint and had been from 1875.
5
 The relatively weak response from Congress was the 
Sherman Purchase Act of 1890, under which the Federal Government was required to 
purchase 4.5 million ounces of silver every month with Treasury Notes that could be 
redeemed for gold. Naturally, as with many issues of government bonds, wary investors 
preferred the idea of hard gold to paper. The result was a significant reduction in the 
national gold reserves.
6
 In 1893, President Grover Cleveland was instrumental in 
repealing the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, but not before the ‘Panic of 1893’ had 
begun, which led to the collapse of some railroad companies unable to repay loans, 
followed by banks and thousands of businesses collapsing, leading to the first severe 
depression in the United States in 1893–1895.7 
 
The international impact of these interrelated events, outlined above, was significant. 
The mining of silver and its price were in serious decline before 1885. Many large silver 
mines such as those in Mexico, (which was in revolutionary political turmoil), the 
Anaconda copper mine in Montana, USA, and the Cobalt mine in Ontario, Canada, had 
closed or were closing down. This was due to the downturn in the demand not only for 
silver, but also for lead, copper and cobalt. The Sherman Act of 1890 led to a recovery 
of the silver price and to a revival of interest in the mining of silver. This provided the 
new mining industry of South Africa with the impetus needed to create an opportunity 
to invest in silver mines. The period 1889–1890 was to witness a rise in silver mining 
ventures and prospects in South Africa with the Transvaal mine, the Albert mine and the 
Willows mine being the most prominent and certainly the most important at this time.  
 
The fortunes of silver in South Africa were tightly interwoven with that of gold and so a 
reversal of gold’s economic might in Johannesburg would impact on silver. Gold’s 
reversals also impacted on other industries and investments. As with so many economic 
collapses, one event may be seen as a dominant cause, but associated or parallel - local 
or international - events may be equally responsible or progressively responsible for the 
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collapse. This is true for the economic depression on the Witwatersrand in 1889–1892. 
The primary cause was believed to have been the change in the nature of the gold ore, 
when in reality this was only one problem. Other problems were shortages and high cost 
of labour on the Witwatersrand, collapse of one major international bank in London and 
three Cape Banks, reduction in venture capital from investors both local and overseas. 
This tangled web of events is discussed in more depth below.  
 
In order to understand the economic collapse of the Witwatersrand in 1890, one has to 
look briefly at the main industry of the region - gold mining. The mining of gold had 
been a relatively easy and profitable process for the first few years of the industry, 
because the gold ore could be broken down (crushed) using simple stamp batteries. The 
resulting crushed rock was carried by water over mercury-coated plates, where the gold 
was attracted to the mercury and the resulting amalgam was collected and then smelted. 
In 1890 the mines had reached depths of 10-20 m, at which point the ore changed to an 
un-weathered conglomerate - which was a mixture of gold coupled with iron sulphides 
(mainly pyrite). The original beneficiation method became inadequate to extract the 
gold and many of the mines closed down. Share prices tumbled and bankruptcies 
followed, as individuals who had owned shares at £5, suddenly found that the shares 
were only worth 5 shillings.
8
 A share market that listed the thirty best shares in 1889 at 




This provides an explanation why so many of the small Pretoria silver mines appeared 
in 1889 only to close down by 1892. Venture capital was not readily available for an 
industry that was competing against a collapsed ‘big brother’ of gold mining. In 1890 
Johannesburg’s survival was in doubt and so investment was on hold. Van Onselen 
states how Johannesburg was founded on the hard work of the individual miner, but the 
crash of 1889 changed the dynamics of Johannesburg’s mining community forever, 
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The problems associated with the economic recovery of the gold constituted only one of 
the financial problems to hit the Witwatersrand in 1889. Over-speculation in shares of 
mining companies or feverish trading in speculative or non-existent companies created a 
market whose ‘bubble’ had to burst. The shortages and rising cost of labour contributed to 
the economic problems of the mines. On the Witwatersrand, the economic exodus of the 
population was a significant factor. It is estimated that the European population fell from 
25 000 inhabitants to approximately 17 000.
11
 It was only in the middle of 1890 that the 
chemical recovery process, patented by a couple of Scottish chemists a few years before, 
was introduced onto the Witwatersrand. In 1891 the MacArthur-Forrest cyanide recovery 
process was generally adopted for the extracting of the gold from the pyritic gold reefs 
and the economic recovery of the Witwatersrand began. 
 
Other major factors that impacted on the economic life of the Johannesburg mining 
industry were both local and international. In early 1890 the first event was the 
simultaneous financial collapse of three banks in the Cape - The Cape of Good Hope 
Bank, the Union Bank and the Paarl Bank - due primarily to over-exposure in the 
speculative share market.
12
 Many of the Rand’s financiers and brokers became insolvent 
overnight, because the banks held thousands of gold-mining shares against personal 
overdrafts. Edouard Lippert, once regarded as one of the Transvaal’s most wealthy men, 
lost heavily. It was also believed that Barney Barnato lost nearly £3 million.
13
 A second 
event that was to impact on the investment in emerging markets – the gold mines of 
Johannesburg, and the silver mines of Pretoria in 1890 – was the collapse of Barings Bank 
in London. Barings was heavily involved in financing the development of the emerging 
Argentinean farming industry. It became over-extended and collapsed.
14
 The ripple 
impact was the withdrawal of European investors from emerging markets, which included 
Johannesburg. 
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When the gold mining industry managed to overcome its technical difficulties of 
beneficiation, coupled with improved labour supplies, it managed to attract local and 
foreign investors back. In the years of recession many of the smaller gold mines had been 
incorporated into the mining groups such as Johannesburg Consolidated Investments 
(JCI) and H Eckstein & Co. The reinvestment in gold mining would not only help 
Johannesburg, but would also see a strengthening of the silver mining industry as the firm 
of H Eckstein & Co took a leading position in the control of the industry from 1890 - 
1895. 
 
Herman Eckstein and JB Taylor formed the investment and management company H 
Eckstein & Co in 1887 to manage the ZAR operations of London based Jules Porges & 
Co. In 1889, when Jules Porges retired, his partners Julius Werner and Alfred Beit 
restructured the company as Werner Beit & Co. The H Eckstein & Co’s partners were 
junior partners in Werner Beit & Co and exercised investment both for themselves and on 
behalf of the London based partners and directors, with ultimate financial control coming 
from London. The partners decided that the company needed a permanent presence in 
Pretoria, close to the political and bureaucratic hub of the country. The reason for wanting 
to establish an office in Pretoria was to foster a strong relationship with Kruger who was 
the key to the political and economic structure of the ZAR in the 1890s. By establishing 
these ties, the partners hoped to be aware of, and if possible, forestall both political and 
economic decisions that would impact negatively on their silver or gold mining 
operations. As with all such plans the partners knew that such a relationship would need 
some form of repayment. This would ultimately require the partners to raise finance for 
two of Kruger’s largest projects – the NZASM railway and the National Bank. Both of 
these projects are discussed below to illustrate the extent of financial commitment by the 
H Eckstein partners to Kruger’s government. 
 
As Taylor’s family lived in Pretoria, it made sense for his office to be based there 
permanently, which came about in December 1890. Part of his duties was the 
management of various investments that the company had in the region, such as its 
investments in the Albert and Willows mines.
15
 Having been born in the Eastern Cape, 
Taylor was fluent in Dutch and this was an advantage over many of his rivals. When 
Taylor was a small boy he had known Kruger, and this relationship was put to good use 
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over the next four years, until JB Taylor retired from the firm in 1894.
16
 His greatest 
service to the company was in knowledge gathering at the seat of government. Taylor 
established friendly relations with Dr Leyds, the State Secretary, and he had connections 
at all levels of the political machine and was well aware of the various levels of corruption 
in the Government and Civil Service, even to Presidential level. 
 
When Kruger tried to establish a State Bank, he initially gave a concession to a group of 
Hollanders.
17
 Unable to raise sufficient capital from merchant banks in Europe they 
approached Lippert – the ‘dynamite king’18 of the ZAR. Lippert was most definitely 
Kruger’s person of choice for the awarding of concessions, which is assuming that a 
Kruger family member was not on the list of choices. Ironically, Lippert was a cousin of 
Alfred Beit, yet the two were to remain on an antagonistic non-speaking relationship until 
Beit’s death in 1906.  Beit and the other Randlords never forgave Lippert for his dynamite 
concession and the damage that it did to the economy of the mining industry. Although 
Lippert had many connections with merchant banking firms in London, he failed in this 




Undeterred, Kruger turned to his friend JB Taylor of H Eckstein & Co for assistance. 
Eckstein was having difficulties with some of the South African commercial banks at the 
time; there was reluctance on the part of the banks to finance new mining ventures. 
Eckstein and Taylor saw an opportunity to not only improve relations with the 
government of the Republic, but at the same time provide an additional source of finance 
to the company. The approval of the Wernher, Beit Company in London as the parent 
company of H Eckstein & Co was obtained and through the Wernher, Beit Company, 
doors to European banking firms were opened. In 1890 the Nationale Bank de Zuid-
Afrikaansche Republiek Beperk was created with both the ZAR Treasury and the firm of 
H Eckstein & Co investing £100 000 each. Once the merchant banks of Europe became 
aware that the Wernher, Beit Company was involved in the creation of a State Bank, all 
reluctance to become part of the investment was overcome and they provided the balance 
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of the £800 000 capital.
20
 It was a condition of Herman Eckstein that for his firm to 
participate in the founding and management of the State Bank, Lippert was not to be a 
director of it. This condition was accepted and JB Taylor became a director of the bank 




An interesting aspect uncovered only in the letter books of H Eckstein & Co deals with 
the proposal by the ZAR Government to tax the silver mines on the same basis as the gold 
mines. At the beginning of April 1891, notice was served on the directors of the Albert 
mine to present arguments why their property should not be proclaimed as a public 
digging under the Gold Law. Dr Leyds explained to the directors that under the Gold Law 
companies had no right to mine their own properties unless they had mining leases. Dr 
Leyds advised the directors of the Albert mine to take out a Mijnpacht lease.
22
 The 
directors of H Eckstein & Co were obviously worried about losing their property and 
mining rights of the Willows and Argent farms to what would have been an open raid by 
prospectors to peg claims on the farms, thus yielding a higher return in individual mining 
licence revenue for the State.
23
 The directors of the Albert mine and principally 
Nellmapius, a close friend not only of Kruger, but also JB Taylor, worked together to get 
the proposal on opening the silver diggings reversed. It appears that they were successful; 
however, the Government was still determined to tax the silver mining operations and 
further discussions were held.  
 
On 21 April 1891 JB Taylor writes to Beit in London that Nellmapius dined with the 
President and discussed the proclamation on silver. The President declared that all 
minerals belonged to the State and therefore as mining for silver was taking place it was 
only fair that the State should receive some remuneration for the mining. Nellmapius 
reported that Kruger continued by stating if the proclamation was found to be premature 
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he would suggest to the Raad
24
 that a fixed rate be levied on the silver extracted. 
Nellmapius thought such a rate would be about 1%.
25
 Clearly the partners were 
concerned, because a few days later, Taylor wrote to Beit: “According to Law – Dr Leyds 
states the Government can claim 2½% on the mijnpacht dues.” Some discussion took 
place regarding the size of the mijnpacht for silver and lead mining and it was agreed that 
it should be set at 25% of the area of the farm, with the payment of Government 
mijnpacht dues then being the same as the Gold Law which was 10%.
26
 Despite the 
imposition of a government levy or tax on an area of the farm or an amount of silver 
produced, the mining of silver was considered a profitable venture and this only changed 
when the international prices of lead and silver collapsed.  
 
By the end of April 1891 Lionel Phillips in a letter to Beit writes: “Government talks of a 
royalty on silver. If this be moderate at say 2% I think it would answer our purpose better 
than proclamation, this of course depends upon what area of the farms will be 
productive.”27 Through the Chamber of Mines, H Eckstein & Co approached the 
government to impose a duty on the output of silver and not put a tax on the farms. The 
argument was that silver, unlike gold, is sporadic in nature with rich spots in one part of 
the farm and nothing in other parts.
28
 Clearly the government had other factors of more 
concern, because on 4 July Taylor wrote to Beit after discussions with Dr Leyds. Taylor 
stated that Leyds informed him that as the mines were working under the Gold Law, and 
it would require a revision of the Law to change it for silver, that the industry could 
continue its operations without fear of any proclamation of public diggings being imposed 
on them. It seems as if this was the final answer from Dr Leyds as it was not mentioned 
again in any later correspondence.
29
 As H Eckstein & Co had benefitted from the 
amicable conclusion to taxation of the silver mines by the Kruger government, they were 
receptive to Kruger’s approaches for financial aid when the Nederlandsch Zuid-
Afrikaansche Spoorwegmaatschappij (NZASM) railway company ran into difficulties. 
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The ZAR had since the days of President Thomas Burgers (1871–1877) desired to have 
its own railway connection to a port not under British control. This need to be 
import/export independent of any British port was to last right up until the latter part of 
the Presidency of Kruger, but was never to be fully realised in practice. Nothing tangible 
came of the plan until a concession was granted to a group of Dutch businessmen in 1887 
that then formed the NZASM. The company was to build a railway line from the 
Mozambique border to Pretoria after, ironically, a British company had built the line from 




During the international financial crisis of 1890 in Europe, the NZASM found itself 
financially compromised and unable to continue with development of the railway line. An 
approach by Kruger to H Eckstein & Co for funds – pre-dating his approach to the Cape 
Government for financial aid - was discovered during archival research for this 
dissertation.
31
 It involved the utilisation once again of the relationship between Kruger 
and Dr Leyds with JB Taylor. Letters in the H Eckstein & Co Archives reveal the details 
of the financial deal which was immediately successful for the continued financing of the 
NZASM railway. A letter from JB Taylor to Beit in London declares that the syndicate 
has advanced £100 000 to the Railway Company (NZASM). The loan was expected to 
provide sufficient funds for the Railway Company to finish the line from the border to 
Nelspruit. In 1892 the NZASM Company was still in financial difficulty and Kruger was 
forced to seek further financial aid. The common belief is that Kruger’s initial approach 
for financial aid was to the Cape Government. This is erroneous, as it was to H Eckstein 




It is clear from the research that along with the other Randlords the partners of the H 
Eckstein Company were not above trying to influence decisions at government level to 
suit themselves. Similarly many of the government officials within the ZAR, and this 
includes Kruger, were also involved in influencing decisions for personal reasons. Kruger 
appears to have directed the construction of the Delagoa Bay railway line away from the 
                                                 
30
  CFJ Muller, (ed), 500 Years – A History of South Africa, pp. 281-282. 
 
31




  During the research a book was discovered in the UNISA Archives which presented many details on the 
construction of the NZASM railway: Delagoa Bay Pretoria Railway, NZASM – official opening souvenir 




silver mines east of Pretoria and towards his own farms, as suggested by Lionel Phillips 
of H Eckstein & Co: “I understand the President has farms in the interest of which another 
route is desirable.” Although to be equally fair, Phillips in the same letter appears to hint 
at some form of bribery to get the railway line to pass close to the Willows mine when he 
states: “But have no doubt that £3000 or £4000 judicially handled would bring the line 
past the Willows.”33 Until the Jameson Raid both sides played each other for what they 
could benefit from the relationship.  
 
Over the next four years there was a great deal of give and take from both the Kruger 
government and the Randlords. But politically inspired and driven Randlords such as 
Rhodes, Beit and Phillips, the latter two of whom were partners in H Eckstein & Co, were 
to alter the relationship with Kruger from one of mutual benefits to hostility. By 1894 
relations had disintegrated and there was a rising desire to seize power from the Kruger 
government. A group of the Randlords formed the Reform Committee and plotted an 
armed intervention which became known as the Jameson Raid. It is not the intention to 
present a detailed study of the Jameson Raid and the men behind the Reform Committee 
as both have been more than adequately covered by the historians Elizabeth Longford
34
 
and Jane Carruthers et al.
35
 However, a brief summary of events is given below in order 
to contextualise the information dealing with the ‘Reformers’ trial and its impact on the 
industries of the Witwatersrand and in particular silver mining. The impact of the Raid on 
the silver mining industry was not the Raid per se, but the removal of four of the six 
directors of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd who were also members of the Reform 
Committee.  
 
It was a belief at the time of writing the dissertation proposal that the removal of the 
four directors was the primary cause for the closure of the Transvaal mine. Subsequent 
research has revealed it was the world crash of the silver market in 1893-4 that was the 
real cause for the closure of the silver mines of the greater Pretoria region. The collapse 
of the international silver market was caused by the repeal of the Sherman Act in 1893, 
followed by a severe, but short, economic depression in the United States. The repeal of 
the Sherman Act led to a decline in the demand for silver, which resulted in a falling 
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metal price, followed by further closures of silver mines - especially in Mexico. To 
many the repeal was seen as the death knell of silver as a metal worth mining. The final 
blow for the South African silver mines was falling prices for the associated lead and 
copper. By 1893 the political situation was beginning to change in the ZAR and by the 
time of the Jameson Raid, at the end of 1895, the prospects for successful mining of 




It is necessary to present a brief summary of the Raid and more importantly the Reform 
Committee in order to understand the impact the arrest and trial of the reformers had on 
the possible re-birth of silver mining in the late 1890s. As the gold fields of the 
Witwatersrand developed from 1887 to 1893, Britain realised that to control the ZAR was 
to control the world’s major source of gold. Britain denied the ZAR access to the sea 
north of Natal by expanding Natal’s territory until it reached the border with 
Mozambique. This action forced Kruger to use British controlled ports for imports and 
exports as the Delagoa line had not been completed. To do so meant having to pay the 
inflated rail tariffs either to Durban or the Cape ports. When financial constraints on the 
further development of the Delagoa Bay railway from Middelburg to Pretoria created 
problems for Kruger, the Cape Government offered loans, but with restrictive conditions. 
Realising that the stranglehold he wanted to apply was not going to work, Cecil Rhodes as 
Cape Prime Minister, began plotting a coup d’état to oust Kruger and gain political and 
economic control of the ZAR. The plan was to send a military force of seven hundred 
armed soldiers into the ZAR from the Bechuanaland (Botswana) rail line at Pitsani, led by 
a man who was to give his name to the Raid - Dr Leander Starr Jameson.  They would 
ride in at the ‘invitation’ of the Reform Committee, in support of an Uitlander uprising.37 
In the end the Raid became a fiasco, with all of the raiders, apart from those killed by the 




The Reform Committee consisted of Randlords, wealthy businessmen, directors of many 
mining and trading companies and a few lawyers and brokers, along with some minor 
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participants who were more support staff than planners – 64 men in all.39 Their role was 
to organise the armed uprising in Johannesburg, capture the State Armoury and the 
principle leaders in the ZAR government in Pretoria. 
 
The imprisonment and subsequent trial of the ‘Reformers’ is also well covered in 
Elizabeth Longford’s book40, but what is not generally covered in the sources is the fact 
that twenty-five members of the Reform Committee were directors of mining 
companies and
 
some were directors of a large number of mining companies. Four of 
those arrested as conspirators were directors of Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd. They were 
Lionel Phillips (Chairman), George Farrar, Samuel W Jameson and HA Rogers. Phillips 
and Farrar were two of the four conspirators who were initially sentenced to death. The 
Jameson Raid and the subsequent trial of the Reform Committee members resulted in an 
almost complete breakdown of relations between the Kruger government, the 
Beit/Rhodes mining community, the Imperial Government and Joseph Chamberlain, the 
Colonial Secretary in London. This breakdown ultimately led to the Anglo-Boer War. 
 
During the search for documents dealing with the men involved in the silver mining 
industry, one source was found which revealed the impact caused to industry as a whole 
in Johannesburg by the arrest of the members or supporters of the Reform Committee.  
The source lists the directors and the companies that they were involved with. The 
following is a summary of those who held directorial posts – with the number of 
companies in brackets - many of them being directors or shareholders in silver mining 
companies: Lionel Phillips (24), George Farrar (33), Solly Joel (30), HJ King and 
George Richards (17 each), HB Marshall (12), HA Rogers, SW Jameson & Abe Bailey 
(10 each), RG Fricker, JS Curtis, St John Carr, F Mosenthal, JA Roger, JH Hammond, 
JJ Lace, P Du Bois, Captain Mein (3 each), F Spencer and HC Hull (2 each), WHS Bell, 




These men who formed the Reform Committee were, for a large part, the leaders of 
Johannesburg’s industries of gold, silver, coal, mining equipment, investment and land 
companies. All of these industries were affected; many companies lost enough directors, 
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such that no signatories existed within a company. Twenty-two companies lost their 
chairman - a number lost managing directors or general managers. By May 1896 the press 
was stating how important it was for these men to return to Johannesburg immediately, as 
many businesses were being brought to a standstill. Of course with the benefit of 
hindsight one cannot condone the fact that their act was treason. After those on trial had 
been released many went back to running the companies that they had been involved with 
before the Jameson Raid. None of the silver mines could be re-opened, as all of them 
were victims of the collapsed international silver market following the repeal of the 
Sherman Act in the USA. The Argent mines, although not operational at this time still 
existed as mining companies, with the mines being looked after by caretakers.  
 
In South Africa the last six years of the nineteenth century was a period when everyone in 
the ZAR knew that war between Britain and the Republics was inevitable - it was the 
timing that was the unknown. The Anglo-Boer War was to see almost all mining 
operations in the ZAR close down. Damage was done to a number of the mines around 
the Witwatersrand and outlying districts – the Transvaal mine at Argent was one of these 
mines. More reference is made to this, along with historical photographs which were used 




Although there was relatively little significant silver mining activity in the period from 
1900 to 1919, what did take place was prospecting and small operator mining of many 
of the silver deposits, especially those west of Pretoria. As they form only a small part 
of the history of silver mining in the region their story is not detailed in this dissertation. 
Recovery of the mining and commerce economy of the Witwatersrand was significantly 
impeded by the scarcity and cost of labour in the period after 1900. The post-war period 
to 1910 was to witness an attempt by the Randlords – who still existed, and still 
controlled mining and commerce – to continue their form of autocratic management as 
had existed before the Anglo-Boer War. To a large extent their principle appeared to be 
to keep both the European and black working class - the miners – in a situation of poor 
wages and poor working conditions. Due to the lack of documentary source material it 
has not been possible to study the part played by the black underclass in the silver 
mines. 
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The growth of European worker intransigence began with a significant labour strike in 
the gold mining industry in 1907 and the growth of industrial unrest would continue and 
culminate in 1922 with the most serious strike in South African history. In researching 
the history of the silver mining industry only two cases of industrial action by miners 
against silver mine management have been found in the sources – the 1922 strike at the 
Transvaal Silver and Base Metal Co Ltd mine and the Pretoria Silver Lead Co Ltd mine. 
Although the economic impact on the silver mining industry was small by comparison 
with the gold mines, there was industrial strike action on the mines and this will be 
explained in Chapter 4. 
 
In trying to understand the background to the 1922 strike and its brief impact on the silver 
mines, it is necessary to put it in context with the earlier strikes that hit the Witwatersrand. 
A brief historical background to mining labour conditions and the rise of unionism from 
1907 is provided. A recent book by Krikler presents the history of the various strikes 
leading up to the 1922 revolt.
43
 Management of the gold mines was continually looking 
for opportunities to cut the rising cost of their operations. At the root of the problem was 
the high cost of employing skilled white miners, a large proportion of who were from 
Britain or Australia and had immigrated either during the 1890s or after the end of the 
Anglo-Boer War. Many of these miners were from Cornish tin mines, the coal mines of 




The depressed state of such mines in Britain, and the adverse conditions under which the 
miners worked, led to the development of strong socialist political affiliations amongst 
them. The miners were used to striking against oppressive managements, either for better 
pay or improved working and living conditions. When these miners came to South Africa 
it was natural that they would bring their political views with them. Many of them had 
come to South Africa because of the expectation of better pay, yet the conditions under 
which they worked were seldom better than the mines of Britain. 
 
Similarly, miners and skilled artisans came from Australia and they brought with them a 
strong sense of unionism. It was a unionism described by some as syndicalism, with a 
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very strong bias to a political left that flexed its muscles on a number of occasions.
45
 
Although it was not called communism or Marxism it had many of the identifying 
principles of the two political ideologies. The initial rallying focal point for the British 
and Australian miners was the importation from 1904 by the Chamber of Mines of 
Chinese labour onto the gold mines in order to keep labour costs down. Use of Chinese 
labour was not universally supported by the mining houses or Randlords, although it was 
widely promoted by H Eckstein & Co, and the Albu brothers of General Mining.
46
 The 





In 1902 the white miners formed themselves into a mining union, the Transvaal Miners 
Association (TMA). This union had been vehemently opposed to the importation of 
Chinese labour as an alternative to African labour. Africans, after the Anglo-Boer War, 
were reluctant to return to the mining industry, primarily because wages had been set at a 
lower rate than they were before the war started and there were growing racial tensions 
between black and white miners. The fear amongst white miners was that they would 
ultimately be replaced by semi-skilled Chinese labour. Most active in this campaign were 
the Australians. When the Victoria goldfields in Australia had been opened, Chinese 
labour had ousted many Australian miners. The leader of the TMA was Tom Mathews, 
but it was those who were associated with him in various labour movements on the 
Witwatersrand that represented a radical group of strongly far left labour leaders, people 





By the end of 1906, the post-war economic boom was collapsing. The days of white 
employment in mining and industrial sectors were coming under increasing economic 
pressure. By the early part of 1907 hundreds of white mine workers were unemployed and 
a bitter irony is that instead of standing together, the British and Australians held 
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themselves aloof of the similarly unemployed Afrikaners, a policy that was to backfire 
within a few months.  
 
Still determined to reduce costs, the mining houses allowed Chinese and African 
labourers to take more semi-skilled and skilled jobs and Botha’s Transvaal Government, 
keen to see the mines in production, turned a blind eye to the opposition from the TMA. 
When the miners went on strike in 1907, the strike was quickly put down by the use of 
Imperial troops. The result was that Afrikaners moved into mining positions often 
replacing British and Australian miners. In the short term it gave the mines and the 
government what they wanted – gold production and revenue. As a long-term solution it 
was a disaster, because it brought nationalist Afrikaners into a close work environment 
with African labour, and with socialist British and Australian labour. The result was a 
three-way development of racialism in the mining industry. 
 
The sources indicate that there were a number of small silver mines and prospects in 
operation during the period 1907-1914. However, there is no indication that the general 
labour unrest during this period extended to the silver mining operations. A possible 
reason for this is that many of the mines were operated by only a few European miners 
and so they had no real negotiating power with their respective owner managements. By 
May 1913 the mining houses were once again set on a course of union-busting activities. 
It began at the New Kleinfontein mine near Boksburg, when the manager insisted that 
five engineering workers had to extend their Saturday shift to match that of the miners 
and they refused. The Amalgamated Society of Engineers along with the TMA and JT 
Bain of the Transvaal Federation of Trade Unions held a meeting at which they urged 
strike action. This was the turning point for labour, because the leadership of the unions 
and the federation bodies had finally decided to show their true colours. The strike was 
about power or the development of syndicalist ideas - control of the means of production 




As was to be expected the mines refused to negotiate and the Chamber of Mines was 
certain that once again the Government would apply military force to put an end to the 
strike. The attitude of the mining bosses can be summed up by a quote from Lionel 
Phillips, Chief Executive of the Rand Mines group and successor of the H Eckstein group: 
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“A general strike would of course be a serious matter from a dividend-paying standpoint. 
I do not think, however, that it could last very long and, if it does happen, we must make 
up our minds once and for all to break the unions here…”50   
 
By 2 July 1913 a quarter of the white miners – 5000 – were out on strike and by 4 July a 
call for a general strike was answered by 18 000 miners. With large numbers of men 
roaming the streets it was natural that rogue elements would take certain actions. When 
fighting broke out between Imperial troops and rioting strikers, 100 strikers and onlookers 
were killed. The government was eventually forced to negotiate and despite being 
humiliated, managed to settle the situation and the strike fell apart. In 1914 an attempt by 
the Syndicalist elements to repeat the General Strike was met by a well planned response 
by General Smuts, the deputy prime minister. He quickly deployed 10 000 troops to the 
Rand and mobilised a total military force of 70 000 troops who were put on alert 
countrywide. By declaring martial law he then ordered the arrest and the illegal 
deportation without any form of trial of nine union leaders.
51
 It would be interesting to 
know if such strike action would have continued beyond 1914 had the First World War 
not intervened or the deportation of the nine union leaders had not happened.  
 
In 1919, potential trouble between white workers and the mining companies was once 
again developing. JC Smuts had become Prime Minister after the death of Louis Botha. 
Politically Smuts had been damaged by his handling of the 1914 strike. He also lost 
considerable Afrikaner support when a group of former commando leaders rose up in 
what became a failed rebellion against the Botha/Smuts government, because Botha had 
taken South Africa to war against Germany. The mining companies wanted assurances 





Proposed pay cuts to coal miners at Witbank led to a strike beginning on the 2 January 
1922. Within ten days 24 000 Industrial Federation members were out on strike. By the 
end of January worker militancy was rising, especially among the nationalist Afrikaner 
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workers. It became clear that communist sympathisers were behind the movement to 
break the power of the mining companies. By February the strike persona had devolved 
from leadership through the South African Industrial Federation to a militant Afrikaner 
Action Committee. This committee ignored the demands of the communists that Africans 
should not be attacked or that mine officials should be left alone. By March the whole of 
the mining area of Johannesburg had been seized and the Afrikaner leaders were calling 
for the armed overthrow of the state – the Smuts Government. At this point Martial Law 
was declared and some 20 000 troops, backed by tanks, field guns and aeroplanes, 
became involved in a series of bloody and deadly skirmishes from Boksburg to the final 
battleground of Fordsburg. The cost in terms of lives was very high at 43 soldiers, 86 
policemen, and 81 civilians, of whom 42 were bystanders and included a number of 




The attempt to overthrow the government had failed at a huge cost both in lives, the 
economy of the Witwatersrand and of the country. Did the 1922 strike have any impact 
on the silver mining industry? In 1922 there were only two operating silver mines – 
Transvaal Silver and Base Metals Ltd (TSBM) and the Pretoria Silver and Lead Co Ltd. 
Although the strike began in Witbank, it is logical that any mining activity between 
Witbank and Johannesburg would have been affected. No reports of violence were 
reported by either the TSBM or Pretoria mine companies. It appears that the white 
workers simply downed tools and walked off the properties between the 8 and 20 March 
1922.
54
 The result of the strike for the country was strong labour legislation in the form 
of the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act.  
 
Labour problems plagued all industrial countries in the early part of the twentieth 
century; it was symptomatic of the social and political changes of the time. The 
emergence of National Socialism and communism alongside capitalism was to become 
the catalyst that spawned many wars and disputes throughout the twentieth century; the 
First World War was the first major war. A war that was as much about state controls 
over other states as about social and political changes. The First World War was to see 
the ending of the use of the ‘Gold Standard’. Most countries that had been part of the 
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Gold Standard (backing their currency with gold at a set rate of exchange) before the 
First World War abandoned the Gold Standard at the outbreak of the War, because of a 
breakdown in international currency agreements.  
 
After the war, Germany was the hardest hit economically. It was required to pay 
crippling war reparations to the Allied powers. This decimated Germany’s gold reserves 
and its un-backed paper currency went into hyperinflation in 1922-24. Faced with 
economic, political and social collapse, Germany re-adopted the ‘Silver Standard’ and 
in June 1924 its reintroduction of the silver Mark led to an increase in the international 
demand and price of silver, which peaked in the years 1924-25.
55
 Ironically, the increase 
in the price of silver helped the German mining industry to recover, especially its silver-
rich lead mines, but unfortunately the price rise was too late for the Argent mines, 
which by 1925 were once again closing down, due both to the economics of the local 
mining industry and to the primary fact that the development of the deposit at Argent 
was failing to disclose any further economically recoverable areas of ore. This will be 
discussed further in chapter 4. 
 
The prices of silver and lead from the earliest possible date available, that being 1882, 
were plotted using the records of H Eckstein & Co. In developing the values for the two 
metals from 1882 to 1999, several problems were encountered. Although a table of the 
average values of silver in US $/ounce was found, and has been used,
56
 a similar source 
for lead has not been found. In South Africa, the Chamber of Mines was unable to help 
with historical values and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange does not track metal prices. 
The London Metal Exchange does not keep historical data as far back as the early part 
of the nineteenth century, let alone the 1890s. A United States Geological Survey site 
was found and used, as it gave the annual price of lead per ton in dollars per metric ton 
from 1900 to 1999.
57
 Despite attempts to find the price of lead per ton from 1882 to 
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1900 no such sites were found. The only source for such values was found in the H 




The table that was found in the records of H Eckstein & Co gave details of the value of 
soft lead (without silver content). The values are tabled from 1882 to 1901 and reflect 
the highest and lowest values for the metal in pounds sterling. It is not clear if the values 
are for a short ton (2000 lbs) or standard ton (2200 lbs) and it was decided to use the 
values for a standard ton. It was necessary to convert the sterling values to dollar values 
using the currency conversion rates of the 1890s. An historical currency conversion site 
was found and used to convert all of the sterling values of the Eckstein document to US 
dollars.
59
 The values used in the graph reflect the mean values for each year from 1882 
to 1899, converted from the sterling prices to a dollar value. 
 
When the dollar values for lead for the years 1900 and 1901 were compared with the 
data from the US Geological Survey site, there is a value variance of about $17 between 
the two sources. It may be that the Eckstein figures are based on short tons; however, 
that would only account for a variance of 10% and not the 17% variance. It was decided 
to utilize the figures given in the two tables and plot them on the same graph to show 
the variations of value of the two metals over the one hundred and twenty year period. 
Also indicated on the graph and of particular importance are the periods that the mines 
of the dissertation were in production. The result is that the variance is hardly noticeable 
as there were no large price fluctuations of lead between 1882 and 1900. It was decided 
to ignore the variance between the two sources as it is the trend that is more important 
to graph. 
 
As only one group of mines – the mines at Argent - were developed and operated in the 
1890s, the 1920s and the 1950s and had a return of interest from the mining company in 
the 1970s, it was decided to plot the periods of such activity to ascertain if there were 
any possible economic trends for the timing of the periods of interest. The graph below 
shows four horizontal black bars above the two graph lines and these indicate the most 
active periods of mining and prospecting activity in the greater Pretoria region.  
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Graph 1. Prices of lead and silver and periods of major South African silver mining activity (black bars) 
in the greater Pretoria region 1882 – 1999. 
 
The graph for silver demonstrates - less significantly - the reasons to start mining a metal 
than the graph for lead does. It must be remembered that even in current mining 
operations, where silver is recovered as a metal, it is as a by-product. South Africa 
currently produces about 172 tons of silver per annum as a by-product of gold and 
platinum mining including a smaller production from lead and zinc mining.
60
 Interestingly 
this value is approximately double the total production of the Pretoria silver mines during 
the period of the dissertation. In the 1880s and 1920s the major metal being mined was 
lead or copper, but it was lead and copper significantly rich in silver per ton of ore 
recovered and so it is correct to call the operations silver mining. 
 
The first bar in the graph shows that in the period 1889–1897 the mine at Argent 
(Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd) was opened and developed as the price of lead and silver 
was in decline. In fact the serious decline in prices was around 1892. By 1894 both 
metals had reached a low point in value and, coupled with the political problems of the 
Jameson Raid of 1895-6, the mine had little chance of economic survival. The world 
production of silver in 1911 had reached 6 407 tons, but by 1917 this had declined to 
4 734 tons, at this point the graph shows a rise in the price of both metals.
61
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After the end of the First World War in 1918 General Mining Corporation made a 
decision to reopen the old Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd mine, re-naming it the Transvaal 
Silver & Base Metals mine. The graph shows that the price of lead and silver had 
increased significantly and although there was a dip in the price of lead and silver in 
1921, lead recovered and held its price until 1931. From 1931 lead declined back to its 
pre-1916 price and did not recover until the late 1930s, when the threat of the Second 
World War and the resultant re-arming led to a greater demand for lead.  
 
In late 1946 lead prices began a climb that would see new average levels reach around 
$330 per ton for a ten-year period. It was during this period that a Gold Fields - General 
Mining - Anglo American consortium re-prospected the Argent mines area and 
reopened and mined some of the old mines including the 1920s Transvaal Silver & Base 
Metals mine and the Brakfontein mine under a company named the Argent Lead and 
Zinc Co Ltd. 
 
By 1957 lead prices again fell and the mines that the Gold Fields consortium had re-
opened and were mining, were closed, and effectively mothballed. In the early 1970s 
rising prices of both lead and silver led to reviews of their mine holdings by the 
consortium. Ironically, just when it looked as if there was a possibility of reopening 
some of the operations, the price of both lead and silver fell as dramatically as it had 
risen. The geological reports were not encouraging for the finding of further large, 
economic deposits in the Argent area and the consortium was effectively abandoned.  
 
It is notable that the graph on page 22 reflects that silver did not regain its 1918-19 
value until around 1960. Even at the current value of silver it would be uneconomic to 
mine it unless it was a by-product of other valuable metals such as gold, platinum or 
copper. Why then is there this apparent romance about mining silver, why do we talk 
about ‘silver mines’ when in reality they are copper or lead mines? The answer probably 
lies in our historical attitudes towards precious metals such as gold and silver. They 
were perceived as metals of significance in historical times and this - almost aura of 
them - has continued up to present times. Certainly, in the late Victorian period, gold 
and silver held such power for investors that often defied common sense. Silver had 
been debased as a currency by most of the economic powers of the time, the Sherman 




silver as a currency in America. Its lure and demand lay in jewellery and silverware. 
Today one of the greatest demands for silver lies in the micro-electronics industry, 
where it is used in the manufacture of printed circuits.   
 
Table 2. Estimation of the amount of lead, silver & associated base metals 





















































































Albert Silver 1892 - 1893 20 000  2 280 2 000   1 
Victoria Regina Silver  ?       
Silver Hill Mining         
Welverdiend         
Uitkomst Dev. Syndicate         
Dwarsvlei Syndicate         
Rhenosterspruit Mine         
Nevada Silver & Smelting         
Broederstroom Lead  1907 - 08 14 9.8     2 
Roodekrans Mine 1906 - 07 75.5 45.5 85    2 
Silver Hill on Doornranje 1967 ?       
Leeuwenkloof Mine 1907 - 25 1 272 924 77    2 
Boschkop Silver Mine  ?       
White Swan Argentiferous 1890s ?       
Spitzkop Mine 1924 - 1928 48 38 ?    2 
Witpoortje Syndicate         
Willows Silver Mine 1889 - 1891 12 367  18 946 482 245  App 3 
Willows Extension Synd.         
Mundt Silver Mining         
Edendale Lead Mine 1890 - 1938 6 333 4 762 1 127  105  App 3 
Argent Mines (see note) 1889 - 1956 [272 000] 24 967 72 429 254 3081 20 App 3 






















Notes: The collective title of Argent Mines includes the Transvaal or Argent main mine (Dwarsfontein), 
Brakfontein mine, Boschpoort mine and Pretoria mine (Dwarsfontein). At various stages they were mined 
as one company and so the results are often combined in the sources. For a breakdown of tonnages 
produced at various stages see Appendix 3 (App 3). The tonnage of ore mined at Argent is based on the 
total tonnage of lead produced at an average of 64% lead/ton. It is intended merely as a general guide and 
it must be stated no such consolidated amount appears in any of the known sources. Where no entries are 
given, then the production data for the mine has not been found and so it is not known if any production 
of ore took place. Where productive output was known to have taken place, but no figures have been 
found in any of the sources, a question mark is inserted. In the column ‘mine/farm’ only the farm name or 
a shortened form of the mine name has been used due to space constraints. Note ‘Synd’ is an abbreviation 
for Syndicate. 
Sources indicated in the table: 
1. LJ Robb, et al. ‘The Albert Silver Mine Revisited: Towards a Model for Polymetallic 
Mineralisation in granites of the Bushveld Complex, South Africa.’ p.1. 
2. Council for Geoscience, Pretoria, PH Allport, ‘Lead Production of the Union of South Africa’, 
Report no. 1940-0070, 1940, p. 10. 




This chapter has explored the various political and economic events that impacted both 
the individual silver mines and the silver mining industry of the greater Pretoria region. 
The economic collapse of industry, per se, in Johannesburg in the early 1890s not only 
created havoc in the gold mining industry, but also affected the silver mining industry of 
greater Pretoria. It was not the events themselves, but the timing of a number of 
interrelated local and international events that created the havoc and economic damage. 
 
The rise and collapse of the international silver market from the 1860s ultimately led to 
the crisis in 1893, when the USA repealed the Sherman Purchase Act creating a free-fall 
in the international price of silver. The impact on local silver mines was the closure of 
most of the smaller mines and prospects. Table 1 shows the closure date for many of the 
mines as ‘1892’. The mines that were producing good quantities of silver - such as the 
Albert, Willows and Argent mines and which form the main part of the text in the next 
three chapters - were also affected by the falling price of silver. However, it will be 
shown that other factors, such as bad management decisions coupled with local political 
events, would ultimately be the final blow to the operation of the richer mines in the 
1890s. Having said this, however, it will be shown that the major political event - the 
Jameson Raid – was not the sole cause of the closure of the Argent mines. It was not the 
Jameson Raid that created such a state of flux in the industries of Johannesburg and 
Pretoria; it was the collateral damage of the arrest of the Reform Committee members, 
most of whom were the captains of various industries and companies, many of whom 
were directly involved with silver mines. 
 
The Preface raised two questions - who developed silver mining in the region and what 
role did the Randlords play in the development of the silver mining industry? It has 
been shown that during 1890s the principle investors in silver mining were the 
Randlords. They had both the capital and the driving force required to float new 
ventures. Many of the people involved at shareholder and director level were either 
other Randlords or those whose economic status did not equal that of the Randlords. 
Throughout the following chapters many of these men will be drawn into the text.  
 
H Eckstein & Co became a dominant force in the control and operation of various 
industrial operations in the 1890s and through to the early twentieth century. They 




and Argent. They grew economically and politically and because of loans to the Kruger 
government on two major projects they were able, subsequently, to effect decisions on 
the taxation of the silver mining industry as well as influence the government to reverse 
decisions such as the opening of the silver mines as ‘public diggings’.  
 
From 1907 there was a significant growth in white miner trade unionism. Because of the 
growth of this unionism and the political affiliations behind it, the Witwatersrand was to 
experience revolution and death on the mines from 1907 to 1922. The background to 
this growth was discussed in order to place the walk-out of miners from two of the 
silver mines in 1922 in context.  
 
An analysis of the price of silver and lead (lead being one of the sources of silver in 
South Africa) from 1882 to 1999 shows how the major political and economic events 
influenced the price of the two metals. The graph shows the relationship between active 
mining periods and the rise in the price of the two metals. The active mining periods 
were clearly affected by the rise or peaks in the international value of the two metals 
and the dissertation continues with this theme to explain the development and impact on 
the seven mines which are discussed.  
 
In developing the history of silver mining in the greater Pretoria region from 1885 to 
1999, many documents dealing with the production results or values of the metals in the 
ores have been utilised to attempt a review of the total production of silver and 
associated copper, lead and other base metals. In other words how significant was the 
industry? The few documents that were in the public domain mentioned figures of 1.5 
million ounces (42 535 kg) of silver but this was thought to be incorrect or at best only 
part of the total production. Research of the silver mines of the greater Pretoria region 
has revealed that none of the sources have consolidated the production figures, 
especially for silver. This includes various reports by the Council of Geoscience and its 
predecessor the Geological Survey of South Africa. The partial exception was PH 
Allport’s report in 1940, but this report was primarily designed to look at lead 




data for other deposits in this dissertation containing copper and silver or any of the 




Table 2 on page 24 is believed to be the first consolidated table of the production 
outputs from the silver mines of the greater Pretoria region. It shows the mines, coupled 
with known and estimated outputs of the various metals associated with silver. 
Reference should also be made to Appendix 3, where actual and potential outputs are 
produced for the Edendale, Willows and the Argent mines, the results of which are 
reflected in Table 2. It was evident that the highest yielding mines were the Albert, 
Willows, Edendale and the four ‘Argent mines’. It is therefore these mines on which the 
history of silver mining in the greater Pretoria region has been written in this 
dissertation. In the next chapter, the history of the silver mines begins with studies of 
the Albert, Willows and Edendale mines.  
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C h a p t e r  2  
MIXED FORTUNES: THE ALBERT, WILLOWS AND EDENDALE MINES 
As so many mines and prospects were discovered during the research phase of the 
dissertation, listing then all would look like a catalogue of mining operations. As stated 
in the closing paragraph of chapter 1, only the history of the seven major producers of 
silver will be discussed. The silver ore of the deposits of the greater Pretoria region were 
either argentiferous copper or argentiferous lead. The Albert and Willows mines were 
dominantly argentiferous copper, and the Edendale and ‘Argent mines’ were 
argentiferous lead deposits. The seven mines were linked in the 1890s by virtue of the 
period of operation, directorial or shareholder ownership or investment interest and the 
desire by those who controlled them to expand their entrepreneurial activities. 
 
In the Preface it is shown how and why the Randlords became the dominant owners, 
directors and share-holders in the silver mining industry of the 1890s ZAR and why 
they became involved in the mining of silver. In chapter 1 it is discussed how the 
development and periods of operation of the silver mining industry in South Africa was 
directly impacted by both local and international political and economic events. All of 
the silver mines in the greater Pretoria region ceased to operate by the mid–1890s due to 
a variety of reasons, dominant of which was the rise and collapse of the international 
silver market. The one exception was the Edendale mine which appears to have 
continued operating up to the beginning of the Anglo-Boer War in 1899, most probably 
because of the high lead content of the ore and the rising price of the metal – which is 
illustrated in Graph 1. The mines in this and the following chapters are important in the 
political and economic machinations of the 1890s and in the case of the ‘Argent mines’, 
also in the 1920s and 1950s period.  
 
It is not the intention in this dissertation to describe the operation of the individual 
mines. How a mine operated and produced a finished product varied from mine to mine 
and is outside the scope of this dissertation. However, in order to understand the 
developmental history of the individual mines, the details of shafts, levels and 
processing plants are brought into the text. This is done in order to illustrate the 




would develop areas of rich ore. It will also be shown how all of the mines made similar 
mistakes of developing without sufficient capital, which compounded the problems of 
the beneficiation of their ores. The Willows and ‘Argent mines’ were the only two to 
install smelting plants in the 1890s, yet in both cases the smelting operations were 
ultimately failures. The relevant sections of chapters 2 and 3 will illustrate that the 
smelting managers at both mines made fundamental mistakes in the design of the 
furnaces and their subsequent operation.  Only in the 1920s can the smelting of lead at 
Argent to produce lead bullion be considered a success. In the 1890s, after the failures 
of smelting operations, both mines returned to the original methods of crushing, 
concentrating and shipping the concentrates as their finished product. The management 
of the Albert mine did have plans to install a smelting plant, but the plan was never 
implemented, possibly due to cash flow problems and the difficulties of transporting 
coke to the mine. The success of a mine is not measured by how big it is or how long it 
lasted in operation, but by how much finished product it profitably produced. The 
success of the Willows mine was defined by the simple fact that in its six years of life it 
produced 19 tons of silver, at a profit, and was the largest producer in the 1890s period 
of South African history. Hence, the criteria for deciding on which mines to focus on, 
was how much silver they produced. On this basis, this chapter will deal with the 
individual, and where possible integrated, histories of the Albert, Willows and Edendale 
mines. As the mines began their lives in different years, an attempt has been made to re-
construct the histories of the mines in as integrated a manner as is possible, but on 
occasions the dates are not strictly chronological. 
 
An area to the northeast of Pretoria was originally prospected by Alois Hugo 
Nellmapius and probably other prospectors. It is not known what he was searching for, 
but in the 1880s the primary search of the majority of prospectors would have been for 
gold. To find a deposit of metal ores meant a potential financial return for the 
prospector, or a group, who formed either a syndicate or company to mine the deposit. 
In 1885 Nellmapius found a deposit of argentiferous copper on the farm Roodepoortje.  
The farm originally belonged to Christiaan Joubert, who in 1892 became the Minister of 
Mines in the Government of the ZAR. Nellmapius subsequently purchased the farm in 
order to exploit the minerals.
1
 Nellmapius was to become famous for his involvement in 
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the Hatherly distillery at Eerste Fabrieke situated east of Pretoria (near present day 
Mamelodi) and ultimately he became a close friend of President Kruger.  
 
During the prospecting in the late 1880s–1890s ‘rush’ to find the rich deposits of ore, 
dozens of deposits of argentiferous-copper or argentiferous-lead ores were discovered on 
many of the farms in the greater Pretoria region. Most of the options and prospects never 
developed into significant mines. Revival periods in the 1920s and 1950s were often 
driven by the bigger mining companies with better prospecting tools, but they still failed 
to reveal any new significant deposits. Only two deposits of importance - Edendale which 
is fully dealt with in this chapter and the ‘Argent mines’ - fall into these periods, as well 
as the 1890s period. After Nellmapius discovered the argentiferous copper deposit in 
1885, there is a gap of a year before the records show that a company - the Albert (Silver) 
Mine Ltd (hereafter Albert mine) - was formed and listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange. Helga Kaye, in her biography on Nellmapius, states that he named the mine 
after his son Albert. Although it has not been possible to confirm this, it does seem a 
reasonable assumption. It is known that he named his Pretoria house after Albert and later 





Although it appears that the Albert mine was formed as a company in 1886, it was only in 
1889 that Nellmapius became a director.
3
 The investment in the Albert mine created an 
expectation of more deposits in the greater Pretoria region and led to the region becoming 
the target of many prospectors in a search for similar silver deposits. In 1888 and 1889 
further discoveries of silver bearing ore were made on adjoining farms.
4
 The Albert mine 
was operated from 1886 to 1892. The ore of this mine was essentially argentiferous-
copper mixed with metallic sulphides of zinc, lead, uranium, antimony and arsenic. It was 
this mixture that was to make the ores of the Albert mine very difficult to separate and 
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  CS Goldman, The Financial, Statistical and General History of the Gold and other Companies of 
Witwatersrand, South Africa, p. 214. 
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discussed in detail in the text. The main sources for the information were The Standard and Diggers’ 




probably led to its ultimate closure. These metallurgical difficulties, apart from being 
mentioned, are beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
 
It has not been possible to establish the exact date when the Albert mine company was 
floated; however it must have been during 1886.
5
 The prospectus for the Victoria 
Regina Silver & Copper Mining Co Ltd, dated July 1887, mentions the floating of the 
Albert mine some 12 months before.
6
 The original directors of the Albert (Silver) Mine 
Ltd were Isaac Lewis, Samuel (Sammy) Marks, F Clench, Lewis P Ford, Carl Jeppe, 
TW Beckett and JP Hoffmann.
7
 Lewis and Marks had both been involved with diamond 
mining in Kimberley and gold mining in Barberton. They were to become very well 
known Randlord industrialists, with interests and concessions from Kruger. The most 
famous were the alcohol concession and factory at Eerste Fabrieke and various coal 
mine concessions near the Vaal River. Ford and Jeppe were partners in a legal practice 
in Johannesburg and were to become land developers, giving their names to two of 
Johannesburg’s suburbs - Fordsburg and Jeppestown. TW Beckett was one of Pretoria’s 
most important general traders and became Chairman of the ZAR National Bank - 
discussed in chapter 1. F Clench was to be involved with the first Chamber of Mines. 




The richness of the deposit that became the Albert mine is demonstrated by the extract 
in the book The Goldfields Revisited, by Edward Mathers. Writing about a visit to the 
laboratory of Mr Dawson at the Government Assay Office of the ZAR in 1887 he states 
“…one huge block from the Albert Mine, I was assured, gave a test at the rate of 58% 
copper and 500 ounces of silver to the ton.”9 To put these figures in perspective many 
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modern copper mining operations around the world are mining ore at a few percent 
copper per ton and a value of 500 ounces of silver per ton of ore is unheard of now. At 
best in most modern silver mines it may be a few ounces per ton. On the strength of the 
high assays of the deposit, in January 1888, an advertisement in the Transvaal 
Advertiser stated: “Wanted: A First class Foreman. Must have had experience of sinking 
shafts, levels, only practical miners of intelligence need apply, also a good 
blacksmith.”10 Clearly, the management of the Albert mine wished to develop the mine 
via shafts and levels. It probably indicates that they were planning on creating ‘stopes’ 
or mining areas between levels in order to mine the ore which occurred in a near vertical 













Nellmapius corresponded with the partners of H Eckstein & Co for three years trying to 
interest the Eckstein Company to invest in the Albert mine. In November 1889 Eckstein 
wrote to Nellmapius: 
 
…I note you have a very high opinion [of the prospects]…I made enquiries about 
the lode and find that with the exception of a few rich stringers, shaft one is 
practically barren…Look how often the Alberts have reported wonderful 
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  Archives of H Eckstein & Co Ltd. Volume HE 22, Letter book of H Eckstein to Nellmapius, 18 April 
1890, pp. 8-10. 
 




Eckstein was also raising serious concerns about the ineptitude of the mine’s 
management with Nellmapius, by stating: “To pay a quarter of a million pounds sterling 
for what has been done in one shaft is over-capitalising it.”13 
 
Early in 1890 Lionel Phillips, one of the partners of H Eckstein & Co, reported to 
Alfred Beit that there were problems with the Albert mine deposit. Eckstein’s 
consulting engineer, Hennen Jennings, on visiting the Albert mine was clearly worried 
about the complex mineralogy, because he had stated that although “…the lode was 
impressive, he had never seen such a complicated lode, a great variety of metals 
apparently being locked in the same vein…”14 One week later, in another letter to Beit, 
Phillips appears to declare that H Eckstein & Co should be wary of getting involved 
with the Albert mine:  
 
Albert Silver - Mr Jennings took average samples from all parts of the mine and 
the assays return is only about 4 to 5 ozs of silver. The rock is extremely hard and 
expensive to mine and Mr Jennings’ brother thought that in such a mine at least an 
average of 35 ozs would be required to return good dividends. There appears to be 
rich streaks in the vein which contains up to 200-300 ozs of silver per ton, it is 





A year later, the partners were still talking about the bad planning or management at the 
Albert mine when JB Taylor - partner with Eckstein, but based in Pretoria - wrote to 
Eckstein that it appeared that the main shaft had been badly placed in relation to the ore 
body and that after consultation with engineers it had been decided by the Board of the 
mine to sink the shaft to 100 m without carrying out further development.
16
 From the 
sources it has been determined that a mine consulting engineer, M Eissler, was 
appointed in the latter half of 1891.
17
 The mine manager in 1892 was HB Bunkell, who 
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had been manager at the Oriental Gold Mining Co in Barberton.
18
 It has not been 






















Finance was a major concern during the life of the Albert mine and the sources 
continually refer to the need for fresh working capital.  The original capital of £9 600, 
raised through the sale of shares, was far too small for the venture and the management 
had to raise additional capital of £50 000 in 1888, both for operation of the mine and in 
part to repay loans.
20
 Two years later a further issue of 50 000 shares increased the 
capital from £50 000 to £100 000,
21
 and by 1893 a notice in The Transvaal Mining 
Argus states that the shareholders at a special general meeting were to consider raising 
the capital of the company to £200 000.
22
 In November 1890, Eckstein wrote to 
Nellmapius: “The company never seems to get any further than shaft-sinking - surely, 
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with the money in hand, some effort at production might have been made during the last 
four years.”23  
 
A report on the Albert mine appeared in The Transvaal Mining Argus in May 1892 and 
describes the discovery of a rich lode of ore “…carrying pure native copper…”, and that 
the stamp battery was due to arrive shortly for the crushing of the argentiferous rock.
24
 
By November the same paper was stating that the erection of a 10-stamp battery was 
nearing completion.
25
 However, another source states that a 20 head Sandycroft battery 
was erected and an ore dressing plant included Scoular tables, Frue vanners, continuous 
bed jig and hydraulic separators.
26
 This machinery definitely falls into the category of 
concentrating equipment. No details have been found in the sources describing the 
treatment plant, so it is impossible to know what metallurgical processes they used or 
planned to use to separate the minerals in the complex ore body. The ore dressing 
equipment was only brought into service towards the end of 1892, some five years after 
the mine was opened.
27
 Why such equipment was ordered and installed so late in the life 
of the mine is not known. It is known that they had a stamp mill - to crush the ore - 
although the sources differ as to whether it was a 10 or 20 head battery, but that appears 
to be only from 1892. The sources do not clarify how they were treating the ore before 
1892 – did they have a smaller stamp battery or were they high grading the ore by hand 
and shipping it as bagged ore? The latter is the more probable scenario. The 
concentration idea came very late and the falling price of the silver market in 1892 was 
a financial blow that crippled development ideas both underground and on surface. 
Even at the time of the concentrating plant being commissioned the management of the 
mine were only planning on treating 50 tons of ore per day, a very low amount even by 
the standards of the 1890s.
28
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By October 1892 the share value of the company had dropped, yet in December the 
concentration plant was commissioned
29
 and later in the month the syndicate was 
talking of erecting a smelting plant, rather than shipping the concentrates to Europe for 
smelting.
30
 Clearly the management had no concept of the metallurgical difficulties that 
the complex ore body would present and it was compounded by an apparent ignorance 
of the falling price trends in the international silver market. It seems that disastrous 
management and bad planning in underground development in the life of the mine led to 
its demise in 1893. The deposit was proven by three shafts - the deepest reaching a 
depth of 122 m and drives over a distance of 416 m. The development appears to have 
occurred from 1886 to 1891. As the mine plan does not indicate stopes or mined out 
areas, it is likely that the majority of the recovered ore came from the development of 
the drives, rather than any stopes. The mine plan does show a greater amount of drive 
and winze development around the number 3 shaft and so it is possible that this area 
may also have been developed with mining stopes. The actual amount of ore recovered 
compared to development of shafts and drives probably became a serious financial 
problem for the mine in that the capital reserves were not being replenished by 
sufficient product sales. This may have prompted the comment by Alfred Beit - the 
London based senior partner of H Eckstein & Co - in a weekly letter to Eckstein in 
1893: “Albert we must keep out of this – we have just seen Eissler [consulting engineer 
at the mine] and he does not have a high opinion.”31  
 
A report appeared in The South African Mining Journal in January 1893 that a bar of 
silver had been brought to Johannesburg from the Albert mine. It was purported to be 
the first ever produced on the African continent. The bar measured 25 cm long, 12.5 cm 
wide and 2.5 cm thick. The ZAR mint had certified it as weighing 8.45 kg with a purity 
of 0.944. Eissler stated that they had 100 tons of concentrates on surface which assayed 
at 2.26 to 3.68 kg per ton silver.
32
 There are no records of the Albert mine ever having 
smelted ore or concentrates and there is no evidence of smelting at the mine as no slag 
was found in the area during a surface survey conducted ten years ago. Even if they had 
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smelted the ore, they would not have had the technology or equipment to refine the 
bullion to the high level of purity given in the report. This event seems more likely a 
case of re-melting a bar of pure silver from another source and forming it into a rough 
bar and using it to raise speculative capital. Another inconsistency in the report is the 
statement that the first bar of silver was sent to Johannesburg and not to the Government 
in Pretoria. Surely if the management of the mine wanted to advertise the ‘success’ of 
the mine, they would show it to Kruger and his government first.  
 
The same journal in March 1893 was stating that “…the concentration process seemed 
to be a success, and specimens of smelted ore had recently been given to the State 
President.”33 Once again the statement does not make sense. In December the 
concentration plant was commissioned and within one month of that event, the 
management is talking of installing a smelting plant and by March they appear to be 
smelting. No reports of such a smelting plant having been ordered, installed or 
commissioned appear in the sources. In order to create the impression that the Albert 
mine was sound and a good investment, one ploy may have been to smelt some of the 
concentrates in a small furnace to form a crude lump of metallic compounds and call it 
smelted silver ore. Barely two months after Kruger is presented with ‘smelted silver,’ 




The apparent scam of producing a bar of silver did not convince investors to risk their 
money. The lack of ore on the surface ready for treatment, coupled with the dramatic 
drop in the price of silver in the early to mid 1890s, may also have been significant 
factors in the closure. The operation closed as a working mine in May 1893
35
 and at the 
time of closure, the company had an overdraft of £21 000 - underwritten by the 
directors.
36
 The Editor of The South African Mining Journal published a scathing attack 
on the Albert mine management in the May issue of the journal:  
 
…At few properties have such large amounts of working capital been so 
recklessly squandered, and at few, have the evil effects of incompetent 
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management been so convincingly exhibited. …. No excuse can be made for the 
directors, they were given a free hand by shareholders and, instead of proving the 




It seems that management forgot the one basic rule of mining: remove ore at the same 
time as you develop, to make the venture pay.  
 
There are several sources in the literature which state that the mine “…was discovered 
in 1885 and continued working intermittently until 1905” or “…continued working 
intermittently over a period of 14 years until 1905”.38 It has not been possible to 
establish the original source of these dates, but they may have been from the circa 1905 
geological reports. Many of the incorrect dates in the modern reference works on South 
African mineralogy and mining have their origins in such reports. In 1905 the mine was 
surveyed and a plan drawn for the first time (Fig. 2). It is also possible that the date of 
this plan contributes to the erroneous dates for operation of ‘to 1905.’39 
 
After the Anglo-Boer War the Albert mine may have been re-worked by a small group 
of prospectors until 1910, although no records of production were found.
40
 In 1952, and 
again from 1967 – 1969 Anglo American Corporation conducted an extensive drilling 
program on the deposit to ascertain the viability of re-opening the mine. The Geological 
Survey of South Africa (now Council of Geoscience) conducted a geophysical and 
geochemical survey in 1970 and in 1994 the deposit became the subject of further 
mineralogical studies in the interests of providing a full mineralogical report on the 
deposit.
41
 None of these surveys were to result in the mine re-opening. It is known that 
the deposit is rich in silver and other metals with an estimated deposit of 70-100 000 
tons of ore. For this relatively small ore-body, the cost of modern beneficiation of such 
complex ores would probably not be recovered by the sales of the metal concentrates. 
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There are no detailed records in the public domain of how much ore was produced 
during the life of the mine. Dr Henk Voet, formerly of Anglo American in an internal 
report cited in Robb, et al. states that some 20 000 tons of high graded ore were 
produced at an average grade of 1.14 kg per ton silver. This indicates that it was a very 
rich deposit, as it equates to about 2 280 kg of silver and with copper at an average of 
10% per ton the production of metallic copper would have been in the order of 2 000 
tons. In places the grade of the ore ran as high as 45 kg of silver/ton of ore.
 42
 It is 
uncertain if the mine ever made a profit for the shareholders. It is known that it had 
debts when it was liquidated, but these may have been covered by the directors. The 
historical significance of the Albert mine for South Africa is that despite the eventual 
closure of the mine, it was the first serious attempt to work a silver rich deposit on a 
large scale.  
 
It has been stated that the mining entrepreneurs – the Randlords – looked for new and 
potential profitable ventures wherever they could. Several of the future Randlords 
settled in Pretoria, purchasing farms to the east of the city. Harry Struben was one of the 
early gold mining pioneers of the Witwatersrand, destined to become one of those who - 
although he did not make the tens of millions of his contemporaries - certainly became a 
millionaire before he left Pretoria. He was one of the early landowners when he 
purchased the farm ‘The Willows’ in 1862.43 It is mentioned extensively in his 
unpublished memoirs.
44
 Harry and his family, including his brother Fred, all lived on 
‘The Willows’. The farm is located just east of modern-day Silverton, ten kilometres 
east of the centre of Pretoria. Adjoining it are the farms Hatherly owned by Nellmapius 
and Zwartkoppies owned by Sammy Marks – Randlords already mentioned in 
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connection with the Albert mine. To the north of Hatherly was the farm Nooitgedacht, 
destined to become the site of another important silver rich lead mine – the Edendale 
mine, the history of which will be discussed after that of the Willows mine. The remains 
of the Willows mine, in the form of surface workings or dumps no longer exist as the 
site was cleared in the late 1990s to construct the suburb of Nellmapius.  
 
Deposits of copper-lead-silver ores were ultimately discovered in the 1880s and 1890s 
on a number of the farms that surrounded ‘The Willows’, and the cluster of mines and 
prospects in the area gave the town of Silverton its name.  The finding of the veins on 
‘The Willows’ actually predates those of the Albert mine by one year, but Struben did 
nothing with the discovery for over a year. What he had stumbled upon however - 
although he would never see the full development - was to become the Willows Copper 
(Argentiferous) Syndicate Ltd and the second richest mine in terms of tonnage of silver 
produced in the greater Pretoria region. The earliest reference to the Willows silver 
lodes appears in Struben’s memoirs: 
 
While sinking a well on the bank of a river [Pienaars River], to erect a large noria
45
                                  
to lift water by ox power for irrigation at [the] piggeries
46
 the miner struck a 4 foot 
vein of metal at the water level, which was declared to be silver, but I did not at that 





It is not clear when the noria was constructed, as the extract is not dated, but by 
association of events in his memoirs it was probably 1883 or early 1884. The earliest 
dated reference to a lode on the farm is in a letter written by Harry to his nephew 
Godfray Lys, dated 29 June 1884. In the letter he says: “I am very busy nowadays, 
among other amusements I am sinking on a copper lode on ‘The Willows’...” 48  
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Harry Struben sent samples to the Metallurgical Laboratory of the Royal School of 
Mines in London in 1884 and the analysis showed that he had a payable deposit of 
silver and copper on his farm. On the 23 June 1885 Fred Struben wrote a letter to 
Harry’s wife, Mary. In part of the letter he writes:  
 
You know I always said there was silver in the copper lode at The Willows, you 
will see what the assay shows. Stuff from ‘The Willows’, Copper 11.02 % Silver 
100 oz. 5 dwt [pennyweight] 17 grs [grains] per ton of 2240 lbs. So you will see it 
is payable. Well done the old Willows…49  
 
The figures above also appear in a report referred to by Harry in his memoirs. The same 
report gave a value for the Struben’s Confidence Reef (in modern-day Roodepoort) 
sample at 11.8 kg gold and 4.7 kg silver. It therefore appears that he was the first to 
mine silver in what became the Johannesburg region and by association, as a director of 









Fig. 3 Cover of the first half-yearly company 
report of the Willows Copper (Argentiferous) 
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Mary Struben’s diary discusses the family selling and leaving ‘The Willows’ on or 
around 12 February 1887.
52
 Other than comments in his memoirs that he had tired of 
what early Johannesburg had become, Harry stated the reason for the Strubens’ leaving 
for the Cape and then in the early 1890s for England, was to give their children the 
benefit of a better education.
 53
 Both Fred and Harry eventually divested themselves of 
their Rand interests and retired with modest fortunes.  
 
The Willows Copper (Argentiferous) Syndicate, Ltd was formed in November 1888 to 
continue the Struben brothers prospecting and to mine the rich silver - copper lodes. The 
initial directors of the syndicate were Octavius J Skill, who was also cited as the mine 
manager, JWS Langermann - who would later become involved with H Eckstein & Co, 
then become President of the Chamber of Mines in 1909-10 - Harry W Struben, who 
was to resign within six months of the syndicate starting operations, and Edward F 
Simpson and JJ Hamilton (no biographical details have been found on Simpson or 
Hamilton).
54












Fig. 4 JWS Langermann.
55
  Fig. 5 Harry Struben.
56
     Fig. 6 Octavius J Skill.
57
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No prospectus has been found for the Willows mine and the first substantial details to 
emerge are in the 1889 report produced for the half-yearly Ordinary General Meeting of 
the shareholders. Two extracts from this rare eight page report are reproduced below, 
the other pages, (not reproduced); deal with the geology/mineralogy, assay and 
financial reports. From the sources it is clear that this company was a serious 
proposition from its inception, for Randlord participation. Among its later directors and 
shareholders are the names H Eckstein and his partner JB Taylor (their photographs 
appear later in the chapter).  
 
Present at the meeting held on 31 July were JWS Langermann, AH Nellmapius, who 
was connected with the Albert mine and Julius Mosenthal. Mosenthal was a leading 
stockbroker and became involved in the development of the gold mining industry in 
Johannesburg. Julius was the son of Joseph Mosenthal, who founded the Mosenthal 




Very few sources were found on the activities of the mine around November 1888, 
when the mine was started. Regular shipments of ore were being made to Europe from 
early 1889,
59
 and it would appear that a significant amount of mining had taken place, 
because they reported that not only had ore been shipped, but that they had 1 600 tons of 
ore on the surface.
60
 This shows that the ore body must have been close to the surface 
and that mining may have been initially carried out using surface incline shafts rather 
than vertical shafts which would have needed hoisting equipment, (one such shaft was 
found during a pedestrian survey in 1995). The important factor is that initially the 
mining of ore was carried out at the same time as development. From the report it 
appears they intended to conduct smelting within a year of opening the mine, employing 
both a smelting expert from Europe and finalising plans for a smelting plant. 
 
The report of the Directors is one of the few 1880s silver mining industry documents to 
have been found and it is included as figure 7, not only as an interesting document, but 
is the source of many of the discussion points raised below. 
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Apart from the report of July 1889, no further director’s reports have been located. In 
fact had it not been for the letter books of H Eckstein & Co Archives very little of the 
history of this mine could have been reconstructed. One factor that has not been found 
anywhere else other than the Directors report is the early need to raise additional 
working capital. It is discussed in more detail later when further injections of capital 
were necessary and one later source was found that gave all of the details. The 
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transcripts of the letter books yielded eighteen pages of complicated financial history 
and personality struggles. 
 
Although the Directors report of July had mentioned the appointment of a smelter, in 
August 1889 it was reported that a competent smelter had been engaged and was on his 
way to South Africa. Mention is made in later correspondence that the smelter was a Mr 
Evans, but no further details have been found on him. It also stated that smelting 




Lionel Phillips, a partner in the firm of H Eckstein & Co was appointed to the Board of 
the Willows Syndicate in March 1890.
63
 Inexplicably the appointment was short lived, 
and in December 1890 he offered his resignation.
64
 It was during his time as a director, 
that correspondence with Alfred Beit in London indicates their main concerns were the 
operating costs and the impact of the rising amount of antimony in the ore. The financial 
viability of the Willows mine was always in question. The development of the stopes 
(mining areas) and the installation of the smelting furnaces would utilise virtually all of 
the operating capital and reduce financial reserves to extremely low levels on a number 
of occasions. 
 
As the transporting of coal was a major cost factor Phillips felt they should try to 
influence the positioning of the new Delagoa Bay Railway (NZASM) in order to benefit 
the mine.
65
 One problem with the suggestion was, however, noted by Phillips – namely 
that Kruger had interests in a number of farms along the proposed route and that it was 
therefore almost certain that Kruger’s choices would prevail.66 These points were 
discussed in chapter 1. 
 
Two large quotes from a letter by Lionel Phillips dated 13 June 1890 are reproduced 
below, as they give a very good insight into the daily ‘hands on’ involvement and degree 
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of participation of the Randlords in their mining ventures. Note how the first part 
discusses the smelting operation and presents rough calculations of the amount of copper 
and silver they can expect to come out of the smelt. The fact that he has to give a 
definition of the term ‘matte,’ is also an indication that the directors, or at least some of 
them, were ignorant of precious base metal smelting technology:  
 
One furnace has started work the second will be ready in 4 or 5 weeks. So far the 
smelting has been going satisfactorily and both Mr Jennings and the smelter 
(Evans) considered the test sufficient and pronounced the opinion that smelting 
can now be continued without interruption though some improvements in the 
mixture of the ore may be made. …The ore is reduced to 10% that is to say out of 
10 tons of say ore 1 ton of mixed silver, copper, iron, sulphur etc. remains in the 
furnace, the remainder being drawn off as slag. The residue or “matte” as it is 
called, Mr Jennings estimates to contain 400 to 500 ozs of silver and 25% to 30% 
copper. Roughly speaking a ton of “matte” is worth £100 and represents the 





The letter also contains a detailed warning that working capital was running low again, 
a problem that continually plagued the company, however, the letter continues on a 
buoyant note, with high expectations of large profits. Interestingly there is a warning 
regarding the “fluctuating silver market”, one of the few such references to the volatility 
of the product that they were mining: 
 
Mr Jennings estimates that when the two furnaces are working they will produce 
about 1½ tons of matte per diem producing a net return of £3,000 a month. The 
second furnace will not however contribute before August, and by the beginning 
of that month the advance offered by Mr Skill would be exhausted. …Once 
having solved the coal problems it should be possible, (though perhaps difficult 
principally owing to proportional admixture of carbonates, oxides and sulphides 
being necessary) to raise and treat 200 tons a day. This should yield 10 000 ozs of 
silver and 6 tons of copper worth £2 300. With expenses of £5 per ton a net profit 
of £9 000 would result…It is principally a question of coal supply and 
development with perhaps some regard to the fluctuating silver market. Putting 
the quantity at half however, the annual profits would be £230,000…68 
 
The letter cited above also covers other operational problems [not cited] which Phillips 
was clearly concerned about. One of the greatest, being the obtaining of sufficient coal of 
a quality suitable for the smelting, this was a concern that is mentioned in many of his 
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letters during this period. Skill came up with an idea to use the money from the sale of ore 
to fund further underground development rather than produce a return for the 
shareholders, but Phillips was against this idea. Phillips knew that without shareholder 
confidence and a return on their investment, that there would be no further financial 
support from the shareholders, or possibly the banks, if they felt that shareholder 
confidence was poor. It appears though, that Skill was planning his own ‘hidden agenda’ 
of development first and return on investment second, assuming funds were available. 
Skill’s ‘agenda’ seems to have been to get the mine to a stage where it was fully 
developed, but financially cash strapped. Then by offering to work it on tribute, Skill 
would have the benefit of working a developed mine from which he could mine the ore 
and sell at high profit for himself, with only the small tribute fee going to the company. 
The development of this hypothesis is expanded on below. 
 
Philips often wrote to Beit that the prospect for more ‘silver farms’ - a phrase commonly 
used in the letter-books - were good, but the economic depression of 1889–1890 was 
worrying. In the following extract is a reference by Phillips to the potential of silver 
mining becoming a large industry: 
 
Now that silver is so much talked of I have numbers of properties offered, but 
have so far taken up nothing beyond the farm Groenfontein.
69
 There seems 
nevertheless a great deal of silver scattered about in the direction of the Willows 
and Transvaal mines, and there is every probability of it becoming a large 
industry.  In the face of the existing depression do you think money will be forth 
coming?70 
 
Earlier in the text it was mentioned that two extracts from the 1889 company report had 
been included because they were rare historical documents from the period. The second 
document, which has been edited, is reproduced as fig. 8 below. Very little of the 
correspondence presents any more than brief mentions of development. The best 
description of the mine is in the manager’s report of 1889, it has been included here to 
show the extent to which companies reported on their underground development in the 
1880s, providing details of the lodes, as well as the surface structures, the numbers of 
staff employed and their positions and in this case demonstrates that this was a mine of 
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substance. Also mentioned in the report was that development had exposed 8-10 000 
tons of ore ‘in sight’ a considerable tonnage of ore both to mine and smelt.71 
 
 
Fig. 8 Manager’s report for July 1889 (partially edited) presenting details of development and staffing.72 
 
Considering the size of the mine, the numbers employed would appear to have been 
extravagant – 10 miners, 1 timberman, 6 engine drivers, 2 mechanics, 2 blacksmiths, 1 
carpenter, 50 black workers and 6 managers - a total of 78 men. A second report on the 
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mine and surface structures featured below, appeared in 1892, and the comparison with 
the above gives some idea of where the capital was squandered, rather than in making 
profits for the shareholders. It gives an additional indication of the development of the 
mine’s infrastructure: 
 
Workings: Two level opened on 3 lodes; on No 4 Reef first level opened for about 
1 200 feet, second for about 150ft. On no 2 Reef first level opened for 400 ft, 
second for about 200 ft. (first level is 70ft vertical, second is 150 ft.) dip about 65°; 
on No 1 Reef first level opened for 120ft. second level about 65 ft; above levels are 
driven in ore; width of lode may be taken as 3ft. 5 vertical shafts, 3 of which are 3 
compartment main hauling shafts. 
 
Surface works: 3000ft of tramway, offices, 3 double stables, cottages for married 
men, boarding house and dwelling house for single men, 5 engine houses, machine 
shop, carpenters’ shop, blacksmiths’ shop, furnace building containing two 20 x 40 
ft reverberatory furnaces, managing director’s house and two homesteads.73 
 
Sidney Jennings, whose position at the mine has not been clarified, was an American 
mining engineer and brother of Hennen Jennings the more famous mining engineer of the 
two of them. Hennen Jennings was appointed as consulting engineer to H Eckstein & Co, 
and was heavily involved with the Argent Silver Mines Ltd in the 1890s. In the July 1890 
director’s report, it appears that OJ Skill was the managing director of the Willows with R 
Meggy as clerk of the works, a person by the name of Mckinlay was the mining manager 
[underground manager] and Ellis the chief engineer. The smelter was a man by the name 
of Evans, although his name appears only once in the sources and it is not clear if he was 
replaced by Sidney Jennings. No mention is made of Sidney Jennings in the Director’s 
report and it has to be assumed that he was appointed either in the latter half of 1889 or 
early 1890. His name is mentioned in a letter by Phillips in April 1890. Skill’s position is 
not without some questions either, in the first report to the directors he signed the mine 





The mine was well subscribed and a healthy company for its time, however, working 
capital was always a problem. It would seem the primary cause in this case was over-
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development of the ore body instead of mining and shipping of the ore. The original 
capital value of the syndicate was £100 000, of which £10 000 was working capital. At 
the beginning of 1889 a share issue of 10 000 shares at £5 a share was used to raise the 
working capital to £60 000. By the middle of 1890 the working capital was exhausted and 
a loan of £15 000 was raised in England. In June, Skill offered a further loan of £10 000 
and this was accepted by the Board.
75
 By October 1890, Eckstein had advanced a further 
£5 000.
76
 Skill offered to lend the Company 10 000 of his shares to raise additional 
capital, until the smelting furnaces were commissioned and they began to yield the returns 
from which the loans could be repaid and a profit made.
77
 Once again Skill appears to 
have had a ‘secret agenda’ for advancing the loan of £10 000, perhaps as another step to 
gain financial control of the mine. Although the evidence is purely circumstantial, the 
letter books of Phillips, Beit, Eckstein and Taylor imply that Skill was always expecting 
the firm of H Eckstein & Co to produce the working capital or loans for the Willows 
mine.
78
 Skill would offer money for operating capital, but they would have to pressurise 
him into producing the money. 
 
In August 1890 Phillips was asking Jennings what affect the element antimony had on 
the value of the shipped ore and matte. The assays of the matte were showing a 
percentage as high as 36% antimony, with copper at 45% and silver 12.87 kg per ton. 
Jennings stated that antimony had the effect of reducing the value of the copper ore by 
as much as 10/- per ton per each percentage of antimony.
79
 In the same month a vein of 
ore 30 cm wide was struck at a depth of 25 m from the surface. The ore assayed silver 
10.77 kg per ton but with a lower percentage of copper. The sulphur values were high at 
11% and at the same time the ore contained an increased amount of antimony, thus 
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By September it was realised that there was a discrepancy between the assays of the ore 
and the matte. Jennings was asked to explain the variance and in letters to Phillips replied 
that new furnaces absorb the matte [into the furnace bricks].
81
 Eissler, a world renowned 
silver metallurgist of the time, confirmed this in conversation with Phillips. It has to be 
assumed that this Eissler was the same person who in 1889 was appointed as the mine 
consulting engineer of the Albert mine. Eissler stated that he had known furnaces to 




The sources revealed that there was friction between Skill and Sidney Jennings. In a 
letter to Beit on the 17 October 1890, Skill states how he had put Jennings on ‘holiday,’ 
a euphemism for suspension. Skill then appears to have unilaterally taken over as 
general manager of the Willows operation.
83
 Was he the mine manager – general 
manager or managing director? This constant changing of managerial title makes it 
difficult to know what position Skill held.  
 
Skill reported that he had found the ‘missing matte’ in the bottom of the furnaces in 
November. When it was broken up it assayed silver at 34 kg per ton and 90% copper.
84
 
There was a request by Beit for the values of assays of the ores and this coincided with 
the finding of the huge values of smelted products in the bottom of the furnaces. They 
actually have no connection and could, with hindsight, be interpreted as evidence of 
Skill’s disinformation to the Eckstein Company aimed primarily to discredit Jennings. 
There appeared to be a problem in the efficient operation of the furnaces. Sydney 
Jennings and the low thermal efficiency of the coal were the main reasons given by Skill 
for it. The result, Skill argued, was poor smelting and low returns of silver and copper 
compared to the mine assays.
85
 Obviously there was a smelting problem, but the removal 
and dismissal of Jennings appears from the correspondence to be more a clash of 
personalities, than of technical incompetence. In the same letter that Skill states that he 
has put Jennings ‘on holiday’, he also states that he has purchased coal “…which gives 
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much better results.”86 Was Jennings forced by Skill to purchase inferior coal, or did Skill 
capitalise on Jennings’ knowledge of a better source of coal after his suspension? 
Jennings was definitely the engineer and so would have had the required knowledge to 
select the correct coal, something which Skill and his lack of such training could not have 
done.  
 
Skill managed to convince Hermann Eckstein that Jennings must go, and he was 
advised to arrange it on the best terms possible. It seems that the method used to force 
Jennings out, was to get him to a point where he walked out after being advised that he 
was to be discharged. When Skill dismissed Jennings in December 1890 he described 
him as an ‘ordinary manager.’87 This treatment would almost certainly have been 
unacceptable to a man of Jennings’ training, but unfortunately for him it was used 
against him when he tried to obtain his contractual four months’ salary on release from 
the company’s service.88 It is interesting to note that he had not lost face with Phillips 
and Eckstein, because a few months later he was given a position as assistant general 
manager of De Beers Consolidated Mines in Kimberly for a few years. Then in 1893 he 
became assistant consulting engineer to the H Eckstein Group as well as general 
manager of the Crown Mines Gold Mining Company (see biographical notes).  
 
In numerous letters Phillips, Taylor and Eckstein expressed their distrust and frustration 
with Skill. In January 1891 Taylor wrote in a letter that Skill had rejected their (H 
Eckstein & Co) figures as to the profitability of the mine and that “…Skill has 
conveniently got rid of Jennings to have no unpleasant truths given out.”89 Another 
piece of evidence against Skill is that once he took over from Jennings he appeared to 
work poor or low-grade ore. Was he trying to get the mine to fail financially or be of 
little value in order to take it over? It is unclear exactly how much mining or smelting 
took place in 1891, but from July of that year most of the letters deal with an offer from 
Skill to the Willows Company, to take the mine over on a tribute basis. In early 1892 
Skill again offered to work the mine on tribute, because once again, the Willows 
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Company had no operating capital. Such a tribute agreement would have been 
disastrous for the shareholders, because the revenue earned from the operation would 
have gone to Skill, even though he was using the shareholder’s assets. In fact Taylor 
raised just such a concern earlier in 1890, at Skill’s first offer to operate the mine on 
tribute. Taylor enquired why rich areas were being ignored for the poorer sulphide ore 
bodies, but he never received a reply.
90
 It is known that Skill was a claims broker in 
Kimberley, not a mine manager or smelter, and this brings into question his abilities at 
the Willows mine.
91
 His own apparent incompetence comes through, when the mining 
operation under his control is analysed. 
 
The capital had been raised from the original £100 000 in 1889 to £120 000 in 1890. 
Between 1890 and 1891 the Syndicate spent approximately £85 000 developing the 
property. They built a large number of accommodation and mine buildings including a 
large house for the managing director/mine manager – Skill. They also installed both 
mining and reduction machinery and commissioned two smelting furnaces.
92
 As the mine 
deepened, the percentage of antimony in the ore increased and the reduction works was 
not designed to cope with this increase. This led to inefficient smelting and a copper matte 
that had significant antimony content that in turn led to a lower price being paid for the 
matte.  
 
In January 1891 JB Taylor, in a letter to Hermann Eckstein, wrote about the starting of 
regular smelting operations at the mine and reported on the potential production and 
income:  
 
No 1 furnace two charges a day on 5 tons of ore is smelted daily by the furnace 
yielding 400 lbs of matte which Skill values at £125 per ton of 2000 lb matte or 
yielding £25 per diem having 26 working days averages £650 per month – The 
monthly expenses are now £1500…The second furnace will be ready by 1 February 
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The monthly reports continued through the first half of 1891 in much the same manner 




                                
 
           Fig. 9 JB Taylor.
95




During the second half of 1891, the collapse and destruction of one of the smelting 
furnaces was blamed on an exceptionally wet rainy season. Owing to the depressed state 
of the silver market, the company was unable to raise fresh working capital for repairs 
and an offer was made to work the property on tribute, which was accepted. It is 
assumed that this is the offer made by Skill as no other offers to operate the mine under 
tribute are named in any of the sources. The lease was for a period of 2½ years, with an 
option of renewal for a further 2½ years at a rental of 10% of the net revenue from the 




What went wrong with this mine? By August 1891 the papers were calling it ‘a shaky 
syndicate’, it had debts of £27 000, and was unable to raise a further loan, however, an 
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offer had been made by Skill to work the mine on tribute.
98
 For months there was a 
constant argument between Skill and Taylor about the terms of any tribute lease. At the 
heart of it Taylor wanted the advances paid by H Eckstein & Co to be repaid before 
Skill took over the mine on tribute. Right up to the time the mine did go into liquidation 
they were constantly trying to get their advances of £8 300 repaid. They also wanted an 




At the beginning of 1892 Eckstein wrote to Beit that Skill still wanted to continue on 
the property for twelve months on a tribute basis, however Eckstein was concerned that 
if Skill failed “…the world would know and the property would be valueless.”100 In 
February 1892 it is reported that the company had accepted the offer of its manager OJ 
Skill to operate the mine on tribute from 1 November.
101
 Most of the correspondence on 
the Willows in the letter books of 1892 deals with Skill accepting a lease, and then 
declining the lease.
102
 By April 1892 there is mention of possible liquidation of the 
Willows Company, but in June Skill finally signed a twelve-month tribute lease.
103
 In a 
strange twist of fate, Skill dies of ‘inflammation of the lungs,’ on 3 September 1892 




There is no clear indication of what mining activities, if any, took place at the Willows 
mine after the death of Skill. In part of a letter dated 14 December 1893 to H Eckstein & 
Co Beit wrote “…if the thing [Willows] goes for a song I think we should buy it.”105 In 
December 1893 the mine went under auction and Beit recommended buying it, as the 
mine owed H Eckstein & Co £5 000 or more. His advice was ignored and the mine was 
liquidated in July 1894. In November Beit wrote that he was astonished that the mine 
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was sold for only £200.
106
 Two sources in the National Archives deal with the 
liquidation of the Willows Copper (Argentiferous) Syndicate, Ltd.  It is clear from one 
of the files that the company had no liquid assets by 1894.
107
 Why H Eckstein & Co did 
not bid for the mine has not been resolved. Nothing appears in the letter books of the 
company to explain the apparent lack of interest. The mine was re-opened on a small 
scale in 1907, however, lack of funds and mismanagement restricted development.
108
 In 
an attempt to locate the mine workings on the farm ‘The Willows’ the only source that 
gave any details such as GPS readings was a SAMINDABA report by the Council of 
Geoscience.
109
 Remains of shafts and trenches were found during a survey in the early 
1990s. As was stated in the introduction to the Willows mine the remains of mining 
activities no longer exist on the farm ‘The Willows’ as the area was developed in 1997 
into Nellmapius, a housing suburb of Silverton. At the same time that the Willows mine 
was in decline the political situation in the ZAR was deteriorating significantly in the 
period up to the Jameson Raid at the end of 1895.   
 
It has been mentioned that the finding of silver rich deposits of copper, at what became 
the Albert mine in 1885, led to a rush by prospectors in the late 1880s to the greater 
Pretoria region, in search of other similar rich deposits of silver. The third deposit to be 
discussed in this chapter was found on the farms Franzpoort and Nooitgedacht, just 
north of the farms Hatherly and ‘The Willows’. No records have been found of who 
prospected and found the argentiferous lead deposit on the farm Franzpoort. It is clear 
from a pedestrian survey of the farm in 2008 that prospecting was carried out. There are 
trenches and several areas where dump material exists. During the research of sources it 
became clear that that the mine generally referred to as the Edendale mine was going to 
have a very complicated history because of the many name changes that it went through 
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in the eighty years of its existence. The table below lists the two farms, the operating 
names of the mine and years of operation in an attempt to clarify the picture. 
Table 3 Mining companies operating at the Edendale mine 
 
Company Farm Operating years 
Franzpoort mine Franspoort 332 JR 1890 - 1898 
Edendale Lead Mines Syndicate Ltd  Nooitgedacht 333JR      1894 - 1905 
Edendale Estates Ltd Nooitgedacht 333JR      1903 - 1909 
Donerhoycul Tributing Syndicate Ltd        Nooitgedacht 333JR      1911 - 1914 
Edendale Inspection Syndicate Nooitgedacht 333JR      1918 - 1919 
Edendale Developing Syndicate Ltd       Nooitgedacht 333JR      1920 - 1923 
The Edendale Lead and Zinc Co Ltd     Nooitgedacht 333JR      1935 - 1937 
Union Lead Mine Nooitgedacht 333JR     1937-  1938 
Union Lead and Silver Mines Ltd Nooitgedacht 333JR   1938 - 1941  
Edendale Lead Mines (Pty) Ltd Nooitgedacht 333JR   1949 - 1974  
 
By linking the names to the farms, it is possible to show that they are the same mine 
under different names and - presumably - management. The only anomaly is the 
Franzpoort mine which can easily be explained, as the farm Franspoort (note different 
spelling for the mine and farm) shares a common eastern boundary with the farm 
Nooitgedacht. Prospecting in the 1890s revealed deposits on both farms and they were 
both developed, but the Franspoort one was ultimately abandoned. The name Edendale 
may be the attempted Anglicisation of an earlier name ‘Uitendal,’ whether this refers to 
the mine name or the possible farm name or portion is unknown.
110
 The causes of 
further confusion were references to Number 1 or 2 mine and number 1 or 2 shafts.  
 
During the research it became clear that there were two mines on opposite sides of the 
Cullinan road R513 and both had a number of shafts, although only one main shaft on 
each mine appears on the plans. The ‘Number 1 mine’ appears to date from the pre- and 
post-1900 period and the ‘Number 2 mine’ from 1907 to the 1940s. It seems most likely 
that the Number 1 mine is the mine that is on the portion of the farm Nooitgedacht that 
adjoins the farm Franspoort, where it is known that prospecting occurred in the 1890s. 
There is no plan clearly defining which mine or portion of the mine is Number 1 and 
which is Number 2. What is clear though is that the reduction and smelting plant was 
located on the Number 1 mine and the lack of such structures at the site of the Number 2 
mine indicates that the reduction and smelting remained at the Number 1 mine.  
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A photograph of the mine with the label ‘Silver mine Nooitgedacht 1892’ exists.111 It is 
believed that the date is in error and is more likely 1922. It shows a portion of the rail 
track that from knowledge of the area, would appear to be the embankment between 
Number 2 and Number 1 mine. As the Number 2 mine did not exist in 1892, this would 










Two references to the Edendale mine date from 1898. The first indicates that the 
prospecting work on Edendale had lain idle for months, but that work on the adjoining 
farm Franspoort was continuing.
112
 The second reference on 14 May 1898 detailed the 
first AGM of the Edendale Lead Mines Syndicate Ltd.
113
 From the report it would 
appear that there was personal enrichment by the original directors in that they collected 
a director’s fee twice what it should have been, and the company secretary was ordered 




According to letters and reports in the H Eckstein & Co Archives, output from the 
Edendale mine in the 1890s was 700.5 tons of lead ore.
115
 The syndicate most probably 
ceased to exist just before or during the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902. From letters in 
the H Eckstein & Co Archives, it appears that the mine was offered to H Eckstein & Co 
in the early 1890s, having been inspected under the name ‘Franzpoort’ by the consulting 
engineers Hennen Jennings, in July 1890, and A Wilkinson, in November 1891. In both 
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Fig. 11 Early photograph of the Edendale 
mine labelled ‘Silver mine Nooitgedacht 





cases it was declined, because of doubts about the viability of the mine. In a letter dated 
27 August 1904, from the H Eckstein & Co Archives, it states that at the time of the 
inspections “…the Lode was only exposed in some surface trenches and shafts not 
exceeding 20 feet deep.”116  
 
A new company, the Edendale Estates Ltd,
117
 was floated in September 1903 with a 
capital of £120 000, which was increased to £200 000 in January 1904. The Edendale 
Estates Company purchased the farm in 1904 from The Berlin Missionary Society.
118
 
The chairman and a large shareholder was JD Celliers. During the years of 1903 and 
1904 the mine featured in the correspondence of H Eckstein & Co a number of times. It 
would appear that the management of H Eckstein & Co could not make up their minds 
if they wanted to buy it or not. 
 
At the first AGM of Edendale Estates Ltd, JD Celliers reported that a shaft was sunk to 
a depth of 45 m and a second shaft had reached 61 m, these were sunk during 1904. At a 
depth of 30 m (most probably the 1
st
 level) there was development over a length of 180 
m. The output was stated to be several hundred tons per month. There was over 11 000 
tons of ore ‘in sight’ and it assayed 72 – 80% galena (lead sulphide) and 450 g per ton 
silver. He went on to explain that all working capital had been exhausted in developing 
the shafts, various levels and machinery and that a loan of £10 000 was required to 
continue operations.
119
 It has to be assumed that the capital was raised, because the 
company was still operating one year later. 
 
In September 1905, the main theme of the chairman’s report was the lack of working 
capital, but despite this the company continued with development. Sinking a new main 
shaft to the third level and driving along the second level for a further 212 m. In the 
previous twelve months the company had sold 1 120 tons of lead ore. One of the largest, 
ongoing problems for the various Edendale mining companies was the inflow of water 
into the mine. Expensive pumping resolved this problem. By selling the water to the 
                                                 
116
  Archives of H Eckstein & Co Ltd. Volume HE 234, file 71E Edendale no 4, 30 August 1904. 
 
117
  Registrar of Companies, Pretoria, File 01/01998/07, Edendale Estates Ltd. 
 
118
  Ibid. 
 
119
  ‘Edendale Estates’, The South African Mines, Commerce and Industries, Vol. 2, (17 December 1904),  




Premier Diamond mine, the Edendale Company was able to cover the cost of pumping 
and make a profit.
120
 The water was supplied on a continuous basis and this became a 
















Fig. 12 Number 1 mine Edendale Estates Ltd 1903 –1909 showing underground development.122 
 
In the first half of 1906 there were a number of monthly reports published in The South 
African Mines, Commerce and Industries. From these reports it has become clear that a 
considerable amount of underground development was achieved in the following six 
month period.
123
 By August 1906 the main shaft was sunk a further 94 m, to a final 
depth of 184 m. At the same time drives were developed east and west of the shaft for 
several hundred metres. The ore body was developed for mining by the additions of a 
series of winzes and raises and ore was mined. Several reports comment on the unusual 
fact that the width of the lode, although generally at 15 cm for most of the deposit, 
appeared to widen with depth reaching an average of 1.0 to 1.5 m between the third and 
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fifth levels. The reports also comment on the ore body carrying lead ore as the primary 
vein in the form of solid galena (lead sulphide) and that there was a considerable 
thickness of cerussite (lead carbonate) either side of the galena. From February the 
manager’s monthly reports state that from the third level the value of argentiferous zinc 














Fig. 13 Two general views of the 
headgear and buildings at the main shaft 




The greater depth also required the installation of new, larger headgear. Between May 
and July 1906 additional ore treatment equipment was installed in the form of 
concentrators and a screening plant and this was required not only to handle the 
additional output of ore, but also the mixture of lead and zinc ore. Fifth level 
development was commenced with drives on the lode being started in August. In July, 





By early 1907 the company was again running into financial difficulties and at a special 
general meeting of the shareholders it was requested that the company’s capital be 
reduced from £180 000 to £30 000 and thereafter, increasing it to £45 000 by a share 
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issue. It was stated that the sole purpose of this request was to find more working 
capital.
127
 It is not clear if the plan to raise more capital was successful, because no 
sources could be found for the period between August 1907 and July 1908. It would 
appear that the capital was raised, because mention is made of the commissioning of a 
large modern ore dressing plant at Edendale Estates Ltd, which was capable of dressing 
up to 100 tons of ore per day on a 24-hour basis. The plant included twelve sets of 
newly designed jiggers, a stone-breaker, a set of heavy rolls, screens and sorting tables. 
According to a press report it was “…the first of its kind in the Transvaal and capable of 
smelting ore direct from the mine” In his annual report for 1906–7 the mine manager, 




A report appeared in July 1908 stating that the ‘Edendale Lead mine’ was to resume 
operations despite having been placed in liquidation by one its creditors, Sir TK 
Murray, a few months earlier. The report continues by stating that Sir TK Murray has 
acquired the property and proposes to re-open the mine.
129
 It would appear that the mine 
ran into a serious cash flow problem again and operations were shut down sometime in 





Between the years 1911 and 1912 a new syndicate, the Donerhoycul Tributing 
Syndicate Ltd, produced 176 tons of lead, zinc ore, concentrates and 35 kg of silver. It is 
unclear if they actually mined ore or re-worked the dumps. When Edendale Estates was 
liquidated in 1909 there were: “Considerable quantities of zinc blende …but in the 
absence of a plant to treat it the ore has been dumped for future treatment.
”131
  In the 
Inspector of Mines report for 1914, TG Trevor reported that “…the Donerhoycul 
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Tributing Syndicate, better known as [the old] Edendale Estates, had closed down 
















Fig. 16 Main shaft headgear and associated 
buildings at Edendale No 1 mine. 
 
 





In 1918 –1919 a new company, the Edendale Inspection Syndicate, de-watered the mine 
and carried out a sampling programme. No further information could be found on this 
syndicate, but it seems that it may have been linked to the next stage in the history of 
the mine when a new company flotation was offered in 1920.
134
 The mine manager, H 
Hicks, wrote two reports referred to in the prospectus for the Edendale Development 
Syndicate Ltd.
135
 In his first report (made at the inception of the company - April 1920) 
he draws attention to the fact that the ground between the two mines had not been 
exploited and that he expected good tonnages of ore to be found in the undeveloped 
area. He also states that the machinery (presumably of the old Edendale Estates Co or 
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the Donerhoycul Tributing Syndicate) was fit for the initial purpose of the new 
company, certainly until the new company would be in a sound financial state to 
purchase new machinery.
136
 From a comment he made in his second report it is clear he 
had previously worked on Edendale for a number of years, and in a later journal report 




In August 1920 Hicks stated in his second report that they had erected a 5-stamp battery 
and associated machinery and that concentrating equipment such as Wilfley tables had 
also been installed. During underground development they had found a new lode. The 
average width of the lode was 1.5 m of which 60 cm was ‘first class ore’ assaying at 
80% lead and 202 g per ton silver. His report continued in a very strong manner stating 
that the remaining 91 cm of the lode assayed at an average of 20% lead and should yield 
1 ton of concentrates for every 4 tons of crushed ore. With many years experience on 





By the end of 1920 there was great excitement in the market as the forthcoming 
flotation of a full mining company was announced. In May 1921 the mine was 
considered a very promising venture. A third shaft had been sunk to a depth of 17 m and 
connected up to the no 2 shaft with a drive. The drive was continued eastwards for 36 m 
under the cerussite [lead carbonate]. The width of the vein averaged 46 cm of cerussite 
and first class galena [lead sulphide]. Another prospecting shaft was sunk 54 m west of 
the no 3 prospecting shaft. At a depth of 10 m the lode was intersected and had a width 




Although there seemed to be a good deal of excitement about the mine and its 
management in 1920 and 1921, the results in terms of tonnages produced do not make 
for encouraging reading. It is not known if the Edendale mine was affected by the 1922 
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strike. It is possible that by 1922 the mine had already gone into decline prior to its 
closure in 1923. By early 1923 the Edendale Development Syndicate Ltd was also 
liquidated and was replaced by Edendale Lead Mines Ltd, which operated from 1928 to 
1931, but only conducted some development work. In comparison to the 1904–1909 
period when the average annual production was 900 tons per year, the 1921–1927 
period had a high of only 83 tons, and averages of 40 tons per year. In 1930 and 1931 a 
further 37 m of shaft sinking was carried out. In 1932 and 1933 the mine is again 
recorded under the control of H Hicks, however, it appears that he only carried out 
prospecting operations. In 1935 The Edendale Lead and Zinc Mining Co conducted 





















By 1937 they were replaced by yet another company, the Union Lead Mine Ltd, under 
the control of JV Bester. The company produced 65 tons of lead ore: however, this 
company only lasted a year and was taken over by Union Silver and Lead Mines Ltd
142
 
which in 1938 produced 88 tons of lead ore and concentrates. It appears that they may 
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have had a sintering/smelting process in the 1930s, although from the description of it, it 
was rudimentary and probably not very efficient. The sources state that smelting was 
not a success and that the reverberatory furnace was converted to a sintering process 
with an output of 2.5 tons per day.
143
 The company continued developing until 1941, 




During the various periods of operation discussed above, virtually no records of 
shareholder meetings have been found and this has led to the history being based 
primarily on newspaper and journal reports of mining activities. The period from 1921 
to 1937 is devoid of journal reporting on the mine, and the only source for activities and 
tonnages, as well as the names of companies, is the 1940 report by Allport.
145
 This was 
a period of high speculation on the Edendale mines with companies being formed and 
operating, probably on very low working capital and struggling with the high inflows of 
water. Pumping costs would have crippled most small operators and this is the likely 
reason for the rise and collapse of so many companies in this period. Lead prices 
plummeted from 1925 and then on reaching a low point in 1932 began rising through 
the 1930s. Silver also dipped to a low point in 1932, but after a quick rise in 1933–34, 
was very flat for the next ten years (see Graph 1, page 22). The result of this downturn 
in the late 1920s to mid 1930s contributed to the succession of speculative mining 
companies which failed.  
 
The period of 1949–1974, when the Registrar of Companies has a company listed as the 
Edendale Lead Mines (Pty) Ltd, is a mystery. No details of any activity at either the No 
1 or No 2 mines have been discovered for this time period in any sources. From 
information in the Registrar of Companies files, the company was always being fined 
for late submission of company returns. By the 1970s the two remaining directors had 
ceased to carry on the business [no details given], the company had no assets, and was 
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insolvent and in 1974 the company was struck off the Register of Companies.
146
 The 
inclusion of the details for this period completes the history of this substantial mine, 
which is known to have had nine changes of ownership over an interrupted productive 
life of at least fifty years (1890–1941) and possibly some form of production into the 
1960s giving it a potential life span of seventy years, during which it has been 
conservatively estimated to have produced 5000 tons of lead and just over 1100 kg of 
silver.  
 
In 2010, the Number 1 mine area was very overgrown - some of the reduction works 
foundations, including the furnace foundations, were found. Although most of the waste 
dumps have been removed, probably for road construction material, there are still small 
dumps of the slag and sintered ore. The main shaft is flooded to about six metres below 
ground level. The area of the Number 2 mine is very unstable and dangerous, with 
significant collapses of the shaft area and the trenches leading to the upper stope levels. 
This mine is also flooded close to ground level. A recent Master’s dissertation by J 
Glass presents details of possible pollution from the remains of the Edendale lead 
mining activities, although the details presented of the mine workings and her 




The three mines discussed in this chapter all have one common link - the H Eckstein & 
Co. Although the company did not ultimately invest in either the Albert or Edendale 
mines they were approached in the hope that they would invest. They had their 
consulting engineers look at the possibilities of profitability of the two mines, but in 
both cases were advised to stay out of them. The main reason for not taking control of 
them appears to have been doubt regarding the yield of silver. With hindsight they made 
the right decisions, although the problem with the Edendale mine was not so much the 
profitability of the deposit, but the need for huge amounts of capital to deal with the 
excessive inflows of water and the resulting high pumping costs. Ultimately, the mines 
of Edendale (the No 1 and No 2 mine) can be considered as substantial operations for 
the time period in which they were developed.  
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The deposit at Albert, although apparently rich in silver, was a much smaller ore-body. 
The complex metallurgy of the deposit with its mixture of metallic elements was far in 
excess of the capabilities of smelters of the 1890s to resolve. The significant problem at 
the Albert mine was management incompetence. They began by placing the main shaft 
in the wrong place relative to the ore body and compounded the error by spending the 
working capital on development without the benefit of mining and selling concentrates. 
 
All three of the mines discussed in this chapter produced many tons of silver. The 
Willows mine was not only very rich as an ore-body, but unlike the Edendale and Albert 
mines, had huge advances of capital investment and working capital. As a producer of 
silver in the 1890s it was the largest in the greater Pretoria region with an output 
calculated at 19 tons of silver (see Appendix 3). OJ Skill as the mine manager lacked 
the competence and responsibility needed for the position. It has been shown that he 
was working more for himself than the mining company and that development and 
smelting operations were far from competently managed and resulted in the eventual 
financial failure of the mine. The history of silver mining in the greater Pretoria region 
continues with the silver producing mines at Argent.  
 
Although a number of Randlords were active in the Albert and Willows mines 
management, they were also the principle driving force in the financial development of 
these two mines, as initial investors and in investing further capital into the companies. 
The Edendale mine, as one of the major silver and lead mines, is unique in that 
throughout its life it never fell under the ‘Randlord’ umbrella. The H Eckstein & Co 
investigated the mine in the early 1890s as a potential investment opportunity, but 
declined involvement in it for reasons which were explained. The development of the 
Edendale mine was left to lesser speculators and although the mine had a long and 
productive life, it did see an extraordinary number of companies form and eventually 
fail with the mine. Ironically the fluctuating international price of metals – lead and 
silver – seems to have had less impact on the Edendale mine than other silver mines in 




C h a p t e r  3  
THE ARGENT SILVER MINES, 1889–1899 
The Pretoria far southeast or Argent area, with its formerly silver rich mines, is located 
close to the railway siding of Argent, 40 km east of the town of Springs. For simplicity 
the name ‘Argent mines’, often used in this dissertation, refers to the four mines located 
on the farms Brakfontein, Boschpoort and Dwarsfontein that are discussed in this 
chapter and in chapter 4. This area was always the main centre of silver mining in the 
country, with the Transvaal mine on the farm Dwarsfontein being the largest, deepest, 
and longest running mine - albeit intermittently - for silver in the greater Pretoria region. 
The term ‘Transvaal mine’ is used as a generic term to describe the same mine under its 
different operating names, as it has changed name and ownership a number of times 
over the one hundred years of its history. It was known as the Transvaal Silver Mines 
Ltd in the 1890s. It became Transvaal Silver and Base Metals Ltd, during the 1920s, 
then Dwarsfontein Galena Ltd in the early 1940s and finally in the 1950s and 1970s as 
the Argent Lead and Zinc Ltd. The three name changes coincide with the periods during 
which major mining occurred, and the fourth period of the 1970s, when only 
investigations into the potential of the area, and its mines were carried out.  
 
The first period - discussed in this chapter - was in the 1880s and 1890s under the 
ultimate control of H Eckstein & Co. The period from 1900 to 1999 will be discussed in 
chapter 4. Although in effect chapter 4 covers a longer period of time, nearly hundred 
years, there were lengthy periods of inactivity on the four mines that make up the 
Argent mines. In general there was far less political intrigue connected with the mines 
in the twentieth century and interest in the mines was purely economic, initially with 
small operators to 1919 and then between the various mining houses up to the 1970s. 
 
Initially the Transvaal mine on Dwarsfontein was owned by various diamond and gold 
Randlords - specifically Barney Barnato and his nephew Wolf Joel. Because of the 
richness of the deposit of the Transvaal mine, intrigue and in-fighting followed when 
other Randlords - such as Hermann Eckstein, Lionel Phillips and Alfred Beit - became 




Farrar where involved in other silver mines in this area. By 1891 the silver mining 
industry in the region had become polarised between two primary players - H Eckstein & 
Co and the Witpoortje Syndicate, controlled by George Farrar. Eventually the partners of 
the two companies merged their silver mining interests under the control of H Eckstein & 
Co to become the dominant force in the silver mining industry before 1900. The period 
would see political intrigue, both within the boardroom and on a national political level. 
The deteriorating relationship between Kruger and the Randlords discussed in chapter 1 
was to have an impact on the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd, although the most devastating 
impact was the collapse in the price of silver and lead in 1894. 
 
This chapter deals with the period of mining activity from 1889 until the outbreak of the 
Anglo-Boer War in 1899. The Witpoortje syndicate had its two most important properties 
in the Argent mines area – the Brakfontein and Boschpoort deposits. These deposits were 
on farms of the same names and shared common boundaries with the farm Dwarsfontein, 
on which the deposits of the Transvaal mine (main mine) and the Pretoria Silver Lead 
Mine (Pretoria mine) were located.
1
 These four mines formed the ‘Argent mines’. 
 









                                                 
1
  Because there are the remains of two mines on the farm Dwarsfontein and they were operated as separate 
companies, the narrative will refer to them as the Transvaal mine which is synonymous with the ‘main 
mine’ or ‘Argent main mine’ and operated as the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd in the 1890s. The other 
mining company developed the Shimwell vein and will be referred to as the Pretoria Silver and Lead 
Mine Ltd, or Pretoria mine, which features more in chapter 4 than this chapter.  
Map 2. The location of 
the Argent mines and 
farms.  
 
Note the term main 
mine is synonymous 
with Transvaal mine 
 




Geographically the mines are located north and south of the Johannesburg - Witbank N12 
highway, close to a rail siding at a station named Argent, east of Delmas.  
 
One of the earliest references for the district involves the finding of a lead chromate in 
1885 and thus the possibility of silver rich ores on the farm Dwarsfontein.
2
 The results 
of the analysis, it must be assumed, led to the prospecting of the area and the finding of 
significantly silver rich lead deposits. Although, no records have been found of such 
prospecting activity, it is known to have occurred because of the extensive prospecting 
trenches on the Transvaal mine property. A company, the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd, 
was formed to prospect and mine the deposit on 23 January 1889, with a capital of £270 
000, of which £25 000 was reserved for working capital. The first Board of directors 
included Barney Barnato (chairman), diamond magnate and chairman of Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investment Company (JCI). George Farrar (chairman of the Witpoortje 
Syndicate), W Ross, HC Trull, Samuel W Jameson (a director of the Willows (Silver ) 
Mine Ltd), George A Tilney (a mining speculator and a director of Crown Reef Gold 
mine) and George Kynoch (a director of the Nevada Silver and Smelting Company).
3
 In 
the following year additional directors, supportive of the Barnatos, were appointed to 
the Board. 
 
A report in The Diggers’ News for June 2, 1889 stated that: “A new lode has been struck 
…and sinking upon it is now being proceeded with…ore from the main lode gave an 
average yield of 76 ozs of silver per ton.”4 Another report in the same newspaper, but 
dated June 11, 1889, states “…seven small incline shafts are down to various depths of 
30 to 43 feet…A powerful hauling and pumping plant from the Sandycroft Foundry 
Company has already been delivered at the mine [for installation] at the main shaft.”5 
Clearly the richness of the deposit was sufficient to attract large amounts of investment 
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capital into the company and it was soon listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. In 
July 1889 an inflow of water was encountered in the deeper parts of the mine.
6
 By the 
end of August 1899, the pumping and hauling plant had been commissioned and shaft 
sinking continued down to 17 m with the water problem under control. A new prospect 
shaft was begun on the main lode and reached a depth of 7 m. The development of a 


















The finding of the originals of the mine engineer’s reports in the Harold Strange 
Library, the reports and proceedings of the 2
nd
 to the 6
th
 Annual General Meetings of 
shareholders of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd and the mine plans of the Transvaal 
mine for 1890 and 1892 in the Barlow Rand Archives, provided significant and 
unprecedented details on the actual layout of most of the mine surface structures for the 
1890s. The plans do not show the concentration plant building or the smelting plant, 
both of which are discussed in more detail below. The report by the consulting mining 
engineer, WH Furlonge, describes the two lodes on the property as the west lode and the 
east lode, approximately 2 km apart.  
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Silver Mines – Report to Directors of Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd by H Jennings, (April 1980), 
Harold Strange  Library, Johannesburg Public Library, Johannesburg. 
Fig.18 Cross-section through the main and 
prospect shafts of the Transvaal Silver Mine, 








Approximately 18 m south of the prospecting shaft, the new main shaft had by 
December 1889 reached a depth of 40 m (130 ft level).
9
 On 7 December 1889, The 
Diggers’ News reported:  
 
”…a 3ft seam of galena [had] been struck in a drive from the main shaft at a depth 
of 100 ft. It gives 50% lead, and 75 ozs of silver to the ton. 25 tons of it are being 
packed in skins and shipped to Barnato Bros in London.”10 
 
It is clear from this newspaper report that the deposit was very rich and that the Barnato 
family were intent on controlling the whole process of mining and selling the ore. The 
first Annual General Meeting (AGM) of shareholders was held on 31 January 1890. A 
press report of the meeting infers a share fraud by Barnato, which became the lever for 
Eckstein, Phillips and Beit, as directors of H Eckstein & Co, to remove the Barnato 
faction as directors of the Transvaal Silver Mine Ltd. In the press report a Mr Lithauer - 
a shareholder - objected to money of the company being invested in shares of JCI, 
owned by the Barnatos. Initially the transaction had made a profit, but by the time of the 
AGM the value of the shares had dropped, thus reflecting a loss to Transvaal Silver 
Mines Ltd. Lithauer’s argument was that such funds should be used to develop the 
Transvaal mine and not venture into speculation capital.
11
 At the time of the Barnato 
control of the company, not all shareholders were happy with the purchase of the shares, 
although they ratified the purchase. Because Barnato had voted for the transaction and 
he was the interested seller of the shares, his action in voting had made the transaction 
illegal. 
 
The Barnatos controlled the original board of directors, but early in 1890 Beit, Eckstein 
and Phillips - who were already involved with the Willows mine near Pretoria - decided 
that it was time to make a hostile takeover of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd in order to 
remove the Barnatos from control of the company. From the early days of Kimberly and 
its diamond mining industry the people connected with Rhodes and Beit - including 
Phillips and Eckstein - were vehemently opposed to anything involving the Barnatos.12 
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The animosity came from the early days of their diamond mining days at Kimberly when 
the Barnato’s mining company was in competition with Rhodes and his company. Phillips 
and Eckstein had both been managers of diamond mining companies in the Kimberly area 
and as such they were both known to and became close confidents of Alfred Beit, the 
financial power behind Rhodes and later Eckstein’s company H Eckstein & Co Ltd.13 
 
The hostile takeover was accomplished by buying up blocks of shares until they had 
enough to demand directorships at the next AGM. Then from within the company, Beit 
and colleagues staged an effective coup d’état by ousting directors who were aligned 
with Barnato. This was achieved by altering the trust deed at an Extraordinary General 
Meeting held in November 1889. The new trust deed required directors to personally 
hold at least 1 000 shares in the company and in the following extract of Phillips’ letter 
to Beit dated 18 April 1890, note how he outlines the plan and the economic plotting 
that was going on by the directors of H Eckstein & Co to achieve their objective of 
ousting Barnato:  
 
We have bought and have control so far of about 30,000 shares at 6/-. I sent for a 
copy of the Trust Deed. The Barnato people were all powerful formerly in this 
concern but we hear on good authority have but a few shares left. De Pass and 
Finlayson hold about 60,000 shares between them but we are told are at daggers 
drawn. Altogether we require half their shares or a few more actually to control 
the concern. You will see that it is a “wide” Trust Deed and the directors have full 
powers. The writer will go on the Board as alternate for Trull. The present Board 
consists of Trull, Ross (of the May Co. not the … [faded]) G. de Pass, Lowenthal, 
Rynoth, Farrar, Jameson, Barnato, Joel, McDonald, and I de Pass. Some of these 
have alternates. McDonald is Barnato’s secretary but is to be removed from the 
Board next meeting because he was not qualified at time of election and one of 
our men just in his place. Lowenthal is working with Trull as well as de Pass. 
Hence we have the majority of the Board here…Kynoch is likely to sell out and 





By May 1890 the H Eckstein & Co owned 64 000 shares in Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd 
and thus a controlling interest.
15
 The planned financial reorganisation was carried out 
when the capital was reduced to £54 000, being one share for five. It was increased 
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again in August 1890 by 54 000 shares at par, with a further 12 000 shares held in 




A comprehensive report on the mine was written in early 1890 by Hennen Jennings. . 
Jennings detailed the development of the surface winzes and the main shaft and was 
critical of the previous development in terms of the pumping equipment installed. He 
argued that it was inadequate, but in one instance was oversized for the needs at that 
stage. Jennings also made a number of recommendations for the future development of 
the mine, in particular the development of drives from the main shafts on the east and 
west lodes and the smelting of the ore at the mine. The report contains a detailed list of 
the machinery and buildings, as well as the number of employees, which at that stage he 
listed as 14 whites and 50 blacks.
17
 Although the report lists two Blake jaw crushers in 
the machinery, there is no indication of a concentration plant at the mine at this time. It 
has not been possible to determine when the concentration plant was constructed, as it 
does not appear on either the 1890 or 1892 plans. It seems likely that the Blake crushers 
were installed in the early part of 1890 or even in 1889 and one has to assume in the 
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Fig 20 Blake jaw crushers & foundations in 1902 
(they are just above the large pipes) with the 1890s 





These crushers required substantial foundations, such as the ones of dressed stone in the 
photograph (Fig 19). The concentration plant building was most probably constructed in 
the latter part of 1891 to coincide with the installation of the smelting plant. During the 
archaeological excavations the position of the foundations of the concentration building 
relative to the Blake crushers appears to confirm this hypothesis, as does the only record 
of the building - the photograph of it (Fig 20) - which is discussed in the next chapter. 
On 10 April 1890 the mine was temporarily closed down for some unknown reason and 
the mine was allowed to flood. One can only assume that during the change of 
ownership no mining operations took place, but by July 1890 the mine was being de-




In July 1890, Phillips was appointed chairman of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd. with 
Hermann Eckstein’s brother Friedrich as a director and so the boardroom coup d’état was 
completed, and Phillips wrote to Beit in London giving details of the directors: 
 
Transvaal Silver:  You will be glad to hear that the registration of the 
supplementary Articles of Association and decrease of capital disqualifies the 
following: Barnato, Joel, EC Jameson, G de Pass, I de Pass, G Raws. The writer 
has been elected chairman, and Mr F Eckstein a director...my only desire is to 
have enough safe men on to have absolute command of the seat at the board. 
Barnato’s representative (Lance) was thunderstruck when he was informed of his 
chief’s disqualification as well as that of Joel.21  
 
The letter continued by giving details of the additional agenda, namely to re-elect G de 
Pass, I de Pass and G Raws to the London Board. It has not become clear why these 
three men were so favoured, unless it was an attempt to wean them away from the 
Barnato camp. It is known that I de Pass was already working for Beit in London. A 
further example of expedient boardroom politics was an agreement between Phillips and 
Farrar to re-elect G Raws as a director. Raws was closely associated with George Farrar 
and two other directors, Ross and Trull in the Witpoortje Syndicate. As Phillips was 
probably looking towards a merger with the Witpoortje Syndicate it made sense to keep 
them on the Board of Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd.  
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Soon after the takeover Phillips states in a letter to Beit: “I have settled the dispute with 
Barnato Brothers,” and continues by giving further details of Barnato’s fraud. The letter 
indicates how the H Eckstein & Co applied pressure on Barnato in order to gain control 
of the Transvaal Silver Mines company. The directors of H Eckstein & Co knew that 
their own actions and the legality of the methods used in the ousting of the Barnato 
faction from the Board may have been questionable. Phillips doubted if they could have 
proved the fraud, so it was a form of economic and social blackmail that gained them 
control of Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd.
22
 The irony of the re-formation of the board is 
that it went from being a Barnato supportive one, to an Eckstein/Phillips supportive one. 
 
In April 1890, when Phillips had taken over as chairman, he was informed that a lease 
had been taken out by Samuel Fox
23
 on the adjoining farmer’s portion of the farm 
Dwarsfontein.
24
 This portion of the farm covered the supposed area where the vein 
might extend to laterally, in a so called ’deep level’ development at a depth of 
approximately 300 m. The company took Fox to court over the matter, citing that the 
farmer was obliged to offer the portion to the company first in terms of their lease 
agreement.
25
 This was a test case regarding the pegging of claims on property next to an 
optioned farm on which there was a working/established mine. In taking out a mining 
lease, a company defines an area of operation regardless of depth below surface. If the 
mineralised lode or vein is dipping in a particular direction it is possible that the vein 
may extend outside of the lease area at depth. This became evident with the gold reefs 
of the Rand and led to the formation of the ‘Deep Levels’ companies such as Crown 
Deep in Johannesburg. In theory if you had the leased area next to the original company 
and the vein crossed the boundary, at depth, and into your area, the vein was yours to 
mine.  
 
In practice, when companies calculated that their vein was going to go out of their lease 
area, they generally covered themselves by leasing the adjoining portion of a farm. Fox 
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argued that he had leased the “surface” land from the farmer, but in reality what he had 
leased was the portion of the farm that was above any deep level section of the vein. 
They argued successfully that Fox was not a farmer and that in time he would offer the 






Fig. 21 Sketch of vein crossing a lease boundary  









It appeared that Fox was associated with a known speculator - Campbell Johnston - who 
had intended to lease the ground next to the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd lease area in 
what could only have been a speculation attempt.
26
 During the final stages of the case 
the Fox party tried to bribe one of the company’s witnesses not to enter the box, and this 
was brought to the attention of the court.
27
 The case dragged on for months, but 
eventually the court declared the contract between Fox and the landowners null and 
void. Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd gained the rights to the area and concluded an 
additional lease from the farmer on the ‘deep levels’ portion of the farm. The court case 
and result had a significant impact on the development of both the Transvaal mine as 
well as many of the gold mines in Johannesburg, as it clearly defined who had first 
option to develop the property adjoining an existing mine. Phillips was convinced that 
Loewenthal, the former managing director under the chairmanship of Barney Barnato 
was deeply involved with the ‘Deep Levels’ case and consequently Phillips was 
instrumental in forcing Loewenthal to resign from the board and take retirement.
28
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Hennen Jennings was appointed as consulting engineer to the Transvaal mine in July 
1890.
29
 He was responsible for de-watering and re-opening the mine after its 
unexplained closure during the change of ownership.
30
 A level was started at the 40 m 
level and a cistern level, for the collection of water prior to pumping to the surface, was 
cut just below it. The main shaft, by the end of December 1890, had been sunk to a 
depth of 51 m. The prospect shaft was sunk to the 31 m level and a cross cut driven to 
the main shaft, during the course of which the lode was proved to have two branches 
carrying good ore (see fig 18). Jennings, mentions in his report that numerous problems 
associated with the installation of the new equipment had been encountered and that it 
was decided to further equip the mine with a machine shop, carpenter’s shop and a 


















Fig. 22 Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd. 1890 mine plan – underground and surface structures.32 Note some of 
the details on Plans 1 and 2 may be poor, due to the reduction from an A1 size original. The plan is 
reproduced as Appendix 5 in a larger scale. 
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During the latter half of 1890, Otto Hahn was appointed as metallurgist and general 
manager of the mine. Apparently he was an ‘expert’ in the smelting of lead ores, gained 
from twenty years experience on a number of mines in the USA and Mexico.
33
 By the end 
of 1890, 124 tons of ore had been shipped to England for sale,
34
 and development of the 
mine had progressed very well.  In February 1891 Phillips wrote that development of the 
drives on the 40 m level had begun. He commented on how ‘splendid’ the ore body 
looked at this level, that the surface winzes [from the prospecting trenches] were down to 
about 15 m and were being developed over a distance of 300 m on the surface of the 




Hahn completed his drawings for two reverberatory furnaces and George Farrar took 
them to England for manufacture during the middle of 1891. Towards the end of the 
year it was reported that the lode had been struck after driving 17 m on the cross cut at 
the 71 m level and that a consignment of ore at 75% lead and 2.83 kg per ton silver had 
been shipped to England. The improvement in the operation of the mine is borne out by 
a press report which stated that the share price of the company had risen from 49 




Two new water-jacketed blast furnaces were landed at Durban in November and were 
transported to the mine.
37
 The new furnaces were each capable of smelting 40 tons of 
ore daily. The smelting plant consisted of the two blast furnaces, two reverberatory 
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Fig. 23 Historical photograph of the visit by Lord Randolph Churchill to the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd 
sometime in 1891.
41
 Many of the men in the photograph are mentioned in the text of the dissertation. 
 
 
By August 1891, the working relationship with Hahn and the underground manager, 
Andrew Angwin, was souring. Comments by Phillips to Beit in the letter books such as: 
“Hahn is doubtless a good metallurgist but quite useless in ordinary management and 
fearfully crotchety”42 and “Hahn is absolutely useless except in his own particular 
branch and Angwin is too slow”43 became typical comments. By December Phillips was 
writing “once he [Hahn] gets outside his furnaces he becomes absolutely useless…Hahn 
is absolutely incompetent as a general manager.”44 It is possible Hahn was out of his 
depth as the general manager, as his background was as a metallurgist of a mine, rather 
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than a mine manager. It appears from the comments by Phillips that he could not 
manage a mining and surface operation simultaneously and was therefore upsetting 
Angwin, the underground manager. Hahn chose to ignore instructions or advice from 
Jennings, the group consulting engineer, which as far as Phillips was concerned, was the 
final error in judgement by Hahn. Both Hahn and Angwin would eventually be 
replaced.
45
 It is not known what became of Hahn, but Angwin was by 1893 the general 
manager of George Farrar’s gold mine - East Rand Proprietary Mine (ERPM) - in 
Boksburg. Whether his appointment to ERPM was because of Farrar’s connection to the 






Fig. 24 Andrew Angwin, in 1893 as general manager 
of the ERPM gold mine, Boksburg and formerly  




In the 17 October 1891 edition of The South African Mining Journal, mention is made of 
a new syndicate being formed, named the Witpoortje Syndicate.  The Witpoortje 
Syndicate 
47
 operated the Brakfontein and Boschpoort mines on farms of the same names, 
which adjoined the Dwarsfontein farm, where the Transvaal mine was located. From the 
Registrar of Companies files in Pretoria, it has been possible to establish that the original 
directors of the syndicate were George Farrar, Charles Parker, Charles Marx, Henry 
Curtis Small, Herman David and Anthony Devenish. With the exception of George Farrar 
no biographical details have been found on the others named. 
It would seem that mining/prospecting operations at Boschpoort began in late 1890 or 
early 1891. In a letter to Beit on 3 January 1891 Phillips mentions Boschpoort for the first 
time: 
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At Boschpoort on the other side of the Transvaal Silver they have struck a lode 
about 18" wide which gives marvellous results.  Assays varying from 1000, 800, 
450 to 200 ozs!  The farm is in the hands of a syndicate here, Farrar, Marx, Ross, 
Trull etc., who also holds Brakfontein, another farm on which lead has been 




By April the syndicate had sunk a shaft on the vein and invited Phillips to inspect the 
mine after which he informed Beit in his letter of 1 April 1891 that he was impressed with 
the two veins, although it required more development to determine the full potential of the 
deposit: “I was allowed to go down the shaft. It is 71ft. deep…there are two veins of rich 
lode matter to be seen one about 2ft., the other about 1ft. in thickness but it is quite 
undefined as yet. Mr Hahn [mine manager of the Transvaal mine] thought well of the 
ore.
49
 By the middle of April the syndicate had accumulated sufficient ore to ship - 
approximately 50 tons - and Phillips mentions the shipment in a general letter. He adds 





Unfortunately very little was ever published regarding the activities of the syndicate and 
most of the detailed information has been gained from the letter books of Lionel Phillips. 
In May, the syndicate approached Phillips with a proposal that he invest with them. It was 
arranged for Eckstein’s consulting engineer, Hennen Jennings, to investigate the various 
prospects. Phillips, in a letter to Beit, states: “Boschpoort seems a good thing and they 
have three other farms, the pick of the district as far as surface goes as they were first in 
the field.”51 Writing to Werner (Beit’s partner in London) later in the month, he appears to 
have agreed to join in the syndicate, subject to Jennings’ report being favourable. Interest 
shown by Rudd (partner of Rhodes) of Gold Fields and Beit wrote that Rudd wanted a 
quarter interest in the venture. However, Farrar was only interested in the Eckstein group 
becoming an investor in the Witpoortje Syndicate. Phillips recounts how: “Farrar was the 
largest shareholder and his opinion carried great weight with the rest of the syndicate.”52  
 
                                                 
48
  Archives of H Eckstein & Co Ltd. Volume HE 149, p. 505, 3 January 1891. 
 
49
  Ibid., p. 627, 1 April 1891. 
 
50
  Ibid., p. 636, 10 April 1891. 
 
51
  Ibid., p. 649, 24 April 1891. 
 
52




Jennings’ report was highly favourable, describing Boschpoort and Brakfontein as ‘a first 
class gamble’. Phillips then bought into the syndicate and probably became the second 
largest shareholder after Farrar. A letter in June 1891 gives an indication of the richness of 
the deposit: 
 
The assays run remarkably high.  The average value of ore shipped about 175 
ozs to the ton, the remainder of the ore (considered seconds), 78 ozs. Of this 
grade ore but little would be needed to get ones money back. Brakfontein dump 
assays 60% lead and 26 ozs of silver and the lode is very strong. I am strongly in 




By August the shaft at Boschpoort had been sunk to 46 m, resulting in exposure of the 
lode. It was very small, around 25 cm, of which 15 cm was galena. The silver content was 
2.38 kg per ton. During this time the prospecting continued on the Brakfontein mine.  
 
Although it was narrower than the Transvaal mine lode, the Boschport lode averaged 4.25 
kg per ton silver. The capital of the syndicate was £16 000 and the managing director was 
JC Parker. Apparently, in the early days of the syndicate, Parker was concerned, as the 
company secretary GH Trotter had met losses on the stock exchange by embezzling a 
thousand or so pounds of the syndicate’s cash and at the time of the report Trotter was in 
gaol awaiting trial.
54
 A letter by Phillips gave details of the fraud. It is interesting how 
Trotter committed the fraud and the measures Phillips took to ensure such a fraud could 
not happen again: 
 
The Secretary of the syndicate has been arrested for embezzlement, I think he 
has been speculating with the funds of the syndicate but do not expect from 
present information that we will suffer a serious loss. He did it cleverly as a 
requisition for wages came from the mine, is passed by the bond bearer, cheque 
drawn, etc. He drew two cheques for the same amount getting different directors 
to sign them.  In future with all our companies I intend to make the directors sign 
the requisition as well as the cheques.  It was a daring thing to do and only came 




Towards the end of 1891 Phillips wrote a detailed letter about the farms in the 
syndicate. Discussing Boschpoort, he states that the lode had widened to 60 cm with the 
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galena (lead sulphide) being about 25 cm wide and the ore assayed at 57% lead and just 
over 390 g per ton silver. The letter makes it clear that Brakfontein was the syndicate’s 
prime property and Phillips mentions that they will have to “…to buy the freehold of 
Brakfontein for £14 000 or abandon the farm.” Regarding the prospecting on the other 
leases of the Witpoortje Syndicate he was not very hopeful and all work was stopped on 
the other farms. As the funds of the syndicate were low with “…only about £2 500 
working capital left…most of the members are in favour of floating Boschpoort.”56 
 
A decision was made by the directors to drive about 31 m from the shaft on Boschpoort 
and then float the company. It seems that Phillips wanted to extend the development for 
a few months more, but other members of the syndicate were keen to float the company 
and in the end Phillips relented. In a letter in November 1891 Phillips wrote: 
“Witpoortje syndicate shares have been dealt in at over £600…if we let them float part 
of the concern for say £120 000 with £50 000 working capital subsidised at par I should 
not be surprised to see the shares go over par in a brisk market.”57 
 
By December 1891, at a special General Meeting of the shareholders, Lionel Phillips had 
obviously purchased a substantial holding of shares in the syndicate because he presided 
at the meeting. Others present were Messrs. Hermann David, Sidney H Farrar (brother of 
George Farrar), V Robinson, Charles Marx, F von Hessert and B Lazarus. Together they 
represented seventy-five percent of the capital. The share capital of the syndicate was 
increased from £16 000 to £17 600. It was also stated at the meeting that after further 
development on Boschpoort it was planned to float the company in March of 1892.
58
 The 
results of the first shipment of concentrates by the mine were given in the 11 June 1892 
issue of The South African Mining Journal. The shipment yielded an average of 60% lead 




At the same time that development was taking place on the Brakfontein and Boschpoort 
mines, the Transvaal mine was developing two separate areas. The Transvaal mine was 
down to 71 m level with drifts east and west in strong lodes. The width of the lode 
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varied, but in the main part of the mine, on the 71 m level, the vein was running 
between 2 and 4 m wide of solid galena, [lead ore rich in silver].  The so-called east 
lode, some 2 km east of the Number 1 shaft, was also being developed with a shaft 
[Number 2 shaft] and drifts were being developed both east and west of the shaft. In 
January 1892 it was decided to shut down the east lode operation, primarily due to the 
















Fig. 25 Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd. 1892 mine plan – underground and surface structures.61 
 
Two detailed reports were produced in early 1892, one by Hennen Jennings, in his 
capacity as group consulting engineer, and the other by Otto Hahn, the general manager 
of the mine. Jennings’ report gives extensive details on the developments up to the end 
of 1891. These details had been the sinking of the main shaft to a depth of 105 m, with a 
third level being developed at 101 m, and drives had been extended by some 250 m 
during the year.  The 10” (254 mm) plunger pump previously installed on the 40 m 
level, was lowered to the 71 m level with a drawing lift installed to the 101 m level. The 
mine was put on a more permanent basis when a steel headgear replaced a wooden 
structure above the main shaft. Developing the drifts on the 71 m level had shown that 
the lode width averaged 1.85 m. On the 40 m level, drifts had been extended an average 
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of 123 m north and south of the shaft, with an average lode width of 1 m, but were up to 




A great deal of development work had taken place both above and underground in 1891, 
but as so often happened with the silver mines of the greater Pretoria region the amount 
of working capital was underestimated for the work needed to bring the mine to 
economic production. The result, as with the Willows and Albert mines, was the 
Transvaal mine ran into a significant cash flow problem. The most likely cause was the 
development of the smelting operation and the large expenditure involved in smelting 
the ore. Although Hahn was supposed to be the expert, it appears that he may have 
lacked specific knowledge for the task. He had considerable difficulty understanding 
that the local cokes did not have a sufficient calorific value for the furnaces that he 
designed, in other words the heat generated by the local coke was lower than imported 
coke and this meant longer roasting times. His designs were probably based on those of 
overseas furnaces which ran on better grades of coke. The result was that the company 
had to import ‘Cardiff smelting coke’, and this led to questions about the viability of the 
smelting operation. Hahn was under great pressure to resolve the situation, but it would 
not improve until the middle of 1892. The company borrowed £25 000 for working 
capital, although there was a considerable tonnage, (50 000 tons) of ore ‘at grass,’ with 
average values of 23% lead and 0.74 kg per ton silver.
63
 Based on the values of the two 
metals in 1892 this would have given an approximate value for the ore stockpile of £355 
000.  
 
In his second annual report, Otto Hahn the general manager, (see Appendix 5 for full 
version of the report) commented on the difficulties of obtaining good coke and furnace 
bricks.64 The main part of his report dealt with the development work on the smelting 
and reduction works at the mine. The report presents a great deal of detailed information 
of the type of equipment, the process, and the numbers of men employed on the mine. 
The detail regarding the buildings is of particular importance when combined with the 
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 Archives of H Eckstein & Co Ltd. Volume HE 5, Annexure 19. General Manager’s report to 3rd AGM 




information on the surface plan of the mine (Fig. 21), as it formed part of the research 
used for the archaeological excavations conducted at the Transvaal mine. These two 
historical documents contributed to the formulation of the excavation model which 
formed part of the excavation plan.
65
 In the report by Hahn the men’s single quarters 
were described as follows:     
 
…the white men’s quarters was also constructed…of wood and iron, and 
occupies an area of 175 ft. x 26 ft. It contains a dining hall, two rooms for 
boarding house attached, and 24 rooms for 2 workmen each. The rooms are all 
lined with brick, whitewashed, and provided with wooden ceiling and floor. The 
kitchen, which is separated from the dining-room by an open air space, is also of 




This description complements the results of the archaeological excavation of part of the 
single quarters, where pieces of plaster and corrugated iron were found. As the building 
was destroyed by fire during the Anglo-Boer War, all traces of the wooden floor and 
ceiling would have been destroyed. The report presents a huge amount of detail regarding 
the buildings, their size and use and in some cases approximate locations. No trace of any 
structures of the reduction works has been found, but the report mentions that it: 
 …was located by Mr Jennings and the writer on the 21st of July, at a distance of 
700 yards to the north-east from the Main Shaft.  Grading was commenced soon 
after, and stone foundations laid for two tall chimney-stacks, one for the roasters, 
and one for the smelter, as soon as the company’s quarry was cleaned out and 




The description also provides a clue as to the location of the quarry from which the stone 
was obtained for the dressed stone foundations of many of the buildings. The photographs 
of the Anglo-Boer War damaged 1890s buildings (which are included in the next chapter) 
show that the buildings had dressed stone foundations. This fact is significant as it 
corroborates the statement above about the use of building stone. To date such a quarry 
has not been found, and it probably disappeared under one of the 1920s dumps of waste 
rock or crushed slimes.  
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The report mentions the manufacturing of bricks on site. It describes the construction of a 
brick furnace and that they also produced crude, low fired or sun-dried brick on the site. 
This coincides with the archaeological evidence of low and medium fired bricks which 
have by association, with dateable structures, been identified as coming from the 890s 
period. The description of the houses in the report mentions that they were built “of wood 
and iron with a lining of sun dried brick”: 68  
   
The waste of brick burnt in the ordinary open field-kiln was so large that it was 
considered advisable to build a brick-kiln, with stationary fire-places, which gives 
better satisfaction in every respect…One brick kiln, 21ft. 10in. x 16ft. 3in. and 





The company had to be relatively self-sufficient in food stuffs - primarily due to the 
location of the mine 100 km east of Johannesburg - so they practised vegetable farming. 
The results were not always successful as the extract explains: “The Company has about 
65 acres of ground under cultivation, mostly with mealies. The growing of vegetables is 
only a moderate success, the vermin getting the lion’s share.”70 The sources make no 
mention of animal husbandry but it is fairly safe to assume that the mine also kept cattle 
and either sheep or goats.  
 
From a social point, the health of the workers and the accident rate were costly concerns 
to the management. It appears that until 1892 the death rate had been due to various 
diseases rather than mining related accidents, as the extract of the general manager’s 
report for 1892 states: 
 
The health of the men has not been as good as the salubrious climate of this 
region would lead one to expect, yet only one case of serious illness has come 
under my notice, viz., one of typhoid fever. There have been two deaths among 
the white men from natural causes, one of heart disease, and one of 
consumption. Among the natives pneumonia seems to prevail to a large degree, 
and there have been six deaths as a consequence of it. Of accidents there are 
fortunately only two to record, one to a white man who was struck by a loose 
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rock while timbering the shaft, and one to a native, neither of a fatal nature but 




Pneumonia, typhoid and consumption [tuberculosis] would have been some of the main 
killers in the nineteenth century. The lack of antibiotics and poor housing/living 
conditions would have meant almost certain death, once contracted, from the diseases. It 
is possible that death from tuberculosis among the miners was incorrectly diagnosed, 
the real cause being death from silicosis or the inhalation of quartz dust. This disease 
eventually destroys the lung tissue and a person’s ability to breathe. A similar, but more 
debilitating variety of the disease is known as phthisis, which results in the loss of body 
weight as well as the ability to breath. Both of these lung ailments would lead to the 
deaths of tens of thousands of mine workers on the Witwatersrand from the 1890s 
through to modern days, although the symptoms are more readily recognised today and 
modern precautionary measures have significantly reduced the death rate. By 1902 the 
Chamber of Mines recognised three diseases as the biggest killers of the black labour 
force on the mines, with pneumonia, the largest killer, accounting for 41.7% of deaths. 
The second and third killers respectively were diarrhoeal diseases at 20.5% and scurvy 
at 12% and these were due almost solely to poor diet and poor living conditions.
72
  
Death from silicosis was largely unrecognised at this time and was largely denied by the 
mining industry as the prime cause of pneumonia-like deaths. Part of the reason for this 
denial would most probably have been culpability and the possible pension re-
percussions for the mining companies.  
 
The final element of social importance in Hahn’s annual report is that it lists the number 
of employees and their occupations: 
 
The working force under the mine manager consists of 17 white men, 
comprising miners, engine-drivers, tool-sharpeners, carpenter and smith, and 
200 or more natives. 
 
 At the reduction works there are employed, 1 construction engineer, 3 fitters,
 8 carpenters, 1 blacksmith, 4 masons, 3 bricklayers, and in connection therewith, 
at ore floors, brickyard, clay-pits, and quarry:-- 
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 13 additional white men. Total 33 white men and 120 natives.  The official staff 




Thus the total workforce at the Transvaal mine in 1892 was 55 whites including the 
mine manager and 320 black workers. These numbers make it a significant employer for 
the 1890s. It is interesting that the places given for employment of the men included the 
brickworks and quarry, thus confirming other sources that the company made its own 
bricks and also quarried and dressed stone. Only one other report dealing with 
employees and occupations was found during the extensive research that was carried out 
for this dissertation and that was at The Willows mine (see previous chapter). 
 
About 3 km north of the Transvaal mine, on a different portion of the farm 
Dwarsfontein, is another argentiferous lead lode. Although no details have been found 
of any active mining on this deposit prior to 1900, a company - the Pretoria Silver and 
Lead Company Ltd - was registered in 1892 and appears in the Registrar of Companies 
files. The reason for mentioning it is that the deposit did become active again in the 
early 1900s, although this is the earliest reference to the deposit.
 74
 It has not been 
ascertained what became of the 1892 Pretoria Silver and Lead Co. It is known that the 
invested capital was £60 000, which was a substantial amount in 1892.  The directors 
were listed as Ludwig Ehrlich, David J Pullinger, Egbert J Kock, Benjamin Courtney 
and WA Tilney, (once again no biographical notes). There was a George Tilney, who 
had been an original director of TSM under the Barnatos; perhaps he was related to WA 
Tilney. The likely scenario for the apparent failure of this mine in the early 1890s is that 
its development occurred when the price of lead and silver was collapsing on the local 
and international metal markets. A new company with a similar name was opened in the 
early 1900s and the detailed story of it will form part of the next chapter. 
 
From the unknown members of the board of directors of the Pretoria Silver and Lead 
Company the discussion moves to the veritable ‘Who’s Who’ of Randlords and mine 
owners, that attended, or were represented by proxy at the 3
rd
 AGM of the Transvaal 
Silver Mines Ltd in April 1892.  Among those present were Lionel Phillips, George 
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Farrar, Carl Hannau, Otto Beit, Friedrich Eckstein and Edouard Lippert. As 
shareholders, represented by proxy, were Hermann Eckstein, JB Taylor, Alfred Beit, 

















Fig. 26 Barney Barnato.
76
      Fig. 27 Lionel Phillips.
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The men who controlled the silver mining industry in the 1880s - 1890s and 











Fig. 29 Hermann Eckstein.
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                Fig. 30 Alfred Beit.
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                        Fig. 31 George Farrar.
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On 25 June 1892 Phillips wrote to Beit a long detailed letter with the results of assay 
samples taken in the mine, they clearly show that the richest part of the mine was on the 
first level at 40 m.
82
 Much of the excitement dealing with the richness of the mine was 
based on the first two years of development, which would have been in the upper levels 
of the mine. With hindsight it becomes clear that although the deposit was very rich and 
would continue to be so throughout the life of the mine, both in the 1890s and 1920s, 
the above average or richest part of the mine was on the first level.  
 
The two smelting furnaces were in operation by July 1892 and were treating about 75 
smelting charges per day, each charge consisting of about 680 kg, thus about 25 tons per 
day for each furnace. The daily yield of lead bullion was expected to average about 8 
tons from each furnace. The bullion was cast into 51 kg bars, assaying silver at 4.5 kg 
per ton.
83
 The SA Mining Journal reported that over 80 tons of silver-lead bullion had 




Towards the end of 1892 a letter was sent to all shareholders detailing the progress 
made at the mine. It mentions that both blast furnaces were in operation and that 360 
tons of bullion had been produced, containing approximately 1 187 kg silver and 358 
tons of lead. When the original scheme for smelting had been proposed by Hennen 
Jennings, he had stated that a problem might exist with local coal/coke and advised 
testing it before finalising the designs of the furnaces or roasting ovens, but this does not 
appear to have been done. The report mentions that the initial charges were with 
imported coke, but that the local coke, when tested, was found to be only 10% inferior 
to the imported coke. The cost of the local coke was only about one third of the 
imported coke. It was also reported that all smelting operations had been suspended 




Neither of the surface mine plans indicate the location of the smelters or roasting ovens, 
but one account published in The South African Mining Journal does give a clue to its 
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general position. It describes how the ore was dressed to three grades and then taken 
from the shaft to the smelting plant situated about 650 m northeast of the shaft; this 
would put it close to the site of the 1920s smelter.
86
 This source also confirms the 
statement in the 1892 annual mine manager’s report by Hahn that the reduction plant 




By October 1892, the problem of a good supply of local coke had still not been fully 
resolved and although the roasting furnaces were in operation, the smelters were not. It 
was decided to suspend mining operations, because of the large quantities of ore ‘at 
grass.’ The only underground work carried out up to this time had been development 
work, and the mine was now in a position to exploit the ‘backs’ or mineable areas for 
many years.
88
 Lack of coke or coal supplies created a situation where they could not run 
the roasters and smelters at the same time this led to huge stockpiles of ore ‘at grass.’ 
The mine was well developed and had sufficient ore ‘in sight’ to supply the 
roasters/smelters for 3-5 years, no further underground development was necessary and 
operations were suspended in October 1892.
89
 Again this lack of control or balance of 
the surface and underground development would have created significant operational 
difficulties. The company was either mining ore or smelting the ore but neither 
operation at the same time and so labour time and utilisation would have been wasted 
and costly. 
 
At the end of December 1892 it was reported in The SA Mining Journal that the 
smelting operations were to commence again in January 1893. It was also stated that a 
large amount of ore had been roasted and that a supply of good coke had been sourced 
locally.
90
 However, by 21 January 1893 the same journal reported that owing to the 
great depreciation in the value of lead and silver since the smelting works was first 
proposed, it had been decided to stop the smelting operation at the mine.
91
 Added to the 
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downturn in the value of the smelted metals was the large increase in import duties 
payable on the imported coke and the failure of local suppliers of coke to meet the 
demands for the smelters and roasters at a reasonable cost.  It was decided to erect an 
ore dressing and concentrating plant and to export the concentrates, rather than smelt on 
site. The former consulting engineer to the mine and now group consulting engineer, 




An article appeared in the 24 December 1892 edition of The Standard and Diggers’ 
News in which it commented on a shareholders meeting of the Witpoortje Syndicate 
Ltd.
93
 It stated that Farrar had announced that the properties of the syndicate, of which 
the Boschpoort and Brakfontein mines were the most important, would be closed down 
to await the results of the new system of concentrating the ore to be adopted at the 
Transvaal mine. If the new system of beneficiation was successful a similar plan would 
be followed by the Witpoortje Syndicate. The Standard and Diggers’ News was one of 
the earliest newspapers on the Witwatersrand and it was nearly always anti-management 
in its approach and therefore its articles have to be read objectively. The reference 
follows the disclosure by the Transvaal mine in The South African Mining Journal that 
its smelting operation was to be closed down and a concentrating plant and process 
installed instead. The editor of The Standard and Diggers’ News was concerned that 
Farrar and the directors of the Witpoortje Syndicate had decided to close the mine down 
and play a ‘wait-and-see’ game with Transvaal mine, regardless of the wishes of 
shareholders. While it would appear that this was true, one has to remember that the 
syndicate and Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd had a number of common directors, who were 
also the largest shareholders of both companies. No details of operation of the 
Witpoortje Syndicate after December 1892 have been found.
94
 However, the records of 
the Registrar of Companies show that the company was only liquidated in 1909 and for 
which no explanation has been found. 
 
Returning to the story of the Transvaal mine, in early 1893 correspondence was 
published in which shareholders of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd expressed their 
disbelief at the explanations given for the closure of the smelters and the need to install 
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a concentration plant as an alternative method of processing the ore. The mine had been 
over-developed, but the smelters were never fully functional, primarily due to a lack of 
local supplies of coke. It seems clear though that the advice of Hennen Jennings to test 
local supplies of coal/coke and obtain assurances of supply before committing to 
smelting were ignored. Was Hahn the main culprit, or was it bad directorial 
management – probably both, but Hahn was expendable and would soon be sidelined 
and then dismissed. Clearly Jennings, as group consulting engineer, was also at fault for 
not having followed up on his advice to test the coke before allowing the order of the 
new smelting ovens. One of the major mistakes though was not to enter into contracts 
for the supply of local coke before the expenditure of building the costly roasting and 
smelting plant. 
 
It was mentioned in The South African Mining Journal dated 4 February 1893 that the 
new general manager – E Wertheman - was due to arrive shortly and that a general 
meeting of shareholders would then be called. No mention was made of Otto Hahn, the 
former general manager.
95
 In March 1893, the chairman, Lionel Phillips, stated that 
towards the end of December 1892 the company had shipped 289 tons of lead bullion 
and 266 tons of ore, which were expected to give a return of £10 000. There was lead 
bullion and ore in shipment, or at the mine waiting to be shipped, which was expected to 
yield a further £12 600. There was also 18 000 tons of ore ‘at grass’ containing an 
average of 20% lead and 750 g per ton silver. Lionel Phillips continued by stating that 
Otto Hahn, their general manager, had presented them with details that the ore 
contained only 3% sulphur and that by simply roasting it, it could be rendered suitable 
for smelting. After trials it was found that the ore in fact averaged closer to 8% 
sulphur.
96
 This meant that the roasting time would have to be longer and would require 
more heat, which in turn meant larger amounts of coke with no corresponding increased 
yield in silver and lead. This raises the question of how such a supposedly ‘experienced 
and expert’ smelter made such a costly and time consuming mistake. 
 
After the commissioning of the smelters, the international market price of silver fell by 
4 pence per 30 g and the price of lead by £2 per ton, leading to a drop of £2 800 in 
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 Although the richness of the ore meant that the mine was still 
profitable, the need for a longer period of roasting also meant that more furnaces would 
have had to be installed to roast the same quantity of ore in the same time period, 
costing, it was estimated, a further £20 000. The Board therefore decided to suspend 
smelting operations and to install a concentration plant and ship the concentrates. It was 
expected to have the plant installed by August 1893. The Board employed Wertheman 
on a one-year contract. According to Phillips, Wertheman was “…a gentleman who had 
considerable experience in the treatment of that class of ores” and he was to replace 
Otto Hahn as general manager.
98
 In 1891, Phillips had said that Hahn was a man who 
had come with the highest recommendations of his ability, a man with twenty years 
experience in the smelting of lead and silver ores! 
99
 This raises the question of whether 
Phillips was misled in the capabilities of Hahn or he was incapable of determining the 
requirements of a manager/smelter for the mine – it was probably both. In January 1893 
Wertheman left for Europe to order the concentrating plant. Hahn lost his position 
primarily because of the mistake regarding the quantity of sulphur in the ore which 




The mine continued to smelt ore until all roasted ore was converted and in April 1893 
the company shipped 338 tons of lead bullion and 68 tons of sorted ore to Europe.
101
 By 
July 1893 the new ore dressing and concentrating plant, consisting of some 250 tons of 
machinery, arrived at the mine.
102
 At the beginning of August 1893 the decision was 
made to suspend all mining work underground, except the pumping, until such time as 
the concentrating plant had proved itself. Shutting down underground operations would 
reduce the running costs of the mine. At the end of September 1893 The SA Mining 
Journal reported that the concentrating plant was in the process of being commissioned 
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and in November 1893 the plant was producing between 400 and 500 tons of 
concentrates per month.
103
     
 
During the switch from a smelting operation to a concentrating operation it appears that 
the decision to suspend underground development and mining was reversed, as 591 m 
of drifts were added on the 40 m level, 96 m of drifts on the 71 m level and 61 m of drift 
development on the 101 m level. The total ore raised was 7 737 tons, most of which 
came from the development of the drifts rather than stoping. The smelting process 
treated 1 418 tons of ore and resulted in 376 tons of lead bullion being shipped, with 
just under 10 tons of lead bullion prepared for shipment. The concentrating process by 
comparison treated slightly less than 6 000 tons of ore and resulted in 1 263 tons of 
concentrates being produced, of which 695 tons were shipped by the end of 1894, along 
with a shipment of 693 tons of untreated ore. By the end of the year there was 
approximately 20 000 tons of ore stockpiled at the mine.
104
 Despite assurances by 
Wertheman, that the concentrating plant would cost less than £10 000, the account 
entries show that the cost was nearly £18 000. This was additional capital outlay on top 




The details above show that concentrating the ore was operationally far more viable 
than a smelting operation. Despite employing ‘experts’ in the reduction or smelting of 
ores, the directors of the various silver mines such as the Albert and Willows mines and 
the Transvaal mine were misled by these experts, into either spending huge amounts of 
money to construct smelting plants or the cost of operating reduction and smelting 
plants.  
 
There was a need to realise the actual returns of all ore and concentrates shipped to 
accurately gauge the financial position of the company. During this period 29 517 tons 
of ore were treated, producing 4 364 tons of concentrates. The lower grade of the ore 
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has to be seen against the falling international prices of silver and lead, with the value of 




In early 1894 the general manager, Wertheman, sent a report to the Board: 
 
I have on previous occasions laid before your Board the unsatisfactory results of 
our research work and now draw your attention to the fact that the payable ore in 
your mine seems limited to one bunch of ore… Lateral exploration has failed so 
far to develop other bunches of industrial value, while, in depth, the main bunch 
gives out. …I do not, at the ruling values of our product, deem it prudent to incur 
liabilities for the purpose of prospecting, and therefore advise you to suspend 
operations at the ‘Transvaal Silver Mines’.107 
  
On this advice the Board decided to close down all mining and only continue 
concentrating operations, which closed down from the end of March 1895 as the price 
to which silver fell made the mine unprofitable to work. This led to Wertheman 




The mine was allowed to flood and from March 1895 the surface plant was put under 
the control of a caretaker.  The mine was not liquidated as rents had been paid on the 
properties and the only reason for suspending all activities was the low price of silver 
and lead. It was expected that they would regain their former prices, at which time the 
mine could be re-opened. The chairman of the Board at the 6
th
 AGM said that “…a 
word of praise was due to Mr Wertheman, as it was he who had turned the mine around 
and into a profitable position, unfortunately he had resigned following the closure of the 
mine.” 109  
 
As indicated in chapter 1, in January 1896 four of the directors of Transvaal Silver 
Mines Ltd were arrested as conspirators in the Reform Committee. The Jameson Raid 
and Reform Committee are discussed in chapter 1. They included Lionel Phillips 
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(chairman), George Farrar, Samuel W Jameson and HA Rogers. Phillips and Farrar 
were initially sentenced to death. Consider, the mine is in financial difficulties, its 
operations had closed down due to the depressed price of lead and silver, to a degree it 
has lost direction and then four of its six local directors are removed, including the 





The next reference to the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd company is the report of the eighth 
AGM, held in August 1897, where the chairman RW Schumacher had virtually nothing to 
report. The mine and surface works were still closed down and there was very little 
prospect of opening in the short term due to the low international metal prices. 
Schumacher reported that the “…price of silver had continued to fall such that the world 
price had fallen to below 26 pence per ounce.”111 At this low price it was clearly 
uneconomical to operate the mine. 
 
In August 1898, Friedrich Eckstein, brother of the deceased Hermann Eckstein, had 
taken over the chairmanship of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd. The ninth AGM was 
almost a repeat of the previous year. Questions were raised as to why the company was 
not liquidated and Eckstein stated that they had a mine with rents paid in advance and 
with equipment assets. If the price of silver recovered, they could easily re-open it, but 
in the longer-term, liquidation was a possibility. This appears to have been the last 




The ‘Argent mines’ were developed primarily with the capital of the Randlords in the 
1890s. They were deeply involved with the daily management of the mines, but as with 
all of the silver mines of the greater Pretoria region, they were controlled by the fate of 
the international silver market and local political events in the mid–1890s. 
 
The arrest and trial of the four directors following the Jameson Raid created a vacuum 
in mine management. Following the trial there was a lack of motivation to re-establish 
the mine, but research has shown that it was the depressed metal prices that were the 
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primary reason for the closure and not the de-motivation of the directors. The research 
was able to provide, from the annual reports of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd (which 
are part of H Eckstein & Co records), the tonnages of ore produced. Using the assay 
values from the reports, the potential tonnages of lead and silver for the 1890s period 
could be calculated. It was clearly a very rich mine producing some 61 000 tons of ore 
from which nearly 6 000 tons of lead bullion and high-graded lead ore were shipped 
overseas. The potential output of silver from this shipment was calculated at just over 
17 tons. 
 
The 1890s was the period of greatest prospecting and development of silver mines in the 
greater Pretoria region. The Willows mine produced 19 tons of silver in the same 
period. The difference was that the Transvaal mine continued producing silver in the 
twentieth century, whereas the Willows mine was not re-opened after 1900. Both mines 
would pass out of the control of H Eckstein & Co in the early part of the twentieth 
century and from 1910 the company would have no further interest in the silver mines 
of the greater Pretoria region. 
 
Although the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd ceased operating in 1895 it was still registered 
as a company until 1910. The four ‘Argent mines’ would experience different degrees 
of re-prospecting in the twentieth century, but all would become producers of silver and 
lead again over the next 57 years. This was a period that would see a succession of 
tribute miners until the Argent mines were re-structured and re-opened by the Albu 
brothers of General Mining and Finance Corporation in 1919, followed by Gold Fields 
in the 1950s. The story of the Argent mines will continue in the next chapter beginning 
with the period immediately after the end of the Anglo-Boer War in 1902, and 





C h a p t e r  4  
THE ARGENT MINES 1900–1999  
This chapter continues with the history of the Argent mines. The outbreak of the Anglo-
Boer War on 11 October 1899, makes 1899 a natural closing point for the previous 
chapter, as all mining activities across the Witwatersrand and outlying districts ceased at 
that time. During the weeks leading up to the outbreak of war, share prices of all 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange had plunged, and by the end of 
September 1899 most gold mining company shares were listed at zero value. Although 
the mining operations of all of the silver mines in the Argent district, and specifically the 
Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd, had ceased by 1895, the company was still listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 1899.  
 
During the one hundred-year period covered in this chapter - from 1900 to 1999 - the four 
mines of the area, namely the Boschpoort, Brakfontein and the two mines on the farm 
Dwarsfontein, i.e. the Pretoria mine and Transvaal mine, were to see a resurgence of 
interest and capital investment by minor mining companies working the mines on a 
tribute basis. There were also periods of major re-investment by General Mining 
Corporation from 1919 to 1927 and Gold Fields of South Africa in the 1950s and again in 
the 1970s. The investment in 1919–1927 was to produce not only the greatest 
development of the Argent mines, but also the largest output of silver at 45 tons. The war 
damages compensation claim by the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd for severe damage done 
to mine buildings during the latter stages of the Anglo-Boer War is discussed and the 
chapter will continue with the history of these mines in the twentieth century, a period of 
World Wars, labour and political transition and global economic fluctuations.  
 
During the Anglo-Boer War the mine buildings of the Transvaal mine were damaged 
either by British or Boer forces. The evidence indicates that the damage was perpetrated 
by British troops on 6 July 1901. An eyewitness report by Mrs Cathrina Roets, of the 
farm Dwarsfontein, was submitted by Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd to the claims officer 





claim for war damages of £6 545.
1
 The claim was submitted with four photographs, two 
showing the damage done to the manager’s house and European single quarters - both 
of which were gutted by fire. Whether this was a wanton act of vandalism, or a fire that 
got out of control will never be known. However, the fact that the two buildings were 30 
m apart would seem to preclude accidental damage, especially when added to the 
damage to the other buildings. It is worth noting that the original farm building, with its 
moulded ceilings, forms the core structure to the existing farmhouse on Dwarsfontein 
and so it would appear that the 1890s farmhouse avoided destruction by Imperial troops 
during the commando phase of the war. The other two pictures show the assay office 
and the concentration plant building, both of which suffered structural damage. The 
dressed stone foundations of the two Blake jaw crushers can be seen in the photograph 



















During preliminary archaeological investigations of the site, using the site plans and the 
four photographs, the concrete foundations for the wooden columns and the remains of 
                                                 
1
  National Archives of South Africa, Pretoria. Depot TAB, Source CJC. Volume No 43, Ref. CJC796 – 




  Transvaal Silver Mines - Report to Directors of Transvaal Silver Mines by H Jennings, (April 1890), 
Harold Strange Library, Johannesburg Public Library, Johannesburg. 
Fig. 32 Front cover of the file for war 
claims damages by the Transvaal Silver 






an internal office of the concentration plant building were located. The foundations do 
correspond with the structural shape of the building in the photograph.  
 
The main focus of the archaeological study was to locate and excavate the manager’s 
house and European single quarter’s foundations. The concept was to take historical 
documents (mine plans) and create a composite plan of the mine buildings of the 1890s 
and 1920s.  The predictive model of the position of the 1890 building foundations was 
tested using limited excavation techniques and found to be accurate. The possibility for 
further archaeological research on the Argent site is very strong, with particular 
reference to the 1890s concentration plant and the single quarters being ideal areas for 
excavations. During the excavations, samples of low and medium fired bricks were 
found along with plaster and corrugated iron fragments, all of which confirm the general 
description of the structures given in Hahn’s 1890 manager’s report and mentioned in 
the previous chapter.  
 
The excavated foundations, along with some of the structures as they exist in 2011, 
appear in Appendix 11. A number of artefacts were recovered and they included a small 
square clear glass bottle, a glass ink-bottle - recovered from the 1920s boiler house - and 
sherds of various pieces of 1880s ceramics (tea cups) and a large part of a green glass 
vessel. Photographs of selected artefacts appear in Appendix 10. The significance of 
these finds is the link between the historical documents, the plans and the photographs 
and the descriptive text of the various sources used in this dissertation. A full report of 





It is clear from the annual reports to shareholders that no mining or beneficiation 
activities took place at the mine between 1895 and 1899. It has to be assumed that 
during the Anglo-Boer War, 1899–1902, any caretaker that had been present in the 
period from 1895, abandoned the property, most probably at the outbreak of the war. 
The file and supporting documents for the claim for war damages provided the only 
known photographs of buildings of the Transvaal mine from the 1890s period.  
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No records have been found of any Boer commando that may have camped at the mine 
during the war. A series of questions were supplied by the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd 
as part of the supporting documentation for the damages claim. Specific questions were 
put to a Mr EFW Pohl, who apparently lived on the farm Dwarsfontein up to May 1901, 
when he surrendered himself to the Irene concentration camp near Pretoria. The 
questions and Pohl’s answers have been inserted, (Fig 29).4 The dates are of interest. In 
question one, Pohl states that he left the farm on 24
 
May 1901 and then in question two 
he states that the buildings were all intact when he left. When asked in question three 
who burnt down the buildings, his reply was the ‘Imperial troops on 6 July 1901 under 
General Campbell.’ When asked if anyone was present during the period of destruction 
the reply was Mrs Cathrina Roets and her children, who also lived on the farm at the 
time. Pohl also states that the 
loose timber was used as 
firewood by Boer commandos 
and that a C Vermaak carted 
away two small sheds. From 
this it appears that the Boer 
forces did camp at the mine 
during the war, although Pohl 
places the blame for damage 
on the Imperial forces. 
 
Fig. 33 Questions and replies 
regarding war damage to the 
buildings and property of Transvaal 
Silver Mines Ltd as part of the 
supporting documentation for 






As Pohl was interred by the end of May, it is not clear how he knew about Campbell 
and Vermaak. It has been established from the records of the Consolidated Gold Fields 
of South Africa that Mrs Roets lived on the portion of Dwarsfontein on which the 
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Number 1 shaft of the Transvaal mine existed. In the Gold Fields files it is named as the 












Fig. 34 European miner single quarters. 
                                                                                   
 

























Photographs of the destruction caused to buildings at the Transvaal Silver Mines 
Ltd during the time of the Anglo-Boer War 1899–19025 
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Fig. 36 Mine assay office.   
 
Fig. 37  
Concentration  
Plant house (note 
the Blake crushers 






Research revealed that there were three British officers named Campbell in the British 
army in 1901.
6 
Only one was a major general, namely BBD Campbell and his closest 
reported movements to Argent were in the Standerton area. There was a Major D 
Campbell, but the only reference to him is in the eastern Free State. Finally there are a 
number of mentions of a Colonel WP Campbell who commanded the 2
nd
 Battalion 
Kings Royal Rifle Corps. The conclusion of the research is that it is this Colonel 
Campbell, possibly mistaken as a general (or he may have been a brevet general), whose 
troops were at the Transvaal mine, although the evidence is circumstantial. From 3 July 
1901 General Sir B Blood was nearing the end of his operations southeast of Pretoria. 
The British advance was along two fronts, namely the railway lines between Heidelberg 
and Pretoria and Middelburg and Pretoria. Between 7
 and 10 July 1901, Campbell’s 
force advanced placing him in the vicinity of the mine on 6 July – the date in Pohl’s 
statement – thus it seems quite feasible that the British caused the damage to the mine 
property.
7
 It seems unlikely that affidavits were obtained from either Mrs Roets or the 
owner of a neighbouring portion of Dwarsfontein - Mrs Le Grange – as such documents 
were not found in the file. On 4 July 1905 the Military Compensation Board disallowed 
the claim for financial compensation.  
 
Lionel Phillips, after the Reform Committee trial and subsequent commuting of his 
death sentence for his role in the plot to overthrow the Kruger government, left South 
Africa for England. Of the other directors of Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd who were 
involved in the Reform Committee, nothing is known of their involvement, if any, in the 
company after 1895. The twelfth AGM of the shareholders was held in July 1905. The 
chairman, Henry C Boyd, who was also employed by H Eckstein & Co, stated that the 
cash balance stood at £4 253, with some of the plant machinery having been sold off for 
£56.
8
  There was still a belief that metal prices would recover to their former levels and 
that the mine could then re-open as a profitable operation. 
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TJ Ball took over the chairmanship of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd during 1908. He 
stated that for some time the directors had been trying to lease out the mine on tribute, 
and that such a venture had now been entered into for a period of three years with the 
Transvaal Silver Mines Tribute Syndicate Ltd.
9
 The syndicate appears to have consisted 
of two men, Sir Aubrey Woolls Sampson and Mr JR Williams - who had been the 
consulting metallurgist to H Eckstein & Co.
10
 Having set up their own battery, the 
tribute miners ran into serious problems with underground water later in the year.
11
 The 
syndicate only operated for about eight months – January to August. During that period 
they produced 133 tons of ore with a lead content of 62% per ton and containing 151 kg 
silver.
12
 Despite having taken a three-year lease on the old Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd 
property, the tribute syndicate went into liquidation at the end of 1908.  
 
A second source mentions another company, also in 1908 - Rhenoster Mines Ltd 
“…sinking a new inclined shaft on the Shimwell Lode [discussed later in this chapter] 
and continuing the sinking that had been done on the main lode at the Transvaal mine 
Number 1 shaft.”13 This venture was also short-lived especially at the Number 1 shaft. 
At the prevailing price of lead in 1908, the grades of ore revealed were of insufficient 
value to be economic and operations at both the Transvaal mine shaft and the Shimwell 
lode were closed down. Abe Bailey had formed a new company in 1908 to operate the 
Transvaal mine under tribute. At the time it was stated that the old dumps, which carried 
profitable values, would be re-worked and it was expected that new shafts were to be 
sunk on the vein. Although new pumps were installed, the inflow of water proved to be 
greater than expected and the operation was closed down.
14
 No records have been found 
of the name of the tribute mining company formed by Abe Bailey.  
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In December 1909, the shareholders of Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd met to hear the 
chairman, HC Boyd, tell them how the original tribute syndicate and their successors - 
such as Rhenoster Mines Ltd - having spent very considerable sums in searching for 
payable deposits of ore - had terminated their contract. WM Chandler (a geologist) was 
engaged in 1909 to report on the prospects of the old Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd 
property. He was also involved with the Transvaal Silver & Lead mine on the farm 
Roodekrans, west of Pretoria, [this mine is listed in Table 1 but its short history is not 
discussed in the dissertation]. In his report he stated that no further payable deposits 
would be discovered in the Argent mines. It is unclear how he was able to determine 
this without draining the mine and going underground, especially as it is clear from the 
various reports prior to 1895 that not all of the ore-body exposed in the development of 
the mine had been mined, a great deal of which was in the rich upper two levels of the 
mine. Based on Chandler’s report it was decided by the Board to recommend that 
Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd be placed in liquidation. This was carried out early in 1910, 
thus ending the first major phase in the life of the Transvaal mine under the operating 
name of the ‘Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd’ - a period of 21 years, in which 17 tons of 




The Witpoortje Syndicate, which had been closely associated with Transvaal mine 
through the 1890s, came to an official end in December 1909, when it went into 
voluntary liquidation.
16
 From an operating company point of view, it had probably 
ceased to exist in the middle of the 1890s. It failed to renew any leases that it had on the 
farms Brakfontein and Boschpoort, which meant that although the company still existed 
after the Anglo-Boer War, it had no leased properties to mine.  
 
In the next five years there was a succession of mining syndicates that attempted to 
mine the various Argent mines. They had very little chance of success, due to the huge 
cost of keeping water out of the mines - assuming that they were able to dewater the 
mines in the first place. In 1906, the Brakfontein Silver and Lead Syndicate (Ltd), was 
formed to dewater the Brakfontein mine. This venture was also unsuccessful and the 
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syndicate was liquidated in January 1907.
17
 The leases passed to Boschpoort Silver 
Mining Syndicate Ltd
18
, who dewatered the Brakfontein and Boschpoort mines in 

















Fig. 38 Boschpoort Silver Mining Syndicate share certificate issued to Myer J. Foote who was one of the 





Directors of the Boschpoort Silver Mining Syndicate are listed as Myer J Foote, J 
Emrys Evans, RM Connolly, Dr J Schlesinger and Carl Hanau. Only Hanau has been 
found in biographical sources and his name was mentioned earlier in connection with 
                                                 
17
  Registrar of Companies, Pretoria, File 01/02585/07, Brakfontein Silver and Lead Syndicate (Ltd), 
Registered on 20 September 1906. 
 
18
  Registrar of Companies, Pretoria, File 01/02655/07, Boschpoort Silver Mining Syndicate Ltd, Registered 
28 December 1906. 
 
19
  Gold Fields of South Africa file ARG820/1/1 GEOL. (1) Argent Project Geology, volume 1, entry 1, 
‘General account of the Base Metal occurrences from Hatherly on the Delagoa Railway, to the Brakpan-
Witbank Railway at Argent’, report by Oliver King, 20 February 1919, p. 9. See also ‘Boschpoort Silver 
Mine Syndicate’, The South African Mining Journal, (3 April 1909), p. 110. 
 
20
  Boschpoort Silver Mining Syndicate share certificate issued to Myer J Foote, Archive Ref 622 Silver 







 Control of the leases and mining operations passed to African Farms 
Ltd. in 1909, but no further work was carried out on the mines and the leases were 




Another new syndicate was formed in 1912 and they reopened the old Transvaal mine, 
dewatered a portion of it and very soon were mining zinc ore and argentiferous galena. 
No records of the name of the syndicate have been found and the only references to it 
appear in The South African Mining Journal and the annual report of the Inspector of 
Mines.
23
 In 1914 the Inspector of Mines, TG Trevor, reported that: “Transvaal Silver 
Mine disposed of 395 tons of lead slime which yielded 79 tons of lead valued at  £1 199 
and 246.4 kg of fine silver valued at £1 028.”  
 
One wonders why the tribute syndicates kept forming and failing at the old Transvaal 
mine? It would appear that the potential for high profitable returns from the silver mines 
kept attracting investors. The major reason for the failures of the tribute syndicates at all 
four of the Argent mines, which none of them overcame was the massive inflow of 
water at about 40 m below the surface. Such a problem, even in modern mining, 
involves huge capital outlays in pumps and piping, but for the relatively small tribute 





No details of operational activities were found between 1914 and 1919. The First World 
War (1914–1918) had a significant impact on the ability to operate mines due to 
shortages of white mining labour coupled with the reduced demand for silver. It was to 
be the period of 1919 to 1929 which was to witness the greatest amount of financial and 
technical re-investment in silver mining in South Africa, and the one in which the 
largest amount of silver would be recovered from a single silver mine. The early 1920s 
were to witness the last rebellious attempt by neo-communist leaders of the white 
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miner’s union to change, not only the control and ownership of the mines, but also the 
political control within South Africa. The mines of the Argent area were affected by the 
1922 miners’ strike, and the context behind the strike is discussed in chapter 1.  
 
The old Transvaal mine would be re-named the ‘main mine’ in 1919 and would be 
operated as part of the newly formed Transvaal Silver & Base Metal Mines Ltd 
(hereafter TSBM) when the mining leases were taken over by General Mining. This 
‘mining house’25 company, which was formed in 1895 by the Randlord gold mining 
Albu brothers, George and Leopold, was still largely owned and controlled by them in 
the 1920s. Under the Albu’s control, the Argent mines became the biggest silver mining 
operation this country has ever seen, albeit under the managerial control of General 
Mining. George Albu was chairman of General Mining. 
 
Shortly after the end of the First World War, prospecting operations were started in the 
Argent area. In 1919, a ‘small operator’ under the name of Dwarsfontein Galena 
produced, or more probably re-worked, the old ore dumps at the Transvaal mine 
property. They manage to export 739 tons of lead ore at 25% lead and containing 
782.25kg of silver.
26
 This company was operating on Dwarsfontein during the 
formation of the new silver mining company by General Mining and Finance 
Corporation Ltd. (hereafter General Mining). Dwarsfontein Galena appears to have been 
taken over by the new silver mining company in 1920, but as no details of Dwarsfontein 
Galena have been found in official records, it is possible that it may have been a 
prospecting/development company or division within General Mining. Certainly the 
prospecting and exploration rights were acquired and held by one of South Africa’s 
largest mining houses – General Mining. Exactly when they acquired such rights is 
unclear, but it may have been some time after 1914, when the syndicates either 
collapsed financially or let the leases lapse. The war years may have precluded any form 
of prospecting and so the most likely period for any resurgence of activity is from early 
1919.  
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In 1919 General Mining was to dewater all of the old silver mines in the area in an 
attempt to re-prospect the properties both on surface and underground. These mines 
included the Transvaal mine property on Dwarsfontein, as well as the old mines on the 
farms Brakfontein, Boschpoort and Oudezwaanskraal and later other properties of the 
old Witpoortje Syndicate. New mineralised veins were found on the surface of the farm 
Dwarsfontein. The company would completely restructure the surface operation at the 
old mine of Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd, installing a new shaft headgear, a modern 
(1920s technology) crushing and concentration plant, as well as roasters and smelting 
equipment. The plant would boast the most modern beneficiation equipment of the time. 
Approximately 2 km of narrow rail track was eventually laid, connecting the various 
stages of the plant. Modern housing facilities for both black and white miners were built 
and a few of the original white management houses still exist, and are currently lived in. 
During the archaeological pedestrian survey of the Transvaal mine site it became 
evident that many of the dressed stone foundations of the 1890s buildings had been re-
used in the 1920s structures – especially the boiler house, (see photographs in Appendix 
11).  
 
In November 1919 it was announced that a new argentiferous deposit had been 
discovered on a previously unexploited part of the farm Dwarsfontein. Trenching proved 
the lode along 243 m of strike and two surface winzes were developed 152 m apart on the 
lode. In December 1919 a prospectus was published in which the new company, TSBM, 
with a nominal capital of £70 000, was floated. The chairman of the new company was 
Sir George Albu.
27
 The other directors were Arthur French, Errol Hay, George Gooch 
Hollmes and Comte Francois de Ferries, but no biographical information has been found 
on any of them. It was stated in the prospectus that TSBM owned the freehold to two 
portions of the farm Dwarsfontein and prospecting and exploration rights over some 129 
square km of properties adjoining the Dwarsfontein farm.  
 
The prospectus further mentioned that considerable work had been done on these farms 
by the Transvaal Silver Mine Ltd and the Witpoortje Syndicate during the 1889 to 1895 
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period. Since that time the mines had remained flooded with short intervals of dewatering. 
The reasons for closure of the mines in 1895 were given as a severe fall in the market 
value of the metals in 1894/95. Secondly, the excessive costs prevailing with respect to 
transport, with the nearest rail connection to the coast in the early 1890s being in Natal 
and lastly the difficulty, at the time, of dealing with the considerable inflow of water at 
shallow depths. With the prices of lead and silver being some 150% higher in 1919 than 
in 1895, transport greatly improved, and water inflows an easily solved problem with 
improvements in pumping technology, the prospects for the new venture appeared very 
good and the public’s enthusiasm at the flotation was higher than expected. The flotation 
of TSBM was eleven times over-subscribed with 2 800 individual applications received 




The proposal for re-opening was to dewater the old Transvaal mine on Dwarsfontein 
and work the large areas of developed, but un-stoped ore, [un-mined ore body] in the 
upper levels on the No 1 shaft of the old mine. Similarly, although the No 2 shaft had 
been developed in the 1890s, no stoping had been conducted there and expectations of 
good ore were high. One of the lodes tested on Dwarsfontein was the Le Grange lode - 
named after the owner of that portion of the farm. (In chapter 3 Le Grange was named as 
a co-defendant with Fox in the ‘Deep Levels’ court case).  This lode was traceable on 
surface for some 1 067 m with a width of up to 2.4 m. The Spies lode (also a new lode) 
and on a Spies’ portion of Dwarsfontein, had a length of 610 m. The Brakfontein lode 
over 1 219 m, had little or no mineralisation on surface, but had a good lode at about 37 
m below surface. 
 
At a meeting of shareholders in April 1920, it was announced that the company had also 
acquired options on portions of the farms Hekpoort and Witpoort. On the farm Witpoort 
there were numerous old workings of the Witpoortje Syndicate and these were in the 
process of being cleared.  Acting chairman Mr Arthur French said that ore on the dumps 
was rich in lead and silver.
29
 Another lode of considerable interest was the old White 
Swan mine lode, on the farm Oudezwaanskraal. The prospectus stated that the 1890s 
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  ‘The Outlook for Transvaal Silver & Base Metals’, The SA Mining and Engineering Journal, (24 April 





development of Oudezwaanskraal was a mystery, as no plans existed of the mine, yet 
considerable sinking and development had been carried out and high grades of silver ore 
were still to be found on the dumps.
30
 [This farm is listed in Table 1 and the mine 
operated as the White Swan Argentiferous Co Ltd in the 1890s, but its short history is 





Fig. 39 Sir George Albu Chairman of General  







A report appeared in the press, in July 1920, that drilling and prospecting results were 
encouraging and that the main shaft of the old Transvaal mine had been dewatered and 
re-timbered to a depth of 12 m and that as soon as the first level was reached a program 
of sampling would begin. Dr Heberlein, a well-respected European metallurgist, was 
retained to consult on the most suitable treatment plant.
32
 By October 1920, pumping at 
the main mine‘s No 1 shaft had dewatered the mine to 43 m, some 5 m below the first 
level. The old 1
st
 level workings were said to be sound and in the process of being 
cleared of debris. A new shaft collar and headgear was installed along with pumping 
equipment and air compressors. On surface, the old dumps were sampled and it was 
estimated that the gross value of ore contained in them was £108 000. The major portion 
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A new No 2 shaft was sunk to replace the old Transvaal mine No 2 shaft and at a depth 
of 40 m the 1
st
 level was begun. Development of a cross-cut to the lode was then 
started.
34
 They continued to sink the shaft and by November 1920 intersected the 
hanging of the lode at approximately 61 m with the lode dipping at about 80 degrees.
35
  
During the initial phase of development of the TSBM Company Oliver King was the 
consulting engineer. 
 
Towards the end of 1920 it was announced that a new mining company, Pretoria Silver 
Lead Co Ltd (hereafter PSL), was to be floated, to mine the ‘Shimwell lode’. The 
consulting engineer advising the company was Oliver King, even though it appears he 
was still involved in a similar capacity with TSBM. This anomaly has not been 
resolved. King mentions that WH Furlonge had in fact discussed the lode on Shimwell’s 
portion in a report back in the 1890s.
36
 In chapter 3, mention was made of a company, 
PSL, being formed in 1892 with the intention of mining an argentiferous lode 3 km 
north of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd property. No records of any mining by this 
company have been found and it is assumed that after some prospecting it became a 
victim of the downturn in the silver mining industry in the greater Pretoria region in the 
early 1890s due to the collapse of the international silver price. 
 
The initial shipment of ore from the trial diggings was sent to Swansea and gave returns 
of 50% lead and 1.72 kg per ton silver.
37
 In the prospectus and background material on 
PSL, mention is continually made to the fact that King was the consulting engineer who 
advised on the TSBM deposit and that the share issue for that company had been 
oversubscribed eleven times. The chairman was Lt-Colonel CL Anderson. The directors 
were Chas AO Bain, who had been a mining agent in Johannesburg in the 1890s and 
Andrew Niven, a stockbroker who was also involved in the Reform Committee and 
after the Anglo-Boer War was involved in local politics in Johannesburg.  Four other 
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directors were B Alexander, Jas H Kelley, HJ Hofmeyr and AJ Shimwell,
38
 but nothing 
has been found on them in the sources. In December 1920 work began on the 
construction of buildings and the sinking of the No 1 shaft. W Calder was the general 
manager.
39
 Shaft sinking had been held up while the boiler house and winder room were 
completed and sinking of two winzes was delayed due to flooding.
40
 By the middle of 
March the boilers were under steam and most of the shaft headgear was completed. 






 AGM of shareholders of PSL took place under a new chairman, Chas AO Bain, 
at the end of 1921. Very little of substance was tabled at the meeting, other than that 
1125 kg of ore had been removed from the bottom of the winzes and that a trial smelt, 
which had been carried out in 
Johannesburg, yielded 404 kg of 
lead bullion, assaying at 3 kg silver 
per ton.
42
 By early 1922, the No 2 
shaft had been sunk to a depth of 38 
m. Water was a major problem in 
this mine, with an inflow rate, at 





Fig. 40 Share option certificate  
for the Pretoria Silver Lead  
Co Ltd. September 1921. 
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At the first shareholder’s meeting of TSBM in 1921 a detailed report presented by Sir 
George Albu, the chairman, showed that liabilities in respect of advances made by 
General Mining were in the region of £88 000. These were due mainly to development 
and construction costs and were to be covered by the share options scheduled to fall due 
at the end of January. The prospecting on Witpoort was abandoned because of the great 
distance from Dwarsfontein and the lack of encouraging results. On Brakfontein it was 
planned to sink a new 3-compartment shaft to intersect with the old workings at depth.
44
 
In his report, the consulting engineer of TSBM, Oliver King, stated that an area of land 
between the No 1 and No 2 shaft options had been acquired, thus enabling development 
of the vein between the two shafts. This land formed the Roets’ portion of Dwarsfontein.  
The clearing of the old mine was almost complete and sampling of the 2 128 m of drives, 
winzes and stope faces had been begun. Surface prospecting of the No 1 shaft lode had 
proved its existence over a distance of 793 m and at the No 2 shaft of over 610 metres. 
Between the two proven surface lodes there was an intervening gap of 457 m and it was 
felt that they connected.  Final plans for a reduction and smelting works were prepared 
and it was estimated that the cost would be in the region of £70 000. The plant was to 
consist of crushing and sorting equipment, along with concentrators, oil flotation plant, 




By early 1921 the main mine had been dewatered to just below the 2
nd
 level and after 
clearing out debris, the vein was sampled and found to contain lead at 4.8% and silver at 
164 g per ton and the ore was stockpiled for treatment. The cut off value to cover 
expenses was 4% lead and 142 g per ton silver.
46





 levels revealed that there was approximately 50,000 tons of ore remaining in 
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On Brakfontein it had been decided to dewater the mine, enlarge the old shaft to three 
compartments, and develop a second level at 61 m while extending the development of 
the 1
st
 level. Development on Boschpoort had been promising with the discovery of rich 
oxidised ore at a depth of 15 m. It was decided to test the four parallel lodes by sinking 
winzes either side of the old workings as deep as hand pumping would allow and to 




A meeting of shareholders was called in April 1921 to approve the raising of capital to 
£300 000. At the meeting Sir George Albu stated that the initial working capital of the 
mine had been used in the clearing, dewatering and new developments on the various 
properties of the company. Loans were advanced by General Mining to purchase new 
mining and reduction plant equipment. As the main mine was reaching a stage where 
reduction could soon begin, there was a need to raise fresh working capital prior to the 
mine becoming a producer. Development of the main mine on Dwarsfontein was 
continuing with cleaning of the 3
rd





 levels, where blocks of un-stoped ore had been found. The results showed 
that approximately 124 000 tons of payable ore remained. Albu mentioned that 
development on Boschpoort was being suspended due to the heavy rains and it would 
appear that TSBM abandoned its options on the farm. No reasons could be found in any 
of the sources as to why they abandoned Boschpoort. It is possible that as development 
of the cross-cut to test the four lodes proceeded, they either did not find sufficient ore or 
it was of too low a grade to be economic to mine. At the Brakfontein mine, a small 
steam compressor, hoist and two loco boilers were installed. The shaft was dewatered to 
15 m and the shaft re-timbered. A very strong flow of water was encountered at 132 600 
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Fig. 41 Sketch plan showing the    
relationship of the lodes around 















The SA Mining & Engineering Journal produced a two-part article in June 1921, which 
presented a substantial amount of information on the TSBM mine and reduction 
process. It mentions that the grade of mined ore was only 11 % lead and 298 g per ton 
silver, and that the ore had to be concentrated before smelting. In August 1921, 
Brakfontein had been dewatered and the lodes exposed. Sampling revealed that the 
lodes were payable at 12 % lead and 357 g of silver. The old shaft reached a depth of 40 
m with the first level at 37 m.  
 
The new roasting plant became operational along with the first unit of the smelter, 
producing silver-lead bullion in October 1921. Hand-sorted, high grade ore was used in 
this early operation of the roaster and smelter.
51
 Underground developments at the main 
mine No 1 shaft were very good, with the lode on the 3
rd
 level east opening out to a 
width of 2.1 m carrying good values. The developments of the drifts on 2
nd
 level No 1 
shaft were also improving and the 3
rd
 level of No 2 shaft had opened a lode 2.4 to 3 m 
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Fig. 42 No 1 Shaft at the  
Transvaal Silver & Base  







By the end of 1921 there had been 2 670 m of development on the main lode in shafts 1 
& 2 and 47 m on Brakfontein. The shaft at Brakfontein was also sunk deeper - to 67 m - 
so that a second level could be developed at the mine. The ore reserves in Brakfontein 
were estimated at approximately 110 000 tons running at 10.53% lead and 278 g per ton 
silver.
54
 The plan for the reduction plant on Dwarsfontein was to have a plant capable of 
handling 4 000 tons per month and this was upgraded to 7 500 tons per month, with the 
blast furnaces and crushing stations being commissioned by November 1921. The 
process led to a 95.3 % recovery for lead and 96.6% for silver, very high values for the 
1920s.
55
 Development at the beginning of 1922 continued with the shaft being sunk to a 
depth of 117 m. A double winze had been sunk from the 3
rd
 level and it had reached the 
depth of the planned 4
th
 level. The lode was intersected at this depth and was still very 
rich. The development at TSBM was significant for two major reasons. It was the most 
modern base metal beneficiation plant in South Africa in the 1920s and secondly was to 
become the largest producer of silver – as the primary product - in South Africa. 
 
The concentration plant was commissioned in January of 1922.
56
 One of the most 
significant aspects of the reduction plant at TSBM was the groundbreaking technology 
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reports by the consulting mechanical & electrical engineer to TSBM HW Clayden. ‘Description of the 
Reduction Plant erected at the Transvaal Silver & Base Metals, Ltd.’ Journal of the South African 
Institution of Engineers, (September 1922), pp. 20-27. See also ‘The Reduction & Treatment Pant of the 





installed by its engineers. They were one of the first mines to install ball mills for the 
crushing and grinding of the mineral particles. They were also one of the first mines on 
the Witwatersrand to install the process of froth flotation for metallic particle separation 
as part of the concentration process. This groundbreaking technology in the 1920s is 
commonplace on modern mines around the world. On Brakfontein the shaft sinking had 
been stopped at 6.4 m below the 2
nd
 level, while development of a sump was completed 
on the 1
st
 level. 91 tons of lead bullion, assaying at 98.16% lead and 3.1 kg per ton 
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1922), p. 123 and (28 October 1922), pp. 161-163. (The report included the photographs of the plant 
reproduced above). 
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Fig. 43 General view of 
reduction plant(left) and 





Fig. 44 Crusher and 






Fig. 46 Concentrating and Smelting plant at the Transvaal Silver & Base Metals mine.  
The output of the mine for the first quarter of 1922 was 365.9 tons of lead bullion, 
containing some 1172.2 kg of silver, or approximately 3.2 kg per ton silver. During 
1922 monthly tonnages produced were the main items reported by the newspapers. A 
new more powerful Robey hoist was installed at the No 1 shaft to enable the hoisting of 
a greater tonnage. Clearly the development of the mine was proceeding well and the 
installation of new equipment was seen as part of the development strategy.  
 
Mention has been made of the South African Industrial Federation declaring a general 
strike and that all daily paid employees of mining companies would cease work from 8 
to 20 March 1922. The Miners’ Strike was a bitter fight between miners, mine 
companies and ultimately the Smuts Government. The strike caused a slowdown in the 
development of TSBM,
59
 where the miners simply walked off the mine without causing 
structural damage, which occurred on some of the gold mines. Similar strike activity 




Despite the strike action, the Pretoria Silver Lead Co Ltd issued £30 000 of debentures 
in order to raise capital for the development of the stoping areas in the upper levels of 
the mine. Capital was also required for the development of a reduction and 
concentrating plant. The shafts and level development had proved the lode over 305 m 
on surface and in depth the lode had proved to be rich. It was reported that the mine had 
700 tons of ore ‘at grass’, and the plan was to concentrate the silver-lead ore and then 




The development of the stopes, the miners’ strike and the commissioning of the 
reduction plant greatly impacted on the effective production period of the TSBM in 
1922. The presiding chairman, Arthur French, raised the concern about the need to 
lower the developed and payable ore reserve to 65 688 tons from the previous year’s 
figure of 103 000 tons which had been overstated. It was reported that the reduction 
plant had functioned better than expected during the plant’s seven months of full 
                                                 
59
  ‘Transvaal Silvers Progress’, The SA Mining and Engineering Journal, (29 April 1922), p. 1167. 
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operation until November, and that the financial report for 1922 showed that the 




In the collection of Gold Fields files, one was marked Argent Project FSJ de Jager’s 
reports. De Jager had been the field geologist for Gold Fields in the 1950s and was 
responsible for the reopening of the Argent mines by that company. Most importantly 
for the reconstruction of the history of the TSBM main mine are his handwritten 
transcripts of the monthly reports written in the 1920s by the technical advisor to 
TSBM, [presumed to be Errol Hey rather than the mine manager]. Sadly the original 
documents no longer exist, neither those of the TSBM or de Jager’s transcripts and files, 
(refer to the comments in ‘Sources’ covering the Gold Fields Company files – page xx). 
The technical advisor’s reports are written in a brief, technical, ‘matter of fact’ style as 
part of the mine reporting system. They also show how, in the 1920s, mining was still 
largely a ‘science of intuition’ and the reports reflect the joy and excitement when good 
values were found and the despair when the lodes declined or disappeared altogether.  
 
The full reports run to about seven pages, but a few significant points have been 
extracted to demonstrate some of the changes, decisions, problems or developments at 
the TSBM and Brakfontein mines. The report for February 1923 states that the number 
2 shaft of the TSBM mine had been closed down, as the development had failed to 
prove any economic ore deposits in that part of the mine.63 Around the middle of the 
year it was being reported that the branch lode was beginning to yield significant values 
of lead (7.4%) and silver (210 g per ton) over a 76 cm wide lode and that the assay 
values of the two metals had doubled.64 Throughout the year the assays of the 
Brakfontein ore body were reflecting increases in zinc and as the reduction plant had not 
been designed for such levels of zinc it was creating problems for the reduction plant 
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 By December a third level which had been developed at the Brakfontein 





At the end of 1923, Sir George Albu disclosed that the estimated profits for the year 
were achieved and a net profit of £51 230 was declared. The mine produced 5 424 tons 
of lead bullion from which 15 380 kg of silver was obtained. The accumulated matte 
produced by the furnace contained approximately 6% copper, as well as appreciable 
quantities of lead and silver. However, the mine had had no means of recovering the 
metals from the matte and it was uneconomic to ship to Europe for treatment.
67
 It was 
decided to install a set of matte crushing rolls and an annular roasting furnace of the 
Godfrey type.
68
 The concrete and brick remains of a structure exists at Argent, which 
has remained a puzzle for several years but which is now believed, after further archive 
and site research, to be the structural remains of this Godfrey furnace.
69
 After the 
completion of the furnace, it became possible for the mine to process the matte. The 
furnace was also used to enrich the matte to 50-55 % copper, at which point it became 
very viable to ship the matte to Europe for treatment.  
 
There is clear evidence of a lack of interest or willingness by provincial or national 
government to assist the mining industry in the 1920s. It is seen in decisions not to 
improve facilities to the TSBM mine, despite the mine indicating the revenue benefits 
especially to the State Railway operators. The mine was 5 km from the railway station 
at Argent. The company tried to arrange for the construction of a siding to the main 
mine, showing that revenue would be generated from the transport of supplies in and 
bullion out of the mine. The rail authorities declined the request. The Transvaal 
Province was also approached with requests to maintain the road past the mine. The 
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company argued that as it was a Provincial Road, the Province should maintain it. The 




In reading the old TSBM records mention is made of the ”No 2 Freehold”, but none of 
the TSBM records state where such an area was, other than alluding to “adjoining the 
property of Pretoria Silvers”.71 When the Gold Fields files were copied, one of the 
documents showed the mine plan of the Shimwell Lode (Fig. 47). It delineates the 
position of the Freehold area no 2 in relation to the Rhenoster section and the Pretoria 
mine shaft. The plan shows that it was immediately adjacent to the Pretoria Silver Lead 
Co Ltd lease area. By 1924 the Shimwell lode had been traced, on surface, for about 
800 m. 
 
At the beginning of this chapter it was mentioned that in 1908 a small syndicate, 
Rhenoster Mines Ltd, sank an inclined shaft on the Shimwell Lode. They carried out a 
small amount of development work at a depth of 31 m from surface. Various plans and 
sections of the mine show the Rhenoster section as having a shaft down to the 31 m 
level and a second shaft called the Transvaal Silver and Base Metals shaft also to a 31 m 
level - which must date from the 1920s.   
 
The mine plan by Pelletier, dated 1951 (Fig. 47), shows the relationship between the 
‘Pretoria mine shaft’ and the ‘Rhenoster section’. Interestingly, the Rhenoster section 
shows two areas: the TSM and Rhenoster shaft on the 31 m (100 ft) level and a separate 
area to the northwest marked as TSBM Winze and a 14 m (46 ft) level.  
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The 14 m level appears to have been about 50 m long with an equal development 
northwest and southeast from the bottom of the winze. No records have been found 













What is puzzling is the shaft on the 46 ft level and identified as the ‘TSM shaft’. No 
records exist indicating that the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd (TSM) of the 1890s 
developed a shaft on the Shimwell lode. It has to be assumed that it was a drafting error 
and should read ‘TSBM shaft’. 
 
By reading the technical reports of 1924, it appears to have been the year in which 
‘doom took hold’. Suddenly there are comments with such phrases as “barren lode”, 
“nothing further being discovered” and “closing down.” With such negative comments 
the suspension of all operations was becoming a reality.
74 
Did the management really 
explore all possibilities for further deposits or even alternative sources of ore from other 
mines in the district? TSBM had leases on many of the farms in the district and the mine 
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that could have kept the reduction plant in operation, and therefore TSBM for several 
more years, would have been the Pretoria mine – also on Dwarsfontein. 
 
Dr Percy Wagner, the famous South African geologist, visited the Transvaal mine at 
Argent in 1924 going to both the No 1 & 2 shafts. He reported that the lodes on the 
mines consisted of both rich and barren patches of ore. The No 2 shaft had gone through 
the rich patches and looked as if all that was left were barren sections. On the No 1 shaft 
(main mine) he recommended that development on 5
th
 level southeast be stopped and 
that development on 7
th
 level east and west be continued to prove the lode. His 
comments on Brakfontein and the Pretoria mine were not favourable and in his opinion 
the richest areas had probably been mined out. Wagner’s detailed analysis of the 
mineralogy of the mine appeared in a paper by him in 1924.
75
 By the middle of 1924, 
development at the Brakfontein mine ceased and by August management decided that 
all economic ore bodies had been mined out and the mine was abandoned and allowed 
to flood.
76




 AGM of the company, held at the end of 1924, was a gloomy one for the 
shareholders. Sir George Albu, the chairman, began by saying that a net profit of £92 
555 had been made in the year and that financially the company was very liquid and 4 
719 tons of lead bullion had been produced yielding 15 292.6 kg of silver. He stated that 
the tonnage treated was less than the previous year, which led to a slight increase in 





 level had also shown un-payable lode and an incline shaft had been sunk to the 
plane of the 8
th
 level, but the lode had proved to be barren and narrowing out. The 
decision was therefore made to suspend shaft sinking at 230 m and there was no 




 level. However, a decision was made to sink an inclined 
shaft from the main shaft at the depth of a 7
th
 level and it was driven down to the 
equivalent of the 8
th
 level or approximately 250 m, to determine if any payable lode 
                                                 
75
  PA Wagner, ‘A Transvaal Silver-lead Deposit’, Economic Geologist, Vol. 14, (1924). pp. 651-667. See 
also Council for Geoscience, Pretoria, PA Wagner, ‘Lead and Silver’, Report No 1924-0005, 1924. 
 
76
  Gold Fields of South Africa file ARG820/1/2 LEA-ZIN de JAGER - Argent Project FSJ de Jager’s 
Reports 1989, entry 5, ‘A report on the structure and possible remaining economic potential of the main 




  ‘The Outlook for Transvaal Silver’, The SA Mining and Engineering Journal, (20 December 1924),  




existed at that depth.
78
  The June 1924 monthly report stated “…the incline attained [a] 
depth of the 8
th
 level, and in view of the fact that the lode (which at this plane is in red 
granite) [actually red quartz syenite] had pinched and was entirely barren, and also since 
the borehole put down to the plane of the 9
th
 level had shown equally unsatisfactory 
results, it was decided, reluctantly, to suspend sinking operations forthwith.”79 
 
After a brief closure of two weeks for modifications to be made, the smelter was once 
again operational in February 1925. The modifications allowed for the treatment of the 
copper rich matte and during February 42.6 tons of lead bullion and 95.5 tons of copper 
were produced.
80
 The exact amounts of silver produced from the bullion and copper 
were not disclosed. The treatment of all remaining stocks of ore, concentrates, by-
products and flue dust was completed by the end of September 1925. The brickwork 
and crucible of the 2x1 m rectangular furnace was demolished, with the metal bearing 
materials being smelted in a 1 metre circular furnace. After this, the crucible was broken 
up and the metal rich parts were sent to the Witwatersrand Co-operative Smelting 
Works for treatment. By October all clean-up work had been completed and the plant 




One of the mysteries of the 1920s investments in silver-lead deposits was why TSBM did 
not take out prospecting rights or options on the portion of Dwarsfontein known as 
Shimwell’s portion. More correctly, why were they not forthright enough to convince the 
owner AJ Shimwell to option the farm portion to them in 1919 or 1920. Had they done so 
they would clearly have had a good vein close to the Transvaal mine. Shimwell had been 
prospecting on his portion of Dwarsfontein and had exposed a portion of the vein. The 
source states that from January to April 1920, he produced 22 tons of lead with a content 
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of 25 kg of silver.
82
 The technical advisor’s reports in the Gold Fields files show that it 
was only in 1925 that TSBM actively conducted any development and mining on the 
Shimwell vein, this being on the old Rhenoster mine and Freehold no 2 portions of the 
vein. 
 
The Gold Fields files and the technical advisor’s monthly status reports provided 
development and production details found in no other source. As with the Transvaal mine 
and the Brakfontein mine, the Shimwell vein reports have been edited and the following 
facts extracted. In March 1925 it was reported that trenching had begun on the No 2 
Freehold property next to the Pretoria mine and that the result was encouraging. The work 
was carried out by 16 black workers under the direction of one white miner. From April 
to July a total of 593 tons of ore was mined assaying averages of lead at 7.5% and silver 
at 132 g per ton and it had been transported to the TSBM reduction works. In the July 
report it was stated that “…as all available ore had been mined at this point the operation 
was suspended.”83       
 
In July 1926 the first mention is made of the Board of TSBM considering the possibility 
of placing the company in voluntary liquidation.
84
 In October the assets, the freehold 
land, mineral rights, machinery and buildings, on the farm Dwarsfontein and the timber 
plantation on the farm Rondevlei were put up for sale. There was no mention of the 
other farms that they had prospected, such as Oudezwaanskraal, Boschkop, Boschpoort 
or Brakfontein. It is possible that the company had disposed of the rights to them before 
the final liquidation. 
 
A meeting of shareholders was called at the end of 1926 to adopt a resolution to place 
the company in liquidation. The chairman mentioned that the assets of the company had 
been put up for sale on a tender basis. The offers were far below what was expected and 
they were all refused. General Mining had then made a single offer of £14 000 for all of 
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the assets, which was accepted. Was this offer in the best interests of the shareholders, 
or of General Mining who purchased an almost new beneficiation plant at a ‘bargain 
basement’ price? It is unknown how many of the shares of TSBM were owned by 
General Mining, but clearly with joint management structures it was easy for such a sale 
to go through without reference to any external shareholders. With the realisation of its 
assets, the shareholders could expect to receive a distribution of half a guinea (10s 6d) 
per share.
85
 The company was officially placed in liquidation on the 8 December 1926, 




Virtually nothing was published on the Pretoria Silver Lead Co Ltd from July 1922 to 
December 1924. During this period, the company had run into serious operating 
financial problems and the mine appears to have been closed down and probably put 
onto a ‘care & maintenance basis’ (see Appendix 1 for explanation of the term). The 
greatest problem was a lack of cash resources to install the necessary crushing and 
concentrating plant. The company management expected to close a deal, worth £50 000, 
with a third party in England, but the deal was not concluded for reasons unknown.  
 
The irony of the situation was that the TSBM Company was running out of ore at the 
Transvaal mine and its reduction works was being put in jeopardy. The PSL mine had 
ore, but no cash resources to process the ore. Why, one asks, could they not help each 
other with the Pretoria mine selling its ore for treatment by TSBM? Although they were 
separate companies with no ‘Head Office’ links, the situation - with hindsight - seems 
bizarre. Within the following year, both operations were closed down on Dwarsfontein 
and both companies were liquidated. If the two companies had made some form of joint 
operation it could have extended their lives possibly by up to two years.  
 
In the case of Pretoria Silver Lead Ltd, the name was changed in 1926 to the New 
Pretoria Silver Lead Mines Ltd; the reason for the change is unknown. The company 
began prospecting operations on the farm Rhenosterhoekspruit in the Waterberg District 
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where tin and bismuth deposits were discovered.
87
 At the same time they retained an 
interest in the Pretoria mine on Dwarsfontein and in April 1927 Mr James Ennis, a 
prospector, was employed to continue prospecting at the mine and he apparently 




Exactly what happened at the Pretoria mine has been very difficult to interpret. If the 
company was forced to close down its Dwarsfontein operation due to an inability to 
raise operating capital, how were they able to continue mining tin and bismuth in the 
Waterberg? In 1929 prospecting work was discontinued at the Pretoria mine on 
Dwarsfontein due to the major drop in the price of lead from £43 to £20 per ton. It was 
shortly after this announcement that the company stopped all operations and was 
liquidated. 
   
During its brief productive life from April 1922 to October 1925, Transvaal Silver and 
Base Metals Ltd (TSBM), milled 169 012 tons from the Transvaal mine, at a mill grade of 
over 7% lead. The Brakfontein mine contributed an additional 14 398 tons of ore and the 
Shimwell vein from shallow trenching and mining 1 883 tons. A further 1 517 tons was 
acquired from the dumps of the old Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd. The total operation 
produced 16 967 tons of lead and 44 577 kg of silver.
89
 There was also production of 177 
tons of copper along with an unknown amount of gold, all of which yielded a profit of 
£227 630 over the period mentioned.  
 
From 1929 the mines of Argent returned to virtual obscurity until 1940. There were two 
reasons for this lack of activity on the mines. Firstly from 1928 the world went into a 
severe economic recession which lasted through the 1930s and secondly the 
international price of silver had remained low through the 1930s and this was not helped 
by the price of lead which fell in value during the period 1928–1932. In 1940 four 
geologists of the SA Geological Survey, LE Kent, HD Russell, JF Enslin and J 
Willemse, carried out both a geophysical survey and mineralogical study at the four 
mines of Argent. In 1940, a report was written by Kent, describing the old Pretoria mine 
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workings. In a further report by Russell in 1941, he comments that the average value of 
the Shimwell lode (Pretoria mine) as “…approx 4% lead and 102 g per ton silver with 
estimated ore reserves in the southeast portion of the vein of 6 000 short tons of lead 
and approximately 15 309 kg of silver.”90 As neither of the mining companies pursued 
the underground development of this deposit one has to question the estimated values of 
the deposit in Russell’s report especially considering that a deposit of this nature would 
have extended the life of either mine by several years.  
 
In searching the files of the Registrar of Companies in Pretoria, a new company name 
appeared in connection with the farm Dwarsfontein - Transvaal Galena (Pty) Ltd. They 
reopened the old TSBM Transvaal mine in June 1940, but no records have been found 
on their mining operation, other than the names of the two directors, Ludwig 
Wipplinger and Isadore Greenberg (no biographical information has been found in the 
sources). It can only be assumed that if any ore or concentrates were produced, it was by 




At the beginning of 1949 the deposits at Argent (Transvaal mine, Pretoria mine, 
Brakfontein mine and the Boschpoort mine) came to the attention of DT Hudson, a 
mining engineer. It is possible he was a speculator in potential mining ventures as he 
secured various forms of title on the deposits, but realising that he did not have the 
resources to work the deposits he approached Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa 
Ltd. The leases were transferred to Gold Fields and the Brakfontein mine was the first to 
be dewatered. This began in late 1949 and they discovered the three levels in the mine 
were still in reasonable condition and accessible. The 38 m level was 366 m long; the 69 
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‘Notes on the Argent lead-silver-zinc deposits’, report by RA Pelletier, Consulting Geologist, 26 May 




The Registrar of Companies has on record a company or syndicate named Boschpoort 
Lead Mine Ltd, which was registered in November 1951.
93
  The directors are listed as 
Tom Edwards, John Douglas Wilson and later Thomas D Curry and Cornelius C 
Schoombie. Once again no biographical details have been found on any of these men. In 
1950, the Boschpoort mine was dewatered, and the Frances shaft was deepened to 94 m. 
Additional development and stoping was continued on the No 3 lode until 1952, with 
lead ore in the form of a lead carbonate being found in a shaft 16 m deep some 300 m to 
the northwest of the main shaft in the upper levels. This shallow shaft is named Paul on 
the plan (Fig 48). It is not clear why this was designated the ‘main shaft,’ especially as 
the other shaft was deeper. The Paul shaft was sunk on what appeared to have been an 
extension of the No 3 Lode. No details of how much ore was mined have been found. 






Fig. 48 Boschpoort Lead  




The period from the 
1950s to 1970s was the 
third and final period 
when a major mining 
group – in this instance 
the New Consolidated 
Gold Fields - took an 
interest in the Pretoria 
southeast area, especially 
the Argent mines. It was a period when prospecting and mining activity took place 
intermittently – still under the influence of international lead and silver prices.  
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During the 1950s – the mines were again dewatered and their values reassessed. A 
consortium company with New Consolidated Gold Fields (as the major partner at 
33.5%),
95
 Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Ltd and General Mining (each 
holding 33.25%) was registered as Argent Lead and Zinc Ltd (ALZ) in June 1952, and 
this became the new operating company for the Argent mines.
96
 In one case – the 
Brakfontein deposit – ALZ developed and mined ore until the fall of the international 
price of lead and zinc would again force the closure of the mines in 1957.  
 
An interim report was written by RA Pelletier (Gold Fields consulting geologist in the 
early 1950s) in May 1950 stating that the sampling of the Brakfontein mine had shown 
that there was still approximately 61 000 tons of mineable ore in the developed part of 
the mine, averaging 5.2 % lead and 4.9% zinc, with silver at 142 g per ton.
97
   
 
The Transvaal mine on Dwarsfontein was dewatered in the latter half of 1950 and was 
sampled by FSJ de Jager, a senior field geologist working for Gold Fields, and his 
estimates were of 67 000 tons of ore averaging 6% lead with silver running at 1% per 
percent lead, and with virtually no zinc.
98
 During the same period, the workings at 
Brakfontein were allowed to re-flood. It was then discovered that the samples taken 
from the mine contained a high proportion of zinc (49%) mixed with the lead. It is 
possible that had they not allowed the mine to re-flood, they may well have started 
mining it again on the strength of the zinc values present in the ore body.  
 
In 1951 Gold Fields dewatered the Transvaal mine number 1 and number 2 shafts on 
Dwarsfontein and started an extensive sampling program. The price of lead had risen to 
such an extent that the un-worked and formerly un-payable areas of the old TSBM mine 
had become viable. The reserves at the No 1 shaft were estimated at 49 000 tons with a 
lead value of 4.9%, and at the No 2 shaft reserves of 18 000 tons at 7.5%. The workings 
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of the old Pretoria mine were also dewatered by Gold Fields in 1951 and the single level 
at 46 m was sampled over its length of 61 m.  
 
In his final report on the Argent prospects in August 1951, Pelletier recommended that 
the old mines of the area, especially Brakfontein and the Transvaal mine on 
Dwarsfontein be brought back into production. According to Pelletier the ore reserves 
of the Brakfontein mine had been recalculated to 91 000 tons averaging 4% lead and 
3.8% zinc with silver running at 1% per percent of lead and 0.33 % per percent zinc. He 
felt that they had an expected life of at least 5 years and that this might well be extended 
to ten years.  His main reasons were that Brakfontein had only been developed to a 3rd 
level and that on the sample results of the levels there were still considerable tonnages 
of ore in the three levels. This was coupled with the potential for further payable ore 
being developed down to a 5
th
 level; and extension of the drives could also expose other 
bodies. Although a 5
th
 level was developed a 4
th
 level was omitted for some reason, 




The lode was very wide and generally consisted of two parallel ore bodies, but it had 
not been developed to its full width. Most of the development and mining had been on 
the footwall ore body and the hanging wall ore body had been left intact. It now seems 
that the hanging wall lode was undetected in the original 1890s or 1920s mining 
operations. A sketch (Fig 49) illustrates the differences between the two types of lode. 
On the Transvaal mine, Pelletier felt that although the full payable depth had been 
reached, there were areas of the mine that had not been exploited and a reasonable 
tonnage was still available in the 
previously developed areas of the mine.  
 
 
Fig. 49 Sketch showing both a footwall and a 
hanging wall lode - they may run parallel to each 
other. The footwall is the wall of rock under a vein, 
and the hanging wall is that which is above the 
vein. Thus a footwall lode is that which is below 
the hanging wall lode as illustrated in the sketch. 
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In June 1953 the international prices of lead and zinc fell dramatically and all construction 
work on Brakfontein slowed down. By June 1954 the prices of lead and zinc had started 
to climb again, but not sufficiently to re-open the mine. As was stated in the first chapter, 
silver in South Africa occurs as a component part of lead, copper or zinc ores but not 
always at economically high enough grades. If the international price of the base metals is 
too low to mine them then the silver is not recovered either. All construction work was 
stopped and the property put on a care and maintenance basis. In August 1955 when the 





The annual reports of Gold Fields, summaries of which appeared in the SA Mining & 
Engineering Journal for 1952, 1953 and 1954, all read more or less the same such as: 
“The [Argent] property has been equipped and can be put into production upon the 
return of more stable conditions in the market for metals”.101 Development of the 
Brakfontein mine was restarted in April 1956 and mining of the lode was started in July 
1956. Stoping operations continued for a year and were stopped in August 1957. An 
extensive report on the costs and potential profits of mining the various deposits was 
written by the consulting engineer of Gold Fields at the end of 1957, shortly after the 
closure of mining operations on Brakfontein.
102
 The mine closed in October 1957, when 
dropping metal prices again made the mining operation uneconomic. The actual 
recovery values for lead were also below what had originally been calculated and so 
viability became an issue. The 4% of Pelletier’s report was in fact closer to 2.5% lead, 
although the zinc recovery was slightly higher at 4.6%.  
 
During the 1950s period of mining, some 700 m of lateral underground development was 
carried out on the Brakfontein lode. Production took place on Brakfontein mine for a 
period of 13 months and yielded an average of 4% lead and 5% zinc with 151 g per ton 
silver. These values would total 59 800 tons of ore yielding 2 392 tons of lead and 2 990 
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tons of zinc concentrates with a silver content of 361 kg. The silver content is calculated 
solely on the lead value of 2 392 tons. It is more than likely that the zinc sulphide 
(sphalerite) would also contain a percentage of silver and in fact Campbell in his 1977 
report (see below) stated that it did, but did not give a value or percentage. Surface 
prospecting of the vein to the north of the mine workings was carried out, but no evidence 
of further mineralisation could be found. Two lines of overlapping holes were also drilled 
on the projected extension of the vein but once again no significant mineralisation was 
intersected.  
 
The impending expansion of the Zincor Ltd smelter at Springs in the early 1970s 
created a reassessment of the potential of the Argent deposits for zinc and this began in 
1973. The substantial increase in the international prices of base metals (lead and zinc 
with silver as a by-product) during this period led to a renewed interest in the mines. 
Gold Fields, as main partner in the Argent Lead and Zinc Co Ltd consortium, took out a 
number of options on farms in the area and carried out an extensive drilling and 
geochemical prospecting operation, which was concluded in 1977. The reports indicated 
that the reserves were too small, and the values too low, to be of interest. In 1977 a final 
report on the Boschpoort deposit concluded that the results of the geochemical and 
drilling program on the farm had failed to reveal any mineralisation of significant 





In the final report on the Argent Project in 1977, D Campbell, the group geologist for 
Gold Fields, stated that although surface prospecting had been conducted to the southeast 
of the Brakfontein mine, the full potential of the lode should be investigated as it could 
contain 2.1 million tons of ore based on a strike length of 2 000 m x 200 m depth x 1.5 m 
width at a grade of 4.4% zinc 2.9% lead and 93 g per ton silver.
104
  If this was so, why 
was it not pursued and confirmed by drilling in the 1970s? The simple answer is we will 
probably never know, as mining at the Brakfontein mine was over. 
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After dewatering the old Pretoria mine (Shimwell lode) once again in the 1970s, 670 m 
of sampling and development was conducted at the 46 m level. The samples averaged 
4.5% lead and 1% zinc. In the final report on the Shimwell lode it was reported that the 
mineralisation was predominantly galena in siderite fillings. Approximately 670 m were 
sampled, of which only 204 m yielded a payable grade of 4.3% lead and 1% zinc over a 
stoping width of 1.46 m. It was concluded that as the combined metal content of the 
Shimwell Lode was lower than that at Brakfontein, it was not a very attractive target for 




The final report by Campbell in 1978, dealing with all of the Argent mines under lease 
to the consortium, concludes with the statement: “Since there is very little chance of 
finding supplementary ore in the vicinity, it is concluded that the potential of the area 
held by Argent Lead and Zinc Co Ltd may be too small to support a viable mine.” 106 
Shortly after this statement all interest in the Argent mines area by the Gold Fields 
consortium was brought to a close although Gold Fields, through ALZ, kept the lease on 
the mining rights at Brakfontein.  
 
A final flicker of interest in 1999 would be the last in the silver mining industry of the 
greater Pretoria region. In January 1999 it was announced that a mining company, OTR 
Mining Ltd, had purchased Argent Lead and Zinc from a consortium led by Gold Fields 
of South Africa. Gardner [managing director] said he had signed a deal to deliver zinc 
from Argent to a ‘major company’. He stated “this would earn OTR R90 million over 
the next 10 months at a cost of R17 million.”107  Where such values came from is a 
mystery that has not been resolved, as at no time in the history of the Argent mines had 
they been high producers of zinc and the prospecting values over the years before 1999 
had never been higher than 7%. When Gold Fields were testing the values in the 1970s, 
Brakfontein was found to be the only possible source of zinc ore, with averages between 
1.3% and 5% zinc. OTR never began operations on the Argent mines, because of the 
                                                 
105
  Gold Fields of South Africa file ARG820/1/1 GEOL (1) - Argent Project Geology, Volume 1, entry 17, 
‘The Argent project – Final report’, report by D Campbell, Group Geologist, 15 March 1977, p. 12. 
 
106
  Gold Fields of South Africa file ARG820/1/1 GEOL (1) - Argent Project Geology, Volume 1, entry 18, 








internal corruption at director level as described in the news report and the whole 
operation dissolved. 
 
With the ending of the Anglo-Boer War in 1902 there was a hiatus of approximately 
two years in the rebuilding of the economy of the old ZAR. The research has shown that 
the post-war Milner administration needed the revenue in the form of taxation from 
mining, but simultaneously saw little need to help the mining companies re-establish 
themselves. Although not a silver mine, Stippel’s dissertation of the Crown Mines Gold 
Mining Company presents a representative mining story of the post-war years.
108
 Crown 
Mines had been raided in 1900 by the Kruger forces who removed the bullion. When 
the British forces captured Johannesburg, the mine was raided again and stores of 
machinery and tools taken. The total loss to the mine in 1902 was over £70 000, none of 
which was ever recovered. The attitude so typical of governments, then and now, was 
taxation first and ‘consequences not their problem’. For the silver mining industry of the 
greater Pretoria region, the post–1900 period to approximately 1906 was one of poor 
recovery. The surface buildings of Transvaal mine were badly damaged and 
reconstruction of events during the war indicates that it was British forces that were 
responsible for the damage. Despite putting in a claim for war damages the TSM 
Company received no compensation from the post-war British administration.  
 
By 1906 venture capital was again becoming available and this is borne out by the 
recovery in the gold mining industry and is seen in the development of a new tin mining 
industry at Rooiberg.
109
 More importantly for this dissertation was the re-prospecting of 
the greater Pretoria region for silver deposits. Although prospecting to the west and far 
southeast areas was to result in a number of mines being opened, all of them would fail 
after a few years, see Table 1. At the same time the Transvaal mine would see a 
resurgence of activity from 1907 to 1914, with various tribute mining companies 
attempting to make profits, but all were short-lived operations.  
 
In 1919 the Argent mines were restructured and re-opened by the Albu brothers of 
General Mining and Finance Corporation in 1919. New approaches to beneficiation and 
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mining techniques would make the mines at Argent the most modern and successful in 
the history of the silver mining industry in the greater Pretoria region. Although the 
mining period was shorter than was probably expected, it was highly profitable and 
during the eight years of its life, the Transvaal Silver & Base Metals produced 45 tons 
of silver and 16 000 tons of lead. 
 
1927 to the late 1940s was a period of inactivity at the Argent mines, with the exception 
of geological prospecting by the Geological Survey. This was due to a number of 
reasons, the dominant one being the world economic recession from 1928 through to the 
late 1930s. There was little or no venture capital available and governments around the 
world were unable to re-inject capital into their economies. After the Second World War 
there was once again an economic lull in new ventures, primarily because of a general 
lack of development capital on a world level. European governments were more 
concerned with rebuilding not only their shattered countries, but also their shattered 
economies.  
 
The re-opening of the Brakfontein mine in 1952 met one of the conditions for success – 
rising prices of lead and silver on the international metals market. Unfortunately the 
initial investment in draining the mines, prospecting and development costs was 
followed by a suspension of operations before yielding profitable returns due to the 
instability in the market. 
  
Later in 1956, the rising market price of lead and zinc offered an opportunity to operate 
the Brakfontein mine, but only for about eighteen months before falling metal prices 
forced its closure again. It has not been possible to determine if the company actually 
made a profit from the 1950s venture, but after the closure the company kept its options 
open. In the 1970s both rising prices of lead, zinc and silver on the international metals 
market, coupled with the demand for zinc ore to feed to the new Zincor smelter in 
Springs, provided an incentive to re-look at the Brakfontein mine.  
 
The early 1970s were to become a highly volatile period for resources, dominant of 
which would be oil. The international price of lead and silver was to rise to 
unprecedented heights, but it was a short-lived peak that would return to lower prices 




economically, the mine went into permanent closure as a Gold Fields operation. It was 
therefore a surprise in the mining community when a small to medium size mining 
company announced an interest in the Argent mines deposit. However, it never 
materialised because of corruption problems within the company.  
 
Since the beginning of 1999 no activity has been observed on any of the mines and none 
is expected in the future. So after a period of 114 years the silver mining industry of the 







C h a p t e r  5  
REFLECTIONS ON THE SILVER MINING INDUSTRY OF THE GREATER 
PRETORIA REGION 
The mining revolution that stirred the Highveld economy in the late nineteenth century 
created a condition of economic and cultural change within the Boer Republic of the 
Transvaal. A force overtook the agrarian economy that few economies have ever 
managed to contain – the force of capitalism. The drive for hidden riches be they 
diamonds, gold or silver was to bring to the ZAR an army of the world’s miners, 
seeking their personal fortune. The majority would be hard-working, hard-living men – 
men who would not be out of place in the gold rushes of Alaska or Australia, or the tin 
and copper mines of Cornwall in England. A few would be the men who made their 
fortunes in diamond and gold mining. For some of those, the rewards of hard work and 
investment would be power, wealth and a grandiose title – the Randlords. For the 
sleepy, agrarian based economy of the ZAR, mineral wealth would become a curse of 
intrusive elements bringing foreign ways, languages and religions and ultimately 
demands for voting rights. The Republic’s more progressive burghers [citizens] 
welcomed the new industries as a means to take the Republic forward and into a 
stronger financial economy, one which could possibly face the expansionist British 
Empire head on. 
 
The Randlords were certainly some of the most powerful men - economically, socially 
and to a degree politically. The dissertation looked at the concept of ‘Randlord’, and 
focussed on those who were involved in the early silver mining industry and what role 
they played. The silver industry was just one aspect of their multi-dimensional interests. 
For the majority, gold mining was their dominant focus with the primary objective 
being the amassing of wealth. For most of them, diamonds from Kimberley was the 
starting point that allowed them to become the power brokers of the Barberton and later 
the Witwatersrand goldfields. Their role in the development of the silver mining 
industry was both as financiers and as directors. If money could be made from silver 
mining, the Randlords became involved.  H Eckstein & Co emerged as the dominant 
mining and financing company that would ultimately control the two largest and richest 




after the Anglo-Boer War and a few would become involved in the next phase of silver 
mine development in the early twentieth century. 
 
Not all of the silver mining ventures of the 1880s and 1890s were the investment 
brainchild of the Randlords. The 1880s were still the time of the individual prospector 
or small syndicate searching for the elusive rich strike. The smaller investor, the middle 
management of many industries, would become the shareholders of the more successful 
silver mines and in turn would become rich themselves and in a few cases, become the 
directors of mining and finance in the early twentieth century. Approximately 30 mines 
existed during the period under review and of those; about 25 were created in the 1880-
1890s. Few lasted for more than two years and it was shown how most of them had 
ceased to exist by 1892, primarily because of the collapse of the international price of 
silver.  
 
Throughout the 114 years of the Pretoria silver and base metal mining industries, they 
have been directly influenced by metal exchange prices, and the economics of mining 
silver has been shown to closely follow significant price fluctuations as substantiated by 
the graph in chapter 1. The results are not only interesting in terms of how the metal 
prices have fluctuated over the 120-year period, but how the prices of the two metals 
can be shown to bear a direct relationship with the periods of mining, i.e. 1890s, 1920s 
and the 1950s. The graph also demonstrates how the timing of development of the 
mines was such that as they got to a production stage the prices of the metals began to 
fall, leading to mine closure within a few years. The non-mining 1970s period was also 
plotted and demonstrates the fickleness of the metal market, with its unpredictable rises 
and falls. The falling prices of silver and lead in the 1970s sealed the fate of the mines, 
with their relatively small ore body volumes by modern mining standards, to remain 
closed - most probably forever. 
 
Both politics and economics played very important and interwoven roles in the early 
development of the silver mining industry. The opening chapter discusses the major 
events that had a direct and indirect impact on the industry. Politics, even today, plays a 
significant role in the various mining industries around the world. In the 1890s it 
became both a bargaining chip for the Kruger government and a persuasion tool for the 




got the loans he needed for financing the NZASM railway as well as the National Bank 
project and the Randlords benefited by their silver mines not being declared as public 
diggings and having unfair taxation imposed on the mining of silver. 
 
Bad choices in the selection of senior mine management such as the mine managers, 
smelters or consulting engineers in the 1890s by the Randlord directors further 
hampered the operation of the silver mines. At the Albert, Willows and the Transvaal 
mine the problem was a recurring theme in the correspondence between Randlords. Otto 
Hahn at the Transvaal mine, M Eissler at the Albert mine and Sidney Jennings at the 
Willows mine, illustrate the ineptitude in staff selection.  
 
The principle role of mining is to extract ore to sell and return profits to the 
shareholders. One of the greatest weaknesses in the 1890s silver mining industry was 
the underestimation of the amount of working capital that would be needed to open and 
operate the silver mines. In most cases, the companies were created with insufficient 
working capital, resulting in the closure or refinancing of the mine. Development of the 
mines was carried out to such an extent that when the mine was ready to start extracting 
the ore, insufficient working capital remained for the operation. The managers of the 
Albert, Willows, Edendale and Argent mines were major culprits in this type of 
problem. For example the Willows mine constructed all of the surface housing and 
beneficiation plant before any ore was brought to surface. 
 
The mining of silver in the greater Pretoria region is one of the lesser known facets of 
South African mining history. It has been shown that it was not only a young industry to 
the ZAR, but provided it with links to alternative sources of revenue for high-profile 
State projects in the 1890s. The research into the various mines has been exhaustive. 
The history of the less productive mines that did not form part of the text of this 
dissertation will, it is hoped, be transformed into an article for future publication. The 
Transvaal mine of the 1890s and 1920s was at the forefront of modern equipment in the 
surface beneficiation equipment and this could provide an interesting study topic in the 
field of mining engineering. Certainly the 1920s Argent mines saw significant 





Establishing the profitability of the silver mining operations has been impossible, 
because the sources declaring profits are too few to establish patterns. It would seem 
that the principal mines discussed in this dissertation did make profits for the 
shareholders - certainly the Willows and the Argent mines did. 
 
In reviewing the output of silver in South Africa in the 1890s and 1920s, it was a 
significant amount in South Africa for the times; by world standards for the 1880-
1890s, it most definitely was not. When one considers that the Bland-Allison Act of 
1878 required the US government to purchase 127.5 tons (4.5 million ounces) of silver 
per month and a large percentage of that was met by the output of the Comstock silver 
mine in Nevada, USA, South Africa’s output was insignificant.1 By modern South 
African standards, the 45 tons of silver produced by the Transvaal Silver & Base Metals 
Company - in the seven years of operation in the 1920s – has been shown to be 
approximately equal to a quarter of the current annual output of silver produced by the 
gold and platinum mines today. The silver mining industry of the greater Pretoria region 
is part of the story of the development of South African mining and it is a facet of South 
Africa’s history that has never been told. 
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Appendix 1 - Glossary of Mining Equipment & Mining Terms 
 
Adit - a horizontal passage or tunnel driven from the sloping surface, such as on a hill, to give access to 
the working area of a mine. 
 
Argentiferous - metallic ore contain silver. Thus argentiferous lead is lead ore containing appreciable 
levels of silver. 
 
Assay - the testing of ores or minerals using chemical tests, or modern scientific instruments, to 
determine the proportions of metals in the ores. 
 
Backs - the height of ore above a given working level; thus if the first level is at 30 m and the shafts and 
drives are all developed the mine is said to have 30 m of backs. 
 
Ball Mill - a rock pulveriser in which balls of metal are enclosed within a near horizontal large rotating 
cylinder. As rock is fed into the cylinder it is broken by the attrition of the rotating balls. 
 
Battery - a machine enclosing 3 or 5 crushing stamps, or a series of such stamp mills in line, driven from 
a common shaft and forming a battery or stamp mill. 
 
Bed - a common geological term meaning layer or stratum.  
 
Blake Jaw Crusher - the original crusher of the jaw type, a crusher with one fixed jaw plate and one 
pivoted at the top. This is usually the primary crusher for ore that is then taken to a secondary crusher to 
be reduced further. 
 
Blast furnace - a type of smelting furnace in which a blast of air is introduced during the smelting 
operation. Small versions of such furnaces can be used for the smelting of copper, tin and lead ores. 
Larger versions are used in the smelting of iron ores. 
 
Bullion - a smelted alloy of metals containing sufficient precious metals – silver or gold - to make the 
recovery of them economical - the dissertation mentions lead bullion or smelted lead containing silver. 
 
Claim - in South Africa a portion of land to which a miner is legally entitled to search for or mine metal 
ores or precious stones. It was an area of 150 feet by 400 feet (45.72m x 121.92m).  
 
Cap – See Shaft cap 
 
Care and maintenance – an engineering term especially among mechanical and mining engineers. It 
implies shutting down and looking after plant and machinery not in productive use such that it can be 
brought back into productive use at a future date with very little effort or major expense. 
 
Cocopans - a term used in South Africa to describe a rocker-dumping type of tipper truck. 
 
Compartments – a shaft is usually divided into two or more compartments or sections, separated by 
framed timbers and planking. The main compartments in a winding or hoisting shaft are usually two 
cages for personal or two cages for personal and two skips for hoisting the ore. The latter would then be 
designated a four compartment shaft. 
 
Concentration - the separation and accumulation of economic minerals from the host or waste rock, or 
gangue. The final concentrate is then passed to, or bagged and shipped to a smelting process. 
 
Country rock - the valueless rock surrounding or penetrated by mineral veins or ore deposits.  
 
Cross-cut - an underground passage directed across an ore body to test its width and value, or a passage 
from the shaft to reach the ore body.  
 
Deposit - a mineral or ore deposit is used to designate the natural occurrence of a useful mineral, or an 





Desulphurising plant – usually a plant with a type of roasting oven in which the sulphur is driven off or 
reduced in ore prior to smelting. 
 
Development – the work done in a mine to open up the paying ground or reef, specifically to form drives 
or haulages around blocks of ore. 
 
Dip - the angle at which a bed, stratum, or vein is inclined from the horizontal. 
 
Drift - a horizontal passage underground, often synonymous with drive as defined below. 
 
Drive - an underground passage for exploration, development or working of an ore body. Drives are 
made at appropriate levels below the surface. In a working mine, ore from the stopes above the level 
descends to the drive below and is then conveyed along that drive to the shaft for raising to the surface. 
 
Dyke; Dike - a tabular body of igneous rock that, when molten, was injected into a fissure, that cuts 
across the structure of the adjacent country rocks, and which is usually vertical or has a very high angle of 
dip. Metallic mineral ore deposits are often associated with dykes. The variance is UK or USA spelling. 
 
Fault - a fracture or a fracture zone in rock, along which there has been displacement of the two sides 
relative to one another parallel to the fracture. The displacement may range from a few centimetres to 
kilometres. 
 
Fines – the fine product of crushing and sieving and which would ultimately be concentrated as a metallic 
powder prior to bagging or smelting. 
 
Fissure vein - a mineral mass filling a fracture or fault line in the country rock.  
 
Flotation plant - a plant where mineral particles are separated using a froth of water and a variety of 
reagents such that some particles float and others sink. Oil flotation merely uses oils between the water a 
froth to capture some mineral particles. 
 
Foot-wall - the wall or rock under a vein, also a general term for the floor in drives. 
 
Frue Vanner - an ore-dressing apparatus consisting, essentially, of a rubber belt travelling up a slight 
inclination. The material to be treated is washed by a constant flow of water while the entire belt is 
shaken from side to side. 
 
Gangue - undesired or waste minerals associated with or a component part of the metallic ore. They are 
mostly non-metallic minerals and some of the most common of the gangue minerals consist, essentially, 
of iron oxides. 
 
Godfrey furnace - a furnace with an annular hearth used for roasting sulphide ores to drive off the 
sulphur leaving oxides of the metallic ores. 
 
Grade - the classification of ore samples or an ore body according to the percentages per ton of ore. 
Below a certain grade it becomes uneconomic to work the deposit, so it is a means of determining how 
rich or poor the deposit is and its economic viability. 
 
Hanging wall - the wall or rock on the upper side of an inclined mineral vein or the part of vein being 
removed.  
 
Haulage - the drawing or hauling of ore and waste rock. It is also used as a term to describe the drive 
along which narrow gauge rails have been laid for the use of cocopans or tipping trucks. 
 
Headgear - the frame that sits at the top of a shaft with the pulley wheels which are used for hoisting the 
ore or men up and down the shaft. 
 






Jaw crusher - a primary crusher designed to reduce large rocks or pieces of ore to a size that is capable 
of being handled by the secondary crusher.  
 
Jig - a device used in ore dressing that separates crushed fine rock particles into different categories to 
eliminate waste from economic metallic particles. 
 
Kibble - a steel bucket used in shaft sinking for both the lowering and raising of men, equipment and 
rock. 
 
Lens deposit - a body of ore or of rock, thicker in the middle than at the edges, similar in shape to a 
double convex lens. 
 
Levels - it is common to space horizontal drives in a mine at regular intervals in depth. They are either 
numbered from the surface in numerical order or designated by their actual elevation below the top of a 
shaft.  
 
Lode - strictly, a fissure in the country rock filled with a deposit of potentially economic minerals; 
usually applied to metalliferous deposits. A lode can be described as a deposit with one or more veins 
spaced closely together such that they can be mined as one deposit. 
 
Matte - a metallic sulphide mixture made by smelting copper and/or lead ores. If the ore is not roasted 
first the matte may contain high values of sulphur as was discovered at the Willows mine.  
 
Mill - the reduction plant where the ore is crushed, ground to fines, concentrated and possibly smelted. A 
general term for the modern reduction plant. 
 
Ore - a natural mineral compound of the elements of which one, at least, is a metal. 
 
Ore at grass - ore stacked or dumped, literally, ‘on the grass’ awaiting treatment or shipment. 
 
Ore-Dressing - the cleaning of ore by the removal of certain valueless portions in the process of crushing 
and jigging. 
 
Ore-shoot - a concentration of primary ore along certain parts of a rock opening. Usually a rich 
aggregation of economic minerals in a vein or lode. 
 
Pipe - an elongated body of mineral; a narrow portion of rich ore extending down the lode. 
 
Poll Pick - a pick with a small sledge-hammer head (Poll) on the one side and pick point on the other. 
Used to knock in props or break off loose rock after blasting. 
 
Reef - a bedded layer deposit of mineral rich ore extending over a very wide distance. It often dips at an 
angle and so can go to great depth such as the Witwatersrand gold reef. Usually the term reef refers to an 
ore containing a precious metal as the dominant mineral such as gold or platinum reefs. 
 
Roaster - an oven designed to convert sulphide ore to metallic oxides by driving off the sulphur content 
of the ore. 
 
Scouler Table - a type of shaking concentration table for separating mineral grains from waste grains – 
used in concentration plants. 
 
Shaft - a vertical opening designed for the use of hoisting equipment to raise and lower men and rock.  
 
Shaft cap - Usually a concrete capping to an abandoned shaft, constructed to prevent people and animals 
falling into the shaft. In some cases there may be a manhole access point as at Argent. 
 
Shaft collar - The main structure of concrete, wood and steel around the top opening of a shaft. 
 





Stamp-Mill or Stamp Battery - One of the earliest mechanised means of reducing ore and rock to 
smaller pieces. The stamp battery was a machine consisting of a rectangular frame carrying 3 or 5 vertical 
stamps or heavy metal pounders that were raised up and dropped onto the lumps of ore, thereby crushing 
the ore. 
 
Stope - an underground excavation from which the ore has been removed, leaving a large cavity in that 
part of the mine. 
 
Stringers – a small filament vein within the rock of an ore body or lode. 
 
Tribute Lease - a lease between the owners of a mine and a syndicate or private individuals who agree to 
work the mine and pay the mine owner a percentage of the profits of the ore sold. It is a method where a 
mining company, after shutting down their own mining operations usually because of high operational 
costs, allows a smaller operator to do the mining. This often saved companies from closing the mine 
down. 
 
Tuyere - a tube or opening in a metallurgical furnace through which air is blown as part of the extraction 
or refining process. Tuyeres as tubes can be water cooled metal tubes as in modern blast furnaces or made 
of refractory clay as in smaller or earlier units. 
 
Vein - a zone or belt of mineralised rock, often extending over considerable distances. The vein would be 
the part containing the metal ores. 
 
Wilfley table - a long established and widely used form of shaking table designed to sort or classify 
heavy metal ores from lighter elements. 
 
Winze - a vertical or inclined opening connecting two levels in a mine. A surface winze is often a small 
































Appendix 2 - Biographical notes on people mentioned in the 
dissertation 
 
Albu, Sir George, – 1857-1935. Randlord mining magnate; came to South Africa in 1876; was a 
diamond merchant in Kimberley 1876-89; subsequently settled in Johannesburg and established, with his 
brother, the firm of G & L Albu; formed General Mining and Finance Corporation 1895, with himself as 
managing director. Was instrumental in re-opening the Argent mines in 1919 and formed the Transvaal 
Silver & Base Metals Company.  
 
Albu, Leopold, - 1860-1938. Randlord mining magnate and he was the brother of Sir George Albu. He 
was a director of General Mining and Finance Corporation in London. 
 
Andersson, Lt. Colonel Sir Charles Llewellyn, soldier and pioneer of Johannesburg; born and bred in 
Cape Town; during WWI Andersson commanded a battalion of the Northamptonshire Regiment; severely 
wounded at the Somme in 1916, he was captured by the Germans in 1916. He was a founder member and 
secretary of the Wanderer’s Club in Johannesburg in the 1890s; an accountant he founded the firm of 
Andersson and Whiteley in 1903. He became chairman of the Sallies Gold mine and a director of the 
Pretoria Silver Lead Mine Ltd. He was knighted in 1922; built and lived at ‘Dolbran’ in Parktown. 
 
Bailey, Sir Abraham (Abe), - 1864-1940. Randlord mining magnate and politician; stockbroker in 
Johannesburg in 1887; acquired extensive mining interests; formed South African Townships, Mining & 
Finance Corporation; member of the Reform Committee sentenced and fined £2000. At the time of the 
trial he was a director of ten gold mining companies. Member of the Cape Legislative Assembly 1902-5 
and Transvaal Legislative Assembly 1907-10; Union House of Assembly 1915-24; from 1902 he became 
heavily involved in tin mining in the Transvaal, he was a director of the Transvaal Silver and Lead 
Company on the farm Roodekrans 1906-1907. 
 
Bain, Charles (Chas) Alfred Oliver, Johannesburg pioneer; took over his father’s mineral-water bottling 
business, in Beaufort West in the early 1880s; he arrived in Johannesburg and soon became well known 
as a mining agent; he was also a founder member of the Wanderer’s Club. From 1920-1924 he was 
chairman of the Pretoria Silver Lead Mines Ltd.   
 
Barnato, Barnett Isaacs (Barney), 1852-1897. Randlord mining magnate, financier; born in London 
arrived in Kimberly 1873; established, with his elder brother, Harry, Barnato Bros., Diamond dealers; 
amalgamated large diamond holdings into Kimberley Central Diamond Mining Co. which he was later 
forced by Rhodes and his allies to merge with De Beers, of which Barnato become Life Governor. 
Acquired large interests on the Rand 1888-89; established Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co in 
1889; it is believed that he may have committed suicide off of Madeira. He was chairman of the initial 
phase of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd. 
 
Beckett, Thomas William, 1851-1924. Pretoria merchant, he helped to found and became chairman of 
the National Bank in the 1890s; director of the Albert (Silver) Mine Ltd 1886-1889, and of Mundt Silver 
Mining Prospecting & Developing Syndicate - 1889. 
 
Beit, Alfred, 1853-1906. Randlord mining magnate and financier; came to South Africa in 1875 as 
diamond buyer and merchant at Kimberly; became a partner in the firm of Jules Porges in 1888 and on 
the retirement of Jules Porges in 1889, a partner in the reconstituted firm of Werner, Beit & Co. Provided 
much of the expertise and financial backing which enabled Rhodes to carry through the De Beers 
amalgamation in 1888. On the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand, he founded the firm of H Eckstein 
& Co in Johannesburg.  He was actively involved as a director of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd, and 
through H Eckstein Co the control of the Willows Copper (Argentiferous) Syndicate Ltd.  
 
Boyd, Henry Crawford, 1870-1952. Company manager; arrived in Johannesburg in 1896; joined H 
Eckstein & Co. Appointed local manager of Central Mining & Investment Corporation Ltd 1911-20; 
chairman of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd in 1905. 
 
Churchill, Lord Randolph Henry Spencer, British Statesman; entered House of Commons as a 
Conservative in 1874; secretary of state for India, 1856-86; Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of 





Clench, C, Foundation member of the first Chamber of Mines in 1887, director of Albert (Silver) Mine 
Ltd. 
 
Eckstein, Sir Friedrich Gustav Jonathan, 1857-1930. Randlord mining magnate; brother of Hermann 
Eckstein; joined the firm of H Eckstein in Johannesburg, 1888-1901; become a partner in Werner, Beit & 
Co in London 1902-10; appointed director of Central Mining & Investment Corporation Ltd 1911; elected 
to the chairmanship 1912; resigned 1914, director of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd. 
 
Eckstein, Hermann Ludwig, 1847-1893. Randlord mining magnate; came to South Africa in 1882 as 
manager of the Phoenix Diamond Mining Co at Dutoitspan in Kimberley; founded the firm of H Eckstein 
in Johannesburg in 1887. One of the founders and the first President of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines 
until 1892 when he resigned and went to London as partner in Werner, Beit & Co. Director of the 
Transvaal Mines Ltd also deeply involved in the decisions connected with the Willows mine, Edendale 
mine and advised Nellmapius with regard to aspects of the Albert mine. 
 
Eissler, Manuel, Consulting Engineer at the Albert mine, he was recognized internationally as an 
authority on lead, copper and silver deposits, writing several books on the subjects of which The 
Metallurgy of Silver (1891) was the most famous. He had been assistant assayer to the United States Mint 
and in 1891was appointed as consulting engineer to the Albert mine. 
 
Farrar, Sir George Herbert, 1859-1915. Randlord mining magnate and politician; chairman of the 
Anglo-French Exploration Co and of the East Rand Propriety Mines Ltd; was a leading member of the 
Reform Committee at the time of the Jameson Raid in 1896 and after the trial was sentenced to death for 
treason. Became the leader of the Transvaal Progressive Association after 1904; elected to the Transvaal 
Legislative Assembly 1907; Transvaal delegate to the National Convention 1908-9; member of the Union 
House of Assembly 1910-11. He was involved as a director of the Witpoortje Syndicate Ltd, Boschpoort 
Silver Mining Syndicate. Later he became a director of Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd. 
 
Farrar, Sidney Howard, 1857-1917. Company director; brother of Sir George Farrar; London director 
of several South African gold mining companies; was a director of Boschpoort Silver Mining Syndicate 
and the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd. 
 
Ford, Lewis Peter, 1846-1925. Lawyer, businessman and Johannesburg pioneer; become a partner in the 
Randjeslaagte syndicate with Carl and Julius Jeppe and founded the townships of Jeppe and Fordsburg, 
the latter being named after him. 
 
Fox, Samuel, 1845-1833. Pioneer of early Johannesburg, arriving in 1885 before it had been proclaimed. 
He became a successful speculator, owning in partnership with Isaac Sonnenberg a large part of the 
central area of Johannesburg. Fox street is named after him. Fox was the original owner of Orange Grove, 
purchasing it for £8000 and selling it for twice that amount. He was a co-defendant in the “Deep levels 
case” with the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd (see text). He died in poverty in the Witbank district.  
 
Hanau, Carl, 1855-1930. Company promoter and director; partner in S Neumann & Co; later represented 
Barnato Bros in South Africa; member of various syndicates on the Witwatersrand, including the 
Coronation Syndicate which he founded 1902. He is reputed to have died in poverty. He was a director of 
Boschpoort Silver Mining Syndicate and a shareholder in Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd. 
 
Hahn, Otto H, He trained as a metallurgist in Germany and then travelled to the United States where for 
twenty years he developed the smelting of lead ores writing many papers on the subject and becoming a 
contributor to the rapid development of American metallurgy. He was appointed as manager of the 
Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd in 1889 but was fired in 1892. 
 
Hofmeyer, Harry J, solicitor and pioneer of Johannesburg; close friend of Chas Bain (see above); 
became Mayor of Johannesburg in 1910; director of Pretoria Silver Lead Mines Ltd.   
 
Jameson, Samuel W, 1849- ? brother of Leander Starr Jameson of the Jameson Raid; Samuel was 
involved in mining and was a director of nine gold mining companies as well as the Transvaal Silver 
Mines Ltd and the Willows Extension Silver Mine Syndicate Ltd. He was a member of the Reform 
Committee sentenced and fined £2000. At the time of the trial he was a director of nine gold mining 





Jennings, Sidney Johnston, 1863-1928. Mining engineer; brother of Hennen Jennings; employed as 
Mine Manager on the Witwatersrand 1893-98.Joined H Eckstein & Co 1899, appointed Consulting 
Engineer to the group in 1900. Was the mine manager/smelter at the Willows Copper (Argentiferous) 
Syndicate Ltd in the early 1890s, also involved with the Transvaal Silver & Lead Mines Ltd 1906-1907.      
 
Jennings, Hennen CE, 1854-1920. Mining engineer, Consulting Engineer to H Eckstein & Co and to 
Wernher, Beit & Co - 1898-1905; returned to the Witwatersrand 1902-3 to advise on the reorganization of 
the mines after the Anglo-Boer War. Was the Consulting engineer to the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd and 
also advised on the Willows Copper (Argentiferous) Syndicate Ltd. 
 
Jeppe, Carl Frederick Wilhelm, 1859-? He was a lawyer; miner and Johannesburg pioneer; partner in 
the Randjeslaagte Syndicate with his brother Julius and, with Lewis P Ford. Jeppestown was named after 
the two Jeppe brothers; director of the Albert (Silver) Mine Ltd, and the Victoria Regina Silver & Copper 
Mining Co Ltd. 
 
Joel, Soloman (Solly) Barnato, 1865-1931. Randlord mining magnate; nephew of Barney Barnato; 
succeeded his uncle as head of the Johannesburg Consolidated Investments Co (JCI) after the death of his 
elder brother in 1898; extended the gold mining interests and its major involvement in De Beers after 
1900. Member of the Reform Committee sentenced and fined £2000. At the time of the trial he was a 
director of thirty gold mining and other companies.  Was a director of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd in 
1889-1890 and was involved in the short-lived Willows Extension Silver Mine Syndicate Ltd 1889-1893.   
     
Joubert, Christian Johannes Jacobus, 1834-1911. Minister of Mines in the South African Republic; he 
was a director of the Albert (Silver) Mine Ltd in the late 1880s. 
 
King, Henry James, 1849-1920. He was a company director. Partner of the S Neumann & Co; served on 
the London Committee of the Premier (Transvaal) Diamond Mining Co; member of the Reform 
Committee sentenced and fined £2000. At the time of the trial he was a director of seventeen gold mining 
companies as well as the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd. 
 
Kynoch George, 1834-1891, The founder and managing director of Kynoch, the largest ammunition 
manufacturer in Britain in the 19
th
 century; he retired in the late 1800s and emigrated to South Africa; he 
became a director of Nevada Silver & Smelting Co Ltd in 1888 and also shareholder of the Transvaal 
Silver Mines Ltd in 1889-1890. 
 
Langermann, Sir Jan Willem Stuckeris, 1853-1932. Mining industrialist and politician; managing 
director of the Robinson Group of Mines and of Randfontein Estates GMC Ltd.; elected to the Transvaal 
Legislative Assembly 1907; member of the Union House of Assembly for many years; President of the 
Chamber of Mines 1909-10; he was a director of the Willows Copper (Argentiferous) Syndicate Ltd, 
1888-89. He was involved with H Eckstein & Co through Lionel Phillips in 1891 with the Rondevlei 
Silver prospect.     
  
Lewis, Isaac, 1849-1927. Randlord industrialist; began prospecting at Kimberley in 1870 with his cousin 
Samuel Marks with whom he established the firm of Lewis and Marks; They were heavily involved with 
land and mining interests in Barberton and later started coal mines at Vereeniging. They were closely 
involved with the control of the Hatherly Distillery near Pretoria and their firm established the Union 
Steel Corporation in 1913. Both Lewis and Marks were directors of the Albert (Silver) Mine Ltd. 
 
Lippert, Edouard Amandus, 1853-1925. Randlord industrialist; cousin of Alfred Beit; moved from 
Kimberley to Johannesburg, secured valuable industrial concessions from President Kruger, the greatest 
of which was the manufacturing of dynamite; established a factory at Modderfontein in 1894. He was a 
large shareholder in the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd in 1889-91. He lost most of his fortune due to the 
post-1920 hyper-inflation in Germany and died in poverty. 
 
Marks, Samuel (Sammy), 1843-1920. Randlord industrialist; arrived in South Africa in 1868 and went 
to Kimberley where he soon became financially successful. For other details see entry on Isaac Lewis. 
 
Michaelis, Sir Maximilian, 1860-1932. Randlord mining magnate and art patron arrived in South Africa 
in 1872 and settled in Kimberley where he went into partnership with both Wernher and Beit. Shareholder 





Molengraaff, Gustaaf Adolf Frederik, 1860-1942. A Dutch geologist, biologist and explorer; He 
became an authority on the geology of South Africa and the Dutch East Indies. In 1888 Molengraaff took 
a job as a teacher (later as professor) at the University of Amsterdam. In 1897 Molengraaff became "State 
geologist" of the Transvaal Republic. His task was to start the geological survey of the Transvaal. While 
mapping the Transvaal he discovered the Bushveld complex. He returned to South Africa in 1901 to work 
as a geological consultant. The Anglo-Boer War had his attention and one of his ideas was to give each 
soldier a small tin identity card, which later became practice in armies around the world. In 1906 he 
became professor of geology at Delft University. 
 
Mosenthal, Julius G, 1853-1918 Stockbroker both in early Johannesburg and later in London. Although 
a son of Joseph Mosenthal, one of the founders of the wool exporting firm of Mosenthal Brothers, Julius 
was not involved in the firm. He was involved in the early development of mining companies in 
Johannesburg and was a shareholder in the Willows Copper (Argentiferous) Syndicate Ltd. He left South 
Africa probably around the time of the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) by 1903 he is recorded as a 
stockbroker on the London Stock Exchange. 
 
Murray, Sir Thomas Keir, 1854-1936. Born in Natal he was a diamond digger at Colesburg Koppie at 
the age of 17. He was responsible for expanding the Natal Railway to the Transvaal.  He was also a Natal 
soldier, farmer and politician. He was the main financial backer for Zaaiplaats Tin Mines and owner of 
the Edendale Lead Mine 1908-1909. 
 
Nellmapius, Alois Hugo, 1847-93. Industrialist; came to South Africa in the early 1870s; acquired 
mining claims at Pilgrims Rest; Started a transport business between Maputo and parts of the South 
African Republic; settled in Pretoria; became a close friend of President Kruger through whom he 
received important industrial concessions which he then used to form close associations with the firms of 
H Eckstein & Co and Lewis & Marks. He was directly involved with the formation of the Albert (Silver) 
Mine Ltd and became one of its directors. 
 
Neumann, Sir Sigusmund, 1856-1916. Randlord mining financier; came to Johannesburg from 
Kimberley; founded the firm of S Neumann & Co; closely associated with H Eckstein & Co in several 
mining ventures; major shareholder in the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd in the 1890s. 
 
Niven, Andrew Mackie, 1854–1928, Stockbroker and businessman; educated in Glasgow and Liverpool. 
Immigrated to Natal in 1881 and then moved to Johannesburg in 1888 setting himself up as a stock and 
share broker with partners J Mackillican and JN Greenless.  In 1894 he opened his own business focusing 
on mining stock. He was a founder member of the Chamber of Mines; became involved in the Reform 
Committee and at his trial was sentenced and fined £2000. After the Anglo-Boer War he returned to 
Johannesburg and became involved in Municipal committees and local politics from 1903-1921. He was a 
director of the Pretoria Silver Lead Mines Ltd as well as a number of gold mines.  
Phillips, Sir Lionel, 1855-1936. Randlord mining magnate, financier, politician and benefactor; he 
managed the diamond claims of JB Robinson. He served as President of the Chamber of Mines (1893-94 
and was a senior partner of H Eckstein and Co. He was chairman of the Reform Committee and after the 
Jameson Raid (1895) he was arrested along with the other members of the committee and at the end of the 
trial was sentenced to death for treason. The sentence was commuted to a large fine and he relocated to 
London, until returning in 1906. Became CEO of Central Mining & Investment Corporation; survived a 
near fatal assassination attempt in 1913, retiring at the end of 1924. In the 1890s he was chairman of the 
Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd until arrested for the Reform Committee activities. He was also closely 
involved with the Willows Copper (Argentiferous) Syndicate Ltd. 
 
Roets, Mrs Cathrina, former owner of a portion of the farm Dwarsfontein. It seems that her portion was 
where the main shaft of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd of the 1890s was located. She witnessed the 
destruction of the mine buildings in July 1901, during the Anglo-Boer War. In 1919 General Mining 
mentioned the acquisition of the Roets portion of Dwarsfontein in their files. 
 
Rogers, HA, a businessman also member of the Reform Committee sentenced and fined £2000. At the 
time of the trial he was a director of ten gold mining companies as well as the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd, 





Skill, Octavius James, 18? – 1892. He was a claims broker in Kimberley in the 1870s; the next reference 
to him is as the mine manager/director of the Willows Copper (Argentiferous) Syndicate Ltd in 1888; by 
1890 he is loaning the company considerable amounts of money. He was in continuous discord with H 
Eckstein & Co especially JB Taylor. Skill was a director of the Willows Copper (Argentiferous) 
Syndicate Ltd right up to the time of his death in 1892. 
 
Struben, Hendrik Wilhelm (Harry William), 1840-1915. Gold mining pioneer, trader and farmer; 
brother of Fred; became first President of the Chamber of Mines in 1887; served on the Diggers’ 
Committee and on a commission that framed the gold laws of the Transvaal Republic. Director of several 
mining enterprises; discovered argentiferous copper on his farm The Willows around 1883-4 and was one 
of the original directors of the Willows Copper (Argentiferous) Syndicate Ltd in 1888. 
 
Struben, Frederick Pine Theophilus, 1851-1931. Geologist and prospector; prospected for gold in 
Barberton area and returned to Witwatersrand in 1883; with his brother Harry they discovered the 
Confidence Reef in early 1885.  
 
Taylor, James Benjamin, (JB), 1860-1944. Randlord mining financier; arrived in Kimberley 1871; 
became a stockbroker in Barberton. Founded the company of H Eckstein & Co with Hermann Eckstein in 
1887; retired from the firm in 1894. He was deeply involved as a director of the Willows Copper 
(Argentiferous) Syndicate Ltd and to a lesser extent with the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd.  
 
Tilney, George Adams, died 1889. Mining pioneer and speculator closely associated with H Struben in 
early gold mines of Johannesburg and especially the Crown Reef Gold Mine of which he was a director. 
He was also a director of the Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd under Barnato. 
 
Williams, John Richard, 1862-1941. Consulting metallurgist to H Eckstein & Co; appointed reduction 
manager of the Crown Reef Gold Mining Company Ltd in 1888. After leaving the Eckstein Company, he 
formed a syndicate with Sir Aubrey Wools-Sampson to operate the old Transvaal mine on a tribute basis 
in 1908, but the venture was a failure. 
 
Woolls-Sampson, Colonel Sir Aubrey, 1856-1924. Soldier and politician; fought alongside the Boers in 
Ferreira’s Horse, in the Sekhukhune War in 1878; served with Buller in the Zulu War of 1879 and with 
Nourse’s Horse in the siege of Pretoria in 1881; He was imprisoned as a member of the Reform 
Committee and like Karri-Davies refused to compromise over the political ban; founder member of the 
Imperial Light Horse with which he served in the Anglo-Boer War. Employed by Abe Bailey’s Finance 
Co.; member of the Transvaal Legislative Assembly, 1907-1910, and of the Union House of Assembly 











Appendix 3 - Development of the total production for some of the 
silver mines 
 
In an attempt to provide production figures for each of the mines when they were in operation, various 
sources have been used. The period prior to 1900 proved the most difficult for obtaining values. If figures 
detailing total tonnages mined and the metals or concentrates produced or even yields per ton of the 
metals were ever officially produced, they have not been found in archival material. For the pre-1900 
mines the lack of records is understandable, as only a few silver mining companies were listed on the 
stock exchange at the time, these being the Albert, Willows, Nevada, White Swan and Transvaal mine 
(TSM) at Argent. Of the five, only the TSM produced regular company reports for the years of production 
1889-1895.  
 
Two company reports dealing with the Willows mine were found. The only other sources for company 
financial and production data were the reports in the Standard and Diggers’ News, The South African 
Mining Journal and the review of the mines in CS Goldman’s review of mines in 1892. After 1900, 
contemporary newspaper reports provided some of the details, but one of the best sources was PH 
Allport’s analysis of mine company production returns to the then Department of Mines, for the period 
1903 to 1938. For details of the Argent mines after 1950 the company files of Gold Fields of South Africa 
were the only source. Note in this appendix the word ‘silver’ has been omitted after the names of the 
mines as they are all silver mines in the discussion. 
 
Table 2 in chapter 1, showing the production figures for the mines mentioned in this dissertation, is 
believed to be the first attempt to create the consolidated total outputs for all of the silver mines. In the 
case of Edendale, Willows and the Argent mines (the only significant producers), the author has tried to 
recreate the possible outputs in values per ton of the main metals produced, viz. copper, lead, zinc and 
antimony and the possible output quantity of silver in kilograms. Average values have had to be 
calculated in a number of cases and are based on the limited actual values available. Where actual and 
calculated values are indicated in a table - the actual, from sources - is shown in red. In some cases 
average values have been calculated and then used to calculate possible metal production. 
 
In calculating the grades of the ores and the value in ounces per ton of ore the following formulas are 
used: 
grade of metal = metal estimated from assay of ore                  silver ozs/ton =         ozs assayed         
                                         total ore mined                                                               ore mined in tons  
       ore mined in tons 
The tables show that the production was probably far greater than the current literature sources would 
indicate. For example, the greatest surprise was the Willows mine. As stated above, no production figures 
have been found in any government publication, yet from newspaper sources and two company reports it 
has been possible to established that they mined approximately 13 000 tons of ore, from which they 
produced 500 tons of copper and, significantly, 14 tons of silver. In all cases tons are stated in long tons, 
which convert equally to metric tons. As the grades in the sources are stated in ounces, they are used in 




resultant tables in the chapter on economics it has been decided to place the data in this appendix and 
transfer the final figures for the Argent, Edendale and Willows mines to Table 2 in chapter 1. 
 
The relevant sources used for the data per year are cited for each table and appear as footnotes for the 
Willows mine. The sources for the Edendale and Argent mines are tabulated below each respective table 
for Edendale and Argent and they do not appear as footnotes. Citation reference numbers appear within 
the data entries of the tables 
. 
Edendale Mine 
Only two sources were found for values or tonnages produced at the Edendale mine. The major sources 





Table 1 - Edendale mine showing sourced (red) and calculated figures (black) for the 
production of lead and silver between 1890 and 1938 


























1890-9 700 [74] 518   [6.42] 4494 127 [0.18] 
1904-5 1120 [74] 828   [6.42] 7190 203 [0.18] 
1905-6 238 74 176.12   [6.42] 1528 43 [0.18] 
1906 877 80 701.60   [6.42] 5630 160 [0.18] 
1907 919.31 73 735.45  
[48] 
60.6 tons  
= 29 tons 
3.32 3048 86 0.094 












116 tons  









271 8 0.315 
1912 152.05 77 117.08   5.86 892 25 0.166 
1921 81.24 76 61.74   [6.42]  15 [0.18] 
1922 22 69 15.18   1.18 26 0.73 0.033 
1923 48 76.63 36.78   [6.42]  9 [0.18] 
1924 82.74 71.27 58.97   [6.42]  15 [0.18] 
1925 3.83 91.12 3.49    ?  ? 
1926 20.97 99.51 20.87    ?  ? 
1927 23.5 99.50 23.38    ?  ? 
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  Archive of H Eckstein & Co Ltd. Volume HE 234, file 71E Edendale no 1, 19 March 1903. 
 
2
  Council for Geoscience, Pretoria, PH Allport, ‘Lead Production of the Union of South Africa’, Report 




From the tonnages of lead ore mined and assay values for lead and silver it was possible to calculate the 
actual tonnages of lead produced. The known assay values of lead were averaged over the twelve known 
values, all of which were generally around 75% and excluding the obvious smelted lead values of around 
96%. The average grade was calculated as 74% and shown in [ ]. This value was used to produce likely 
values for 1890 to 1905. As only six values of silver are stated in Allport’s report, an average value of 
silver per ton was calculated from the six known values (1907-1922). The calculated value is 6.42 ozs/ton 
or at 0.182 kg/ton silver. This value was used to extrapolate the possible values for silver in kilograms.  
 
Note that the years shown above reflect only the years with production, not the total number of years in 
operation and development. The high values for lead - at approximately 98% - have to be for smelted 
matte values and the five entries are excluded in calculating the average for mined ore. However, the 
values would have resulted in good quantities of silver, if the grade of 6.42 kg/ton for ore is used, the 
potential for silver should have realized about 27 kg. Such values have not been included in the 
calculations. No values of silver/ton are known for the zinc ore, even though it would have contained 




The Willows mine, as the history detail shows, produced both high-graded ore that was shipped overseas 






 In late 1890 two furnaces were brought into 
operation and they smelted the ore to produce copper matte or smelted metal, in effect copper metal 
alloyed, in the case of the Willows mine, with antimony and high levels of silver. The smelting operation 
only lasted for a period of about six months and appears to have been plagued by the incompetence of the 
smelter operators. Through the use of monthly reports in the Standard and Diggers’ News the author has 
been able to produce the table below which gives some idea of the amounts of ore mined and copper 
matte produced along with the values of antimony and silver. Using the assay values of the matte it has 
been possible to obtain average grades of copper and silver and use these averages to calculate tons of 
copper and kilograms of silver produced. The surprise was the high amount, potentially, of silver that the 
mine produced. The four quotes below are taken from the Standard and Diggers’ News: 
 
 16 February 1891:  
One furnace was running 30 days. 124 tons 1 900 lbs (125 tons) of ore were smelted, containing 4 
465 ozs silver and 9 215 lbs copper. The amount of copper matte obtained 7 tons 1 212 lbs, 
containing 3 887 ozs silver and 8 760 lbs (3.91 tons) of copper. No 2 furnace has been delayed but 
this furnace should be fired before the end of February.
5
 
                                                 
3
  First half-yearly Company report of the Willows Copper (Argentiferous) Syndicate, 1 July 1889, Harold 
Strange Library, Johannesburg Public Library, Johannesburg, 
  
4
  CS Goldman, The Financial, Statistical and General History of the Gold and other Companies of 
Witwatersrand, South Africa, p. 259. 
 
5




19 March 1891: 
One furnace was running 28 days, 115 tons of ore were smelted containing per assay 5 300 ozs of 
silver 11 660 lbs copper. Matte obtained:  8 tons 830 lbs, containing per assay 4 343 ozs silver and 
9 784 lbs copper.
6
 
18 April 1891:  
 Ore smelted 191 tons, containing per assay 7 624 ozs silver, 14 896 lbs copper, matte obtained 267 
cwt containing 6 460 ozs silver, 14504 lbs copper, In consequence of the continued rains the 
returns will not be as good as expected. No 1 furnace running well.
7
 
30 May 1891: 
181 tons of ore were smelted and 140 cwt matte obtained containing, per assay, 3 797 ozs silver 
and 8 361 lbs of copper…The furnace chimney has become totally unsafe, so propose blowing out 




Table 2 - Willows mine showing sourced (red) and calculated figures (black) for the 
production of copper and silver  




















































































































































































































































1 5 443 [3.9] [212] [39] [212 277]       [6018] 
Dec 
1890 
1 6 220 [3.9] [243] [39] [242 588]       [6877] 





2 [92] [3.9] [3.58]   5.55 [53] [2.96] [1525] [515] [146] [810] 
Jan 
1891 
3 125  3.3 4.11 36 4465 7.54 52 3.91 3887 516 146 1102 
Feb 
1891 
4 115  4.5 5.21 46 5300 8.37 52 4.37 4343 519 147 1231 
Mar 
1891 
5 191  3.9 7.38 34 6460 13.35 55 7.36 6460 484 137 1831 
Apr 
1891 



























                                                 
6
  ‘Willows Copper (Argentiferous) Syndicate’, Standard and Diggers’ News, 19 March 1891. 
 
7
  ‘Willows Copper Synd’, Standard and Diggers’ News, 18 April 1891. 
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No official production figures have been found in government records. In extrapolating the potential 
production of copper and silver from the high-graded ore shipped overseas, the figure of 3.9% as the 
grade for the copper and 40 ozs per ton for the silver are based on the average assay values for the ore 
used in the smelting operation from January – March 1891. It is possible that the hand-sorted ore that was 
shipped in 1890 was of higher grade, but it is not possible to know what the grades may have been. The 
values used provide some indication of the potential production from the Willows mine in the 1890s. It is 
known that there was a high percentage of antimony in the ore, especially as the development went to a 
third level. It is difficult to produce a potential production of antimony because of the wide variances in 
grade from 2 – 20%. If the lower value is used however, then the potential production or recovery was 
245 tons. The possible production of 18.95 tons of silver makes the Willows mine the second largest 




Developing production output figures for the mines at Argent has been problematical for several reasons. 
Firstly lack of official figures for the 1890s has meant a re-creation of output data that is based on 
company reports similar to the exercise with the Willows mine. Output for the period from 1903 to 1938 
is covered in Allport’s report of 1938 and production outputs for the 1950s are based on internal reports 
of the Goldfields Group. No production took place in the 1970s on any of the Goldfields Group options. 
There is a difference in the terminology of the output of smelted metal from the Willows mine, that 
produced silver rich ‘copper matte’, and the Argent mines that produced silver rich lead ‘bullion,’ and 
‘lead matte’ In essence, however, they are very similar in that a dominant element - copper or lead - 
contained significant percentages of silver. 
 
The table below was developed as the first comprehensive table of tonnages mined/smelted and of lead 
bullion produced, coupled with potential outputs of the major metals - lead, zinc and silver. For the first 
time, the tonnages of 1890s are calculated and combined with the post-1900 production figures. The 
sources for the 1890s are the figures presented in the company reports that were found as part of the 
Archives of H Eckstein & Co in the Barlows Archives. The 1900-1927 records are sourced from Allport’s 
1938 report and the company reports of the Transvaal Silver and Base Metals Ltd. The 1950s figures are 
developed from the manager’s reports of the Argent Lead and Zinc Co Ltd, a subsidiary of Goldfields of 
South Africa and the details, although sketchy, were found in the Goldfields’ files. 
 
An additional complication was defining which mining operation the ores came from. It is almost certain 
that the 1890s ores were derived from the ‘main mine’ at Argent (Dwarsfontein) of the Transvaal mine. 
However, in the 1920s period of the Transvaal Silver and Base Metals mine - although the main operation 
was clearly at the ‘main mine’ or Transvaal mine - it is not clear how much of the ore was derived from 
Boschpoort, Brakfontein, the Shimwell Lode and possibly other small operations that the company 
investigated in the early years of the 1920s. During the 1950s Goldfields certainly dewatered various old 




development of zinc deposits and it is clear from the mineralogy that only the Brakfontein mine provided 
such economic potential for zinc minerals. 
 
Table 3 – The Argent mines, showing sourced (red) and calculated figures for the production of lead, 
zinc and silver at the Argent mines – Boschpoort, Brakfontein, Transvaal and possibly the Pretoria 






















































































































































































































































Nov 1889 10  ?  25  50 12.5   75 1875 53 
Dec 1890 11 2000+  176  69 121 1 1.8 90 15840 449 
Dec 1891 12 8000+  767  72 552 1 5.5 91 69797 1979 
Dec 1892 
13 13670 























































Dec 1894-5 15 29517 4364
b







 2112 739  5886  77  311021 17057 
1901 16   {538}
c
         

















26 51788 1468 
























1920 “ 264    25 66 1 2.6 58 15487 439 


























1923 “    5440 97 5277 1 54.4 89 485848 13774 
1924 “    4921 97 4773 1 49.2 94 463096 13129 
1925 “    1840 74 1362 1 18.4 123 227216 6441 
Sub-totals 
1919-1925 












1955 18 16300    3.61 588 5.4 880 4.57 74491 2112 
1956 18
 
























copper = 254 tons 









Table 4 sources 
 
10
  Harold Strange Library, Johannesburg Public Library, Johannesburg, Transvaal Silver Mines Report to 
Directors of Transvaal Silver Mines by WH Furlonge, 26 November 1889.  
 
11  
Archives of H Eckstein & Co Ltd Volume HE 5, Annexure 17 & 18, Report to 2
nd
 AGM of 
shareholders, 9 April 1891.  The tonnage of 176 tons represents the total shipped overseas for treatment 
between October 8
th
 and December 31
st
 1890. The 2000 tons represents the amount of unsorted ore on 
surface at the time of the annual report. The values in the table are the values given in the source and 
represent the potential returns from the 176 tons only.  
 
12 
 Archives of H Eckstein & Co Ltd Volume HE 5, Annexure 19-20, Chairman’s report to 3rd AGM of 
shareholders, 21 April 1892. 
 
13
  Archives of H Eckstein & Co Ltd Volume HE 5, Annexure 22, Chairman’s report to 4th AGM of 
shareholders, 9 March 1893. 
 
14 
 Archives of H Eckstein & Co Ltd Volume HE 5, Annexure 23, Chairman’s report to 5th AGM of 
shareholders, 29 March 1894. Note the shipment of three products – high grade ore, concentrates and 
lead bullion. The grades of lead and silver are given in the report. 
 
15 
 Archives of H Eckstein & Co Ltd Volume HE 5, Annexure 24, Chairman’s report to 6th AGM of 
shareholders, 14 November 1895. 
 
16
  ‘Pretoria Silver, Lead and Copper Mines’, The South African Mining Journal, (19 September 1908), p. 
684. The production of ore during the period of the Anglo-Boer war is doubtful and although the source 
states 1901 the use of the data is questionable and it has not been added to the sub-total. It is believed 
that it may have been a typographical error and the correct date was more likely 1891. 
 
17 
  Council for Geoscience, Pretoria, PH Allport, ‘Lead Production of the Union of South Africa’, Report 
no. 1940-0070, 1940, p. 15. 
 
18 
 Gold Fields of South Africa file ARG820/1/1 BRAK - A review of the main factors concerning the 
opening up of the mine, the operating results obtained and the effects of metal price variations, Report by 
LD Browne, consulting engineer, 10 September 1957, p. 3.   
 
The production figures for Transvaal Silver Mines Ltd 1890 -1895 
 
The mine was effectively in production for about 5 years. During that time it switched from shipping 
high-graded ore to ore plus bullion to concentrates only. No details have been found of any form of 
consolidated production figures for TSM. Using details from the AGM reports between 1890 and 1895 




As the mine stopped operation early in 1895, the figures for 1894 and part of 1895 were consolidated in 
the 1895 AGM report. It has been impossible to separate the production figures of Transvaal mine from 
those of Boschpoort and Brakfontein. The only figures that are almost certainly from the Brakfontein 
mine are the 1955-56 figures, which indicate values of zinc.  
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The assay grade for silver in ounces per ton shown above for the period between 1908 and 1925 are 
derived values. They are based on the stated ounces of silver produced and the ore and concentrates 
produced. It must be stated that the values are a very general guide to the grade per ton silver. As the 
actual amount of ore raised during this period could not be determined from any of the sources, the values 
of silver are most probably inflated, but they do generally correlate with known values from the 1890s. In 
creating the table of values certain assumptions have been made. In the period 1889-1896 is has been 
assumed that the values of lead and silver are based on concentrated values rather than the average value 
of raised ore per ton. If the latter was used – 60 926 tons - as the basis for the calculation of potential lead 
and silver produced, the derived values would be considerably higher and possibly false. The only 
instance where the ore raised has been used is in the 1955-56 values. A problem exists with the 1920s 
figures in that no records of amounts of ore raised have been found. For four years the ore was 
concentrated and smelted into lead bullion. No figures of the ratio of raised ore to bullion have been 
found and it is impossible to determine the amount of lead and silver per ton of ore. It is known what the 
outputs in terms of silver (ounces) and lead (tons) were. The copper averaged 1% and this value has been 
used to calculate a potential minimum tonnage. 
 
General notes:  
a. Amount in parenthesis { } for 1901, see note 16 above. 
 
b. The source states that the production was of 450 tons of lead matte. This can be described as the first 
smelt of the metallic sulphides from the ore. 
 
c. The two amounts are described in the source as lead slime. This represents a product recovered from 
previous concentration operations.  
 
d. It should be noted that although there were several companies or syndicates in operation during the 
period 1908-13, none of them were involved in development or underground mining operations. They 
were only involved in surface recovery of ore and processing by-products such as lead slime or matte. 
 
 
e. While the value or grade of the ore is known from the analysis in the source, the source does not state 
the value of silver per ton of bullion. In order to determine a minimum potential production of silver, 
the assay value of silver per ton of ore at 74 ozs per ton (0.219 kg per ton) has been used. 
 
f. In the 1894 Chairman’s report to the 5th AGM of shareholders page 6 it states that concentrates assay 
at 72% lead and 74 ozs of per ton silver.  
 













Appendix 4  
General Manager’s (Otto Hahn) report to the third Annual General 




To The Directors of the Transvaal Silver Mines, Ltd., Johannesburg. 
 
          Dwarsfontein,  April 8th,  1892 
GENTLEMEN, --- 
 Pursuant to your instruction of April 1st, your General Manager has the honour to submit to you the following Report on 
the operation carried on during the last fiscal year at that part of your property under his immediate personal supervision. 
 
              During my first visit to the Transvaal Silver Mines, one year ago, the outlook of the West Lode and the appearance of the 
ore on the dump, as also the commercial status of the lead and silver market, fully warranted the erection of the Reduction Works as 
recommended by Mr. H. Jennings, and it was decided to order immediately two blast furnaces of a capacity of 40 tons of ore per 
diem each, with the necessary auxiliary machinery. In view of the large percentage of fines produced by the shattering action of the 
dynamite used in the mine, and the probable prospective increase of zincblende (black jack) in the ore, I deemed it necessary to 
embody the erection of two reverberatory roasting furnaces in the reduction plant. 
 
 The lack of accommodation at the mine and the difficulty of communicating with Johannesburg compelled me to return 
to the latter place to work out my plans in all their details. The orders for supplying the plant were divided between the 
representatives of two prominent engineering firms, who rendered me valuable assistance. For the sake of ensuring speed in 
executing the orders, it was decided to get the castings for one blast furnace, the roasting furnaces and a number of auxiliary 
apparatus made in England, while boilers, machinery, and the second blast furnace were ordered from America, where most 
essential articles used in the installation of smelting works are usually kept in stock. The last orders were sent off in June.  
 
 The most vexing problem for our smelting enterprise has been the question how to obtain suitable domestic coke at 
reasonable rates. It is not in the province of a smelter to manufacture all the materials he requires himself, otherwise he might 
become entangled so much in foreign matters as to lose sight of his principle business. Nevertheless an experimental beehive-oven 
was built by the writer upon taking up residence at the Mines, in July last, and a number of coking tests carried out on coals obtained 
from the neighbouring collieries and coal farms. The results were all of a negative nature [report edited at this point]. 
 
 The site of the Reduction Works was located by Mr Jennings and the writer on the 21st of July, at a distance of 700 yards 
to the north-east from the Main Shaft.  Grading was commenced soon after, and stone foundations laid for two tall chimney-stacks, 
one for the roasters, and one for the smelter, as soon as the Company’s quarry was cleaned out and put in shape for furnishing 
building stone. An attempt was made to get the material for the Roaster Shed out during the winter season, so as not to lose too 
much time; but it was only successful in regard to the lumber and galvanised iron, which were purchased in Johannesburg and 
delivered here in August. The arrival of the iron-work for trusses and girders was delayed till the opening of the transport season, 
and retarded the commencement of framing till the middle of October. The Roaster Shed, which occupies an area of 84 x 100 ft., 
was completed late in November, and used as a drying shed for green brick, and, later on, to protect the lumber and other material 
for the Smelter from atmospheric influences. 
 
In the meanwhile the General Manager’s Office and Residence had been finished, and the workmen’s quarters enlarged, 
so as to afford room for the accommodation of 48 white men. Additions to the Kaffir Compounds were also rendered necessary 
from time to time. A new dynamite magazine had to be built, as the old one was in too uncomfortable a vicinity for the Smelting 
Works. A new and spacious Assay Office and Laboratory was also built, but it is not in operation yet, owing to delays for which the 
writer is only partially responsible. The waste of brick burnt in the ordinary open field-kiln was so large that it was considered 
advisable to build a brick-kiln, with stationary fire-places, which gives better satisfaction in every respect. 
 
The first consignment of castings from England was received from Charleston, on the 15th of December, the lumber for 
the Smelter Buildings soon after, and the first consignment of machinery from America on the 30th of December. The last lot of 
machinery and castings arrived on the 31st of March. The Engine and Boiler House is finished in the rough, and the framework of 
the Crusher Shed and Blast-Furnace Shed up. The boilers are set up and walled in, the engine, heater, and line shaft are in place, so 
is the crusher. Cornish Rolls and Blowers are ready to be put in place. I expect to be able to begin operations by the end of May. 
 
The Plant will consist of the following parts:- 
A.  Roasting Department. -- Two reverberating roasting furnaces, with step-grates and fuse box, 75ft. x 17ft., outside dimensions, 
which will terminate in a flue 5ft. wide by 6ft. high by 70ft. long; this flue connects with a condensing chamber, 20ft. by 25ft. by 
12ft., and  through this with a chimney 60ft. high by 3ft. 4in. diameter, resting in a base 12ft. high. Flue and base are built, and the 
foundations for the furnaces laid. The object of these furnaces is to desulphurise the zincy ores, and convert fine ores which would 
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B.  Crushing Department. – This consists of a Blake Crusher, 15in. x 9in. opening of jaw, one set of geared Cornish Rolls, 26in. 
diameter by 12in. face, and one sample grinder. The crusher breaks large lumps of ore to a convenient size for the blast furnaces, 
and for the Cornish Rolls. It also breaks limestone, iron ore, and slag, to size required in blast furnace. The Cornish Rolls grind ore 
to the proper size for roasting furnaces, and for the sample grinder. They also serve to grind fire-clay, matte, and other material 
which is desired in pulverulent form. The sample grinder prepares the ore or other samples which have primarily passed through the 
crusher and rolls for the bucking table at the Assay Office. Size of building, 24 x 40 ft. 
 
C.  Machinery Department  -- Two tubular boiler, of Fraser and Chalmers’ manufacture, 4ft. 6in diameter by 16ft. long, with 
heaters, mud-drums and funnel 70ft high, furnish the steam to a No. 4 Knowles feed pump, A Blake service or fire pump, and a 
14in. x 42in. Fraser and Chalmers’ Corliss engine, which furnaces the motive power to two Baker Blowers, No 5½, one Reedy’s 
double platform elevator, of 200 lbs. Capacity, and the crushing machinery. To assure safety in handling the machinery, loose 
pulleys and belt tighteners have been attached wherever necessary. The feed-water for the boilers is passed through a 24in. tubular 
heater before entering them, and may be taken either from a water tank at the back of the Smelter Building, to which the water is 
piped from the storage-tank at the Mine, or from a reservoir or dam in front of the engine-house, 50ft. x 89ft. x 7ft. 10in., which 
receives its supply by a ditch from the overflow at mine tank. All waste water from the Smelter will be collected again in this dam.   
 
             The building containing boilers and machinery occupies a space of 37ft. 3in. x 96ft. 9in. 
 
D.  Blast-Furnace Department --  A separate building, 12 feet apart from the preceding one, will contain two water-jacketed blast 
furnaces of the most approved pattern, such as I have used at the various works of the Consolidated Kansas Smelting and Refining 
Company, in America. One of these furnaces has been made by the Sandycroft Foundry, and is a model of good workmanship. The 
furnaces are of the open-top or cut-off kind, with no superstructure above the charge floor. The fumes will be drawn off below the 
charge floor through a wrought iron tube, 3ft. in diameter, which will connect with a brick flue, 8ft. wide and 8ft. high, and 50ft. 
long, terminating in a dust chamber 25ft. x 32ft. x 12ft., and through this with a chimney stack 100 ft high. The object of dust 
chambers and high chimneys is not generally understood by lays. I will therefore state that in America, in the early stages of 
smelting, hundreds of thousands of dollars have been puffed into the air for want of condensation chambers, and many a smelting 
camp has been converted into a perfect hell because the smelter fumes were not conducted high enough to become thoroughly 
diluted with atmospheric air, every gust of wind would blow them down and stifle the air. The smelting area of our furnaces at level 
of tuyeres, will be 3ft. 6in. x 8ft. 4in., and at top 5ft. x 8ft. 4 in. The height from the smelting floor to charge floor will be 22ft. 4in. 
They will be provided with 10 4in. openings for the tuyere pipes, which receive their blast through a 12in. supply pipe, from a 42in. 
main. The latter is 79ft. long, from end blower to release valve. The lead will be drawn off from the bottom of the furnace through 
an automatic tap, into a kettle, resting on a stove, from where it is ladled into moulds. After cooling, the bullion bars will be 
removed on trucks constructed for the purpose, sampled, weighed, stamped with shipping number, and stacked ready for shipping. 
The slag and matte will be drawn off through the slag-spout at furnace front, into cast iron pots, holding 380lbs. After cooling the 
contents of the pot, consisting of a solid cone, are emptied, the matte at the bottom of the cone is knocked off and saved for further 
treatment, while the slag is thrown away. 
        The flue dust, consisting of the finest particles of ore, flux and coke, and having about the same value as the original 
charge is collected in the flue and dust chamber. It is from time to time withdrawn through the working-doors, tempered with clay in 
a pug mill, moulded into bricks, and returned to the smelting charge when dry.  
 
The ore and fluxes constituting the smelting charge and the coke used for its reduction are weighed up into trucks in a 
separate shed, where there are two platform scales, one for the ore and one for the fuel. The charge trucks are then run on the lift, 
hoisted to this charge floor, and emptied into the furnaces, which must be kept filled up to the top while running. 
 
 The size of the smelter building is 45ft. x 52ft. All freight arriving at the mines is weighed on a Fairbank’s weigh-bridge 
of 10 tons capacity, with a 24ft. x 9ft. 6in. platform, which has proved a money saving institution. 
 
 The ore will be trammed from the mine to the smelter, and accurate samples will be taken during the loading of the 
trucks to control the smelting operations. The ore extracted from the west lode, lying to the east of the main shaft, has been assorted 
over and classified by me, the screenings giving the highest assay results. There is quite a large percentage of zinc in this ore, owing 
to the close picking of the shipping-ore. To the west side of the main shaft, where the present ore dump is located, about one-third of 
the smalls from the mine has been assorted and classified; the rough ore will be assorted during its removal to the smelter.  
 
 The ore struck in the east lode proved so refractory that it could not have been made available for smelting without 
machine dressing, and I therefore recommended to you the suspension of operations on the mine until some more opportune time, 
when dressing works will have to be called into requisition. 
 
 There is now a six months’ supply of limestone, and sufficient English coke on hand to last until we can get the domestic 
coke contracted for. 
 
 Up to the present time the following buildings have been erected since your last report was issued, for all of which there 
was an urgent necessity: -- 
    One general office, 48ft. 3in. x 52ft. 4in., built of wood and galvanised iron, with lining of burnt brick. It contains two offices,  
four bedrooms, one dining room, kitchen and servants’ rooms, and is lighted in the evening with electric lights. 
       One assay office and laboratory, 44ft. 4in. x 32ft. 4in., built of sandstone, and having brick partition walls. Contains one balance 
room, one laboratory room with sand-bath oven, one assay room with water-bath oven, and two muffle furnaces, and one fire room 
with one crucible furnace. The ovens, furnaces and chimneys are all built of brick. 
       One dynamite magazine, 19ft. x 16ft., of  sandstone. 
  One granary or mealie meal store, 41ft. x 22 ft., of sandstone. 
    One warehouse for supplies, 41ft. x 22ft. of sandstone; not quite finished inside. 
       One scale house attached to weigh-bridge, 17ft. x 13ft., of wood and iron, with lining of sun dried brick. Contains office of 
weigh clerk and bedroom for same. 
       One Kaffir hospital, with physician’s dispensary, 33ft. x 19ft. 9in., of wood and iron, with lining of sun dried brick. Contains 
ward for six beds and two small rooms. 
       One cottage for chief fitter and family, 25ft. x 23 ft., of wood and iron with lining of sun dried brick. Contains one sitting room, 




       One brick kiln, 21ft. 10in. x 16ft. 3in. and 14ft. high, of stone and brick. Has a capacity of 22,000 bricks, which are baked in 50 
hours. 
      One brick shed, 18ft. x 100ft., of wood and galvanized iron. 
      One cattle kraal, 102 ft. 6 in. x 54 ft. 4 in., of stone, for cattle and sheep. 
      One tool shed at reduction works, 11ft. x 8 ft. x 7 ft., of wood and iron. 
      One oil-house at mine, 12 ft. x 10 ft. x 7 ft., of wood and iron. 
       One blacksmith shop at reduction works, 26ft. x 20 ft., of wood and iron, with one stone forge and brick chimney.  
      Three Kaffir compounds, each 29ft. x 23 ft. x 5 ft., of wood and iron. 
      One raster shed, 84ft. x 100ft., of wood and iron. 
  One engine and boiler shed, 96 ft. x 37 ft., of wood and iron. 
      One engine house at east lode, 59 ft. x 20ft. of wood and iron 
      One Kaffir compound at east lode 29ft. x 23 ft. x 5 ft. of wood and iron. 
      One blacksmith shop at east lode, 19 ft. x 14 ft. 9 ft., of wood and iron, with stone forge and brick chimney. 
       The addition to the white men’s quarters was also constructed since. The boarding house is of wood and iron, and occupies an 
area  of 175 ft. x 26 ft. It contains a dining hall, two rooms for boarding house attached, and 24 rooms for 2 workmen each. The 
rooms are all lined with brick, whitewashed, and provided with wooden ceiling and floor. The kitchen, which  is separated from the 
dining-room by an open air space, is also of wood and iron, and is 22 ft. x 12 ft. x 10 ft. high. 
  
Besides the buildings above enumerated, there are the following old ones: -- 
  One cottage, 25 ft. x 23 t of wood and iron, brick lined, occupied by the mine manager and one clerk. 
        One engine house, 100 ft. x 30 ft. x 15 ft., of wood and iron, contains boilers, engines, fitter’s room, and carpenter shop, and a 
grist mill in an annex. 
 One blacksmith shop, 30 ft. x 30 ft. x 15 ft., of wood and iron; contains two forges of stone with iron funnels. 
 One shed, 46ft. x 16 x 9 ft., of wood and iron; used for the storage of lime, cement, and other rough goods. 
 One meat house, 12 ft. x 8 ft. x 10 ft. of wood and iron , brick lined. 
       One house, 30ft. x 26ft. x 10ft., of wood and iron, partially brick-lined. Contained old assay office, shop, and mealie store, and 
will be turned into additional living quarters.  
       One building, 31 ft. x 28ft. x 10 ft. of wood and iron; contains one room occupied by groom, one stable and one store room. The 
latter will be turned into additional stabling room as soon as new warehouse is ready for  occupancy. 
  One stable, 19 ft. x 16 ft. x 9 ft., of wood and iron, formerly occupied by boarding house keeper’s horses, now by Company’s 
coach horses. 
   One Kaffir house, 45 ft. x 12 ft. x 9 ft., and one 25 ft. x 15 ft. x 11 ft., both of wood and iron. 
   One warehouse near reduction works, 19 ft. x 15 ft. x 8 ft., of stone and brick. This use to be the dynamite magazine, but is now 
used for storing articles belonging to reduction works to prevent their misappropriation. 
   One cottage at east lode, 19 ft. x 17 ft. x 10 ft., of wood and iron, formerly occupied by employees at the mine, now vacant. 
   The Company has about 65 acres of ground under cultivation, mostly with mealies. The growing of vegetables is only a 
moderate success, the vermin getting the lion’s share. 
 
 The working force under the mine manager consists of 17 white men, comprising miners, engine-drivers, tool-
sharpeners, carpenter and smith, and 200 or more natives. 
 At the reduction works there are employed :-- 
 1 construction engineer, 
 3 fitters, 
 8 carpenters, 
 1 blacksmith, 
 4 masons, 
 3 bricklayers, 
 And, in connection therewith, at ore floors, brickyard, clay-pits, and quarry :-- 
 13 additional white men. 
 __ 
                   Total 33  white men and 120 natives.  The official staff consists of four clerks. 
 
The health of the men has not been so good as the salubrious climate of this region would lead one to expect, yet only one case of 
serious illness has come under my notice, viz., one of typhoid fever. There have been two deaths among the white men from natural 
causes, one of heart disease, and one of consumption. Among the natives pneumonia seems to prevail to a large degree, and there 
have been six deaths as a consequence of it. Of accidents there are fortunately only two to record, one to a white man who was 
struck by a loose rock while timbering the shaft, and one to a native, neither of a fatal nature but both expensive to the Company. 
 
Nobody regrets the non-completion of the reduction works before the annual general meeting more than I do, but considering the 


































1890 mine plan 













& Base Metals Ltd 
– underground 
plan, circa 1924  
Source: Willemse, J, et al., 
Lead Deposits in the Union of 
South Africa & South West 
Africa with some notes on 
associated ores, Memoir no 39 
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Appendix 8 – Conversion of Imperial to metric mass and distance units 
 
 
It is not possible to give conversions for all of the distances and masses cited in the text. 
The following table of conversions are designed to give the reader a quick conversion 
guide or the means to calculate the metric unit if so desired. 
 













Mass in Imperial units is ounces (ozs) or pounds (lbs) and in metric units are grams (g).  
1 ounce = 28.35 grams and 16 ounces = 1 pound with 2240 lbs = 1 long ton or 1 metric 
ton (1000 kg). 
 
Ounces Grams 
 1           28.35 












Appendix 9  
Conversion table of one pound sterling in the year shown to a value in 2005 
 
Year Value  Year Value 
1880 48.31 1950 22.78 
1890 59.89 1955 22.78 
1900 57.06 1960 15.30 
1905 57.06 1965 12.86 
1910 57.06 1970 10.28 
1915 43.06 1975 5.57 
1920 21.21 1980 2.85 
1925 29.97 1985 2.01 
1930 33.42 1990 1.51 
1935 36.98 1995 1.28 
1940 28.72 2000 1.12 



























































The value of the pound sterling has changed dramatically since 1880. In order to 
calculate the relative value of an amount quoted in the dissertation look at the value for 
the year or nearest year and multiply the value by the figure stated above. The source 




For example £35 000 in 1890 is the equivalent of 35 000 x 59.89 = £2 096 150 in 2005.  
 
                                                 
11
  http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency/default1.asp#mid accessed on 30-11-2011. 
Value of one Pound sterling for the year 




Appendix 10   Photographic collection of selected artefacts from the 













































 Note the numbers are the 
artefact reference 







Fig. 1 Glass inkpot  
# DWA209IR/M11//G1.  
Fig. 3 13.5 mm diameter brass 
button with word IMPERIAL on 
rim. # DWA209IR/U8/c3/MO2. 
Fig. 4 Reconstructed green glass 
vessel with thick bell bottom  
# DWA209IR/Q8/a8/GF16.  
Fig. 5 Square glass bottle. It most probably had 
a cork stopper.  # DWA209IR/F10//G1. 
 Fig. 2 White-bodied industrial 
ware - part of a saucer  








































































Fig. 6 Hand-forged nails with square 
shanks # DWA209IR/F10//MO5. 
Fig. 7 Opaque glassware rim with painted 
pattern –unglazed, possibly part of tea cup. 
DWA209IR/SPO//DC2. 
Fig. 9 Tapering steel with a round ground tip and 
broken opposite end. It may represent the broken 
pick point of a poll-pick – used by miners to knock 
wooden props into place.  
# DWA209IR/F10//MO6. 
 
Fig. 10 Poll-pick in action. Note the ground 












Appendix 11 Twelve photographs of some of the foundation structures at the 





















































Fig. 1 View looking down onto the shaft cap.  Fig. 2 Part of the concentration plant foundations. 
Fig. 3 Boiler plant foundations. Fig. 4 Tube mill plant foundations. 
Fig. 5 Presumed Godfrey roaster foundations. 
Fig. 7 Secondary crusher foundations. 
 
 
Fig. 8 Ball mill plant foundations. 


































                                                                                                            
                                                                                                           Fig. 15 1890s jaw crusher foundation. 
     Fig. 15 1890s  jaw crusher foundation. 
 
Fig. 13 Dry stone retaining wall in boiler 




Fig. 14 Concentration Plant wheel pit and 
office foundations in foreground. 
Fig. 9 Collapsed upper stope near winze E2. Fig. 10 Part of the boiler plant foundations. 
  



























































Fig. 18 The removal of the green glass vessel 
number DWA209IR/Q8/a8/GF16 from the trench. 
Fig. 19 Manager’s outhouse foundation excavation. 
Fig. 20 Team members excavating U9 trench at 
the single quarters. 
Fig. 21 Completed trench in U9 – single 
quarters showing the two rows of foundations. 
stones 
 
Fig. 17 Ground level photograph showing the 
raised profile of the manager’s house area. 
Fig. 16 Manager’s house excavations in progress. 
 
Fig. 22 Line of dressed stone blocks in farm road to the north 
of the single quarters excavation trench. It is believed to 
represent the foundations of the northern end of the eastern 
wall of the building. 
 
